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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis seeks to understand why civil society organisations (CSOs) in the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) began to mobilise in the 1990s and why government 
overtures to consulting CSOs on trade matters emerged from around the same time. In 
addition, this thesis examines the ways in which different types of CSOs have mobilised 
on trade issues and the ways in which governments have included CSOs in trade 
consultations. To answer the “why” questions, this thesis posits that both material and 
ideational factors were important for motivating CSOs to conceive of themselves as 
needing to mobilise on trade matters in the context of the 1990s. The material and 
ideational factors of note here are: shifts in the direction of neo-liberal policy orientation, 
towards a focus on globalisation and towards emphasising good governance. These have 
impacted on actor interests and perceptions. Despite ideational and material factors 
impacting on CSO interest perceptions and on government approaches to trade matters, 
these factors cannot account for variations in the types of CSOs that mobilise and that 
governments consult on trade matters. This is where institutional factors become 
important. Institutions can help one to understand how different CSOs have mobilized 
and how CSOs have been included on trade matters at the region level and across three 
case studies (Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, and St. Lucia). In essence the thesis shows 
that whilst ideational and material factors help one to understand why CSOs have 
mobilised and have been included, institutional factors help one to understand how they 
have been included. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is both a regional trading area and a 
regional political body comprising fifteen countries,1 most of which are former British 
colonies. CARICOM countries have long been open to trade and have, consequently, 
been affected socially, economically and politically by changes in world markets. 
However, there is little to suggest that civil society organisations (CSOs) in the 
CARICOM region mobilised in efforts to shape trade agendas before the 1990s. There is 
also little to suggest that governments attempted to include CSOs of any sort on 
international trade matters prior to the 1990s.   
 
This thesis attempts to understand relatively recent movements towards activism 
by CSOs in CARICOM on trade issues up for negotiation between the CARICOM region 
and the wider world. This thesis also attempts to understand the emergence of 
government discourses and actions geared towards consulting CSOs on these trade 
negotiating agendas. Since activism and inclusion of CSOs on trade matters from the 
1990s stands in stark contrast to the absence of such prior to the 1990s, this thesis 
attempts to address the following sets of questions: 
 
1. Why - 
a. have CSOs in CARICOM begun to mobilise or to express interest in 
mobilising on trade issues?  
b. have governments/CARICOM officials begun to include CSOs or to 
express interests in including CSOs on trade issues? 
 
                                                 
1 CARICOM Members: Antigua and Barbuda; the Bahamas (a member of the Community but not the 
Common Market); Barbados; Belize; Dominica; Grenada; Guyana; Haiti; Jamaica; Montserrat; St. Kitts 
and Nevis; Saint Lucia;  St. Vincent and the Grenadines; Suriname; Trinidad and Tobago.  
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2. How - 
a. have CSOs of differing sorts mobilised on trade issues? 
b. have governments in the region included CSOs on trade issues? 
 
In order to begin to answer these questions this chapter attempts to do what 
Stephen R. Covey terms “beginning with the end in mind”, meaning “… to start with a 
clear understanding of your destination” (1989: 98). Therefore, section 1.1 sets out the 
reasons behind asking these questions; the arguments to be made in this thesis; and the 
theoretical approach to be taken. The chapter progresses in section 1.2 to give a brief 
introduction to CSOs since these are focal groups in the analysis to follow. Section 1.3 
presents an outline of the thesis including a discussion of case study choice and research 
methods.  
 
1.1  RATIONALE OF THESIS AND APPROACH TO QUESTIONS 
 
THE SOURCE OF THE QUESTIONS 
 
 
As already stated, CARICOM countries have historically been dependent on 
trade. The colonial history of the region is relatively well known: most of the countries in 
the region were inserted into the world trading system during colonisation. These 
countries were destinations for slaves coming from Africa during the slave trade, they 
became exporters of agricultural and other primary products to Europe and had to import 
most other products needed in the colonies. With self-governance and then independence, 
Caribbean economies continued to be very trade dependent, building on their traditional 
patterns of exporting one agricultural product and having to import most other goods. 
Some economies in the region began to move away from one-crop dependence and into 
newer areas from the 1950s. These countries (Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad 
and Tobago) became known in regional parlance as the “more developed countries” 
(MDCs) in the region by the 1960s. Conversely, the other less diversified economies in 
the region were termed the “less developed countries” (LDCs). 
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 Despite efforts at diversification from the 1950s onwards, CARICOM countries 
continued to be very dependent on trade throughout the 1970s and into the 21st century. 
For the region’s so-called MDCs total exports and imports combined and taken as a 
percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) reveal that in the 1970s trade comprised 
100% or more of GDP. In the 1980s and 1990s trade continued to account for sizeable 
proportions of MDCs’ GDP. Figure 1 illustrates this by looking at average trade 
dependence for these countries.  
 
Figure 1: Average MDCs’ Trade Dependence: 1970-2002 2
Average MDCs' Trade Dependence: 1970-2002
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Although data is not available for most of the LDCs before 1977, the data that is 
available illustrates that at least from the late 1970s these countries were very open to 
trade too. Average trade dependence for the LDCs during this period illustrates this point 
(Figure 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Source: World Bank (2005), author’s calculations 
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Figure 2: Average LDCs’ Trade Dependence: 1977-20013
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Hence, CARICOM countries were highly open to trade well before the 1990s. These 
countries also negotiated trade agreements with external parties before the 1990s. Most 
notably, these countries negotiated agreements (the Lomé Accords) with the European 
Economic Community (EEC) as part of the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group 
from the 1970s.  Why then weren’t CSOs representing important societal groups active 
on trade issues that would undoubtedly impact on them due to high levels of trade 
dependency across the region?  Also, why didn’t governments consult CSOs that 
represented important segments of country electorates on important trade matters that 
would affect the countries in the region?  
 
Perhaps unemployment levels and levels of social well-being were tolerable in the 
1970s and 1980s and then changed for the worse in the 1990s. This material change 
could, therefore, account for more visible CSO mobilisation on trade from the 1990s. 
This argument may seem to hold some merit, since unemployment rates across the region 
were high in the 1990s.  However, the available data for the MDCs and LDCs illustrate 
                                                 
3 Source: World Bank (2005), author’s calculations 
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that high unemployment levels (above 10%) did not suddenly emerge in the 1990s (see 
tables 1 and 2 below). 
 
Table 1: MDCs’ Unemployment Rates (%) 1980, 1991-20044
 Barbados Bahamas Guyana Jamaica Suriname Trinidad & Tobago 
1980 11.4 14.3 .. 27.3 .. 10.0 
1991 17.1 12.3 .. 15.7 .. 18.5 
1992 23.0 14.8 11.7 15.4 17.2 19.6 
1993 24.5 13.1 .. 16.3 14.7 19.8 
1994 21.9 13.3 .. 15.4 12.7 18.4 
1995 19.7 10.9 .. 16.2 8.4 17.2 
1996 15.8 11.5 .. 16.0 10.9 16.2 
1997 14.5 9.8 .. 16.5 10.5 15.0 
1998 12.3 7.7 .. 15.5 10.6 14.2 
1999 10.5 7.8 .. 15.7 .. 13.1 
2000 9.4 .. .. 15.5 .. 12.2 
2001 9.9 6.9 .. 15 .. 10.8 
2002 10.3 9.1 .. 15.4 .. 10.8 
2003 10.7 10.8 .. 15.9 .. 10.6 
2004 9.9 .. .. 15 .. 8.25 
 
 
Table 2: LDCS' Unemployment Rates (%) 1970, 1980, 1991-20015
 
Antigua 
& 
Barbuda 
Belize Dominica Grenada St. Lucia 
St. Vincent 
& 
Grenadines 
St. Kitts - 
Nevis 
1970 .. .. 8.1 10.1 9.2 12.9 8.2 
1980 .. .. 18.6 17.4 3.2 23.5 10.3 
1991 .. .. 9.9 13.9 18.0 19.8 3.1 
1992 7.8 .. .. .. 16.7 .. .. 
1993 6.7 9.8 .. 16.5 16.8  .. 
1994 6.7 11.1 .. 26.7 19.2 35.0 4.5 
1995 7.8 12.5 .. .. 15.9 .. 4.5 
1996 7.0 13.8 .. 17.0 16.3 .. .. 
1997 9.0 12.7 23.1 15.5 20.5 22.0 .. 
1998 9.0 14.3 .. 15.2 21.6 .. 4.5 
1999 8.6 12.8 .. 14.0 15.7 18.1 .. 
2000 8.1 11.5 .. 11.5 16.5 22.0 .. 
2001 .. 9.3 .. .. 13.5 .. .. 
 
                                                 
4 Sources: ILO (2003), Key Indicators of the Labour Market; CDB 2003 Social and Economic Indicators; 
Barbados Statistical Service (information given to author);CARICOM (2001) 
5 Sources: ILO (2003), Key Indicators of the Labour Market; CDB 2003 Social and Economic Indicators; 
Barbados Statistical Service (information given to author); CARICOM (2001) 
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This information on unemployment rates across the region is very patchy, owing in 
large part to deficiencies in data collection across the region. So it does not prove the 
assertion that high unemployment levels were not new to the 1990s. However, literature 
that discusses social and economic conditions in the region suggests that chronic 
unemployment has long plagued the region, as the time series figures available for some 
countries noted here also tend to imply (e.g. Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Grenada and St. Lucia). According to Bennett (1999): 
 
“In the immediate post-war period the existence of widespread poverty was linked 
directly to high levels of unemployment” (129) 
 
High unemployment levels have been highlighted as one of the region’s pressing 
development problems and, as a consequence, development strategies have attempted to 
deal with this problem from the 1950s. For instance, governments have attempted to 
combat high levels of unemployment and concomitant social problems via public sector 
employment and by taking part in a range of economic activities that would generate both 
wealth and employment (Marshall 1998: 64, 75; Erisman 1992: 4; Mandle 1989: 243-
247). 
 
In terms of other indicators that speak to social well being, CARICOM countries have 
consistently done well in the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human 
Development tables,6 particularly amongst developing countries. All CARICOM 
members (except for Haiti) have been classified as having either “high” or “medium” 
levels of human development. This information is shown below in Table 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Human Development (HD) is an evaluation of GDP, and other economic indicators in conjunction with 
health, education, poverty and other social indicators. Human development scores are given using an index: 
the Human Development Index (HDI) 
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Table 3: CARICOM Human Development7
HD Level (2004) Rank (2004) Country 
Human Development Index 
Score 
2002 
High    
 29 Barbados 0.888 
 39 Saint Kitts and Nevis 0.844 
 51 Bahamas 0.815 
 54 Trinidad and Tobago 0.801 
 55 Antigua and Barbuda 0.800 
Medium    
 67 Suriname 0.780 
 71 Saint Lucia 0.777 
 79 Jamaica 0.764 
 87 Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0.751 
 93 Grenada 0.745 
 95 Dominica 0.743 
 104 Guyana 0.719 
Low    
 153 Haiti 0.463 
 
Despite favourable levels of human development, the persistently high levels of 
exposure to external trade and persistent high unemployment levels (at least from the 
1970s) have meant that trade matters have impacted socially and economically on affairs 
in CARICOM countries well before the 1990s. Certainly, trade began to be universally 
liberalised from the 1990s with the creation of the WTO to which all CARICOM 
countries (except the Bahamas) signed up. However, the information provided so far 
indicates that this liberalisation did not impact markedly on the already high levels of 
trade openness or unemployment (where data is available) when compared to pre-1990s 
levels. Hence, the impact of these (material) factors alone cannot help one to understand 
CSO activism on trade issues from the 1990s or the lack of activism surrounding trade 
issues up for negotiation by CSOs in the 1970s and 1980s. It follows then that one has to 
look at other factors. Therefore, this thesis suggests that it is important, to look at factors 
beyond material ones for understanding CSO motivations for activism in the 1990s and 
for understanding government motivations for seeking to include CSOs on trade matters.  
                                                 
7 Source: UNDP (2004). Human Development Report 2004. 
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 Yet, what other factors and what are material factors anyway? 
 
ARGUMENTS AND APPROACH TO QUESTION  
 
 
The Oxford Paperback Dictionary, Thesaurus and Wordpower Guide (2001) defines 
material as “having to do with physical objects rather than the mind or spirit” and 
materialism as “the belief that material possessions and physical comfort are more 
important than spiritual values”. These meanings come close to what is meant by material 
here.  
 
The term “material factors” in this thesis refers to factors that, though they may not be 
physical, are usually seen as concrete or observable facts. Such factors may be economic, 
social or political events or occurrences that are seen to have impacts on people’s lives or 
behaviours. So, an economic recession and its effects on people’s lives (e.g. loss of 
wealth) can be seen as a material factor. Similarly, the term “materialism”, in social 
sciences does not refer strictly to valuing physical things. For instance, Marxist thought is 
seen as materialist in that it conceives of actor behaviour as driven by economic and 
social facts (e.g. the mode of production). To reiterate, materialism and material-based 
approaches tend to place primacy on social, economic and political occurrences that are 
seen as “hard” causal facts (Doyle 1997: 322). 
 
The other important aspect of the definition of “material” is its opposite: “the mind or 
spirit”. This study does not deal with facets of the spirit but of the mind, specifically 
ideas, beliefs and perceptions. Referring to the Oxford Paperback Dictionary, Thesaurus 
and Wordpower Guide (2001) once more, an idea is defined as “a thought or suggestion 
about a possible course of action ... a belief”. This text then defines a belief as a “feeling 
that something exists or is true…a firmly held opinion”.  Ideas and beliefs describe what 
people think to be possible or to be true whether or not grounded in fact. In addition a 
perception is defined as “a way of understanding or regarding something”. So, 
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perceptions are ideas or beliefs about something and so are theories (“an idea or set of 
ideas that is intended to explain something”- Oxford Paperback Dictionary, 2001).  
 
Without going any further into semantics, it becomes clear that ideas, beliefs, 
perceptions and theories differ from “material facts”. Therefore, these non-material 
things are termed “ideational factors” here and are seen as impacting on actor behaviour 
in addition to material factors. This thesis emphasises ideational factors as important 
because they help people to make sense of the material world and because they also help 
people to create material facts. For instance, the idea or belief that a country is best 
governed as decided in elections in which each citizen holds equal voting rights can be 
seen as vital in informing the creation of democratic regimes. Subsequently, democratic 
governmental forms impact on people’s lives in various ways, making theories and the 
belief in theories important in creating political facts (in this case democratic regimes).  
 
In International Relations there is literature that has discussed the importance of 
considering ideational factors for understanding actor behaviour in international politics. 
For instance, Goldstein and Keohane see ideas as “beliefs held by individuals” that can 
help to explain government policy outcomes (1993: 3), Checkel links political changes to 
ideas (“broad concepts and basic beliefs”) and sees carriers of ideas as important (e.g. 
epistemic communities and NGOs) (Checkel 1997: 4-5, 7). More radically, Wendt 
accounts for actor behaviour in stating: “We want what we want because of how we think 
about it” (1999: 119). In attempting to understand CSO activism and government 
openness to consulting CSOs from the 1990s in the CARICOM region, this research 
follows these scholars by looking at ideational factors as well as material factors as 
important influences on behaviours. Rather than focussing on trade openness, 
unemployment rates or human development (material factors) in the context of material 
changes in the international arena (e.g. trade liberalisation under the WTO) this thesis 
looks at the links between material factors, changes in the international arena and 
ideational considerations. 
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Further, this thesis views international political and economic occurrences as 
partly ideationally based rather than being solely material. For instance, beliefs about 
how political and economic affairs should be conducted to enhance prosperity that 
become popular and that are espoused in policy proposals can be made into reality 
through practices. In this way neo-liberal ideas or theories about economic growth and 
trade underpinned the creation of the WTO and the liberalising world trading atmosphere. 
In arguing along this line this thesis follows a mode of thinking similar to that expressed 
by Peter A. Hall. 
 
Hall asserts that policies can change as a result of a shift in policy paradigms. He 
applies Thomas Khun’s concept of paradigms acting as important factors that frame 
scientific research. Khun viewed shifts in paradigms as altering the status quo in science 
(“normal science”). Similarly, Hall sees radical breaks in policy atmospheres, what he 
calls third order change (i.e. the goals of policy change), as caused by shifts in policy 
paradigms. Hall uses this model to account for the shift from Keynesian to monetarist 
policy in the 1970s. This break in policy resulted from a break in policy ideas (i.e. a 
paradigm shift) (Hall 1993). This thesis draws on this insight by taking the view that 
ideas shape international policy atmospheres. Therefore, international changes and 
occurrences are portrayed as, by necessity, both ideational and material in nature. Hence, 
throughout this thesis occurrences and changes that form the backdrop of CSO and 
government action on trade matters are termed ideational-material changes or 
occurrences. 
 
Based on these premises this thesis asserts that in order to understand why CSOs 
and governments have acted in different ways with respect to trade matters over time one 
must consider: 
 
i. The ideational-material context of the time (internationally 
important theories and material occurrences) which impacts on 
interest perceptions and on actor behaviour.  
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This matter of ideational-material factors and their ability to influence actor 
behaviour will be discussed in Chapter 2. For now though let us look at why and how this 
thesis addresses questions about the character of CSO mobilisation and government 
inclusion of CSOs. 
 
In answering the “how” questions, the importance of institutional factors is 
highlighted. Important institutional factors specific to individual CSOs or that structure 
CSO-government interaction can help or hinder activism, and can shape patterns and 
processes of consultation. Ideational and material factors are important in understanding 
why CSOs want (or do not want) to be included in trade consultations and why they 
would (or would not) want to create institutions or institutional space for activism. 
Institutional factors help one to understand how CSOs are included and how they attempt 
or to be included in consultations on trade affairs. 
 
Institutions have been defined in a number of ways in IR and broader Political 
Science. The following definitions of institutions are instructive:   
 
• “…rules of conduct in organizations, routines and repertoires of procedure” 
(March and Olsen 1989: 21, paraphrased in Koelble 1995: 233)  
 
• “…rules and norms that structure the environment of actors and shape how 
collective outcomes are reached” (Milner 1998: 762).  
 
The first definition focuses on rules and procedures and the second adds norms 
(conventions of behaviour). The latter definition illustrates that institutions can be 
conceived as more than structures; they can also be viewed as grounded in conventions of 
behaviour and conduct. As the latter definition suggests, institutions can shape outcomes 
so that the ways in which both governmental and socio-economic institutions are 
organised individually and in relation to other institutions can influence the formation of 
policy (Garrett and Lange 1995; Milner 1998). It would appear then that it is not enough 
to look at why CSOs mobilize on trade issues or why governments have begun to consult 
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CSOs to understand emerging consultation and activism on trade agendas in the 
CARICOM region. If one wants to look at CSO activism and government consultation of 
CSOs on trade matters from the 1990s, one should look at the institutional context in 
which CSOs began to mobilise and at the institutional features internal to CSOs. This 
institutional focus is important since institutional factors can allow for the inclusion or 
exclusion of some or all groups (Garrett and Lange, 1995) and can impact on “the degree 
of power or pressure an actor can bring to bear on policy” (Hall 1986: 19, quoted in 
Koelble 1995: 236).  
 
Looking at the institutional strengths and weaknesses, rules and norms of differing 
CSOs can, therefore, help one to understand how these actors have mounted activism on 
trade. Looking at the same for governments and regional institutions can similarly help us 
to understand how CSOs have been consulted and included on trade matters. However, 
institutional considerations can also help one to understand why CSOs have or have not 
mobilized and why governments have or have not consulted CSOs on trade matters at 
different periods in time. This chapter previously asserted that ideational and material 
factors are important in helping one to understand these things, but, even in the context of 
certain ideational-material contexts institutions can have bearing on group action or 
inaction. In taking this stance this thesis takes an approach in line with that of some 
historical institutionalists such as Sven Steinmo, Kathleen Thelen and Frank Longserth 
(1992) or Peter Hall (1986) who view outcomes as “… the product of interaction among 
various groups, interests, ideas and institutional structures” (Koelble 1995: 232). The 
view here also holds commonalities with sociological approaches that see institutions as 
important in shaping actor behaviour (both how they act and reasons for acting) and looks 
at the broader socio-economic and cultural contexts in which institutions become 
important (Koelble 1995: 238). The stance of this thesis, therefore, differs from rational 
choice institutionalism that sees actors as coming to institutions and acting within them 
with clear intentions or interests (Koelble 1995: 232; 239-241). Instead, the view here is 
that, although actors may enter into an institutional context with intentions, institutional 
contexts can impact on these intentions or interests, as can ideas and the ideational-
material context of the time.  
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 These points bring us to the fact that this thesis argues a second point with respect to 
understanding CSO activism and government consultation of CSOs on trade matters: 
 
ii. The institutional ability of CSOs to mobilise and the institutional 
context in which CSOs must operate, are important to consider in 
understanding CSO mobilisation and government/regional 
consultation of CSOs. 
 
 Arguments one (i) and two (ii) combined illustrate an approach that sees material 
factors, ideational factors and institutional factors as important in understanding why 
actors behave in certain ways and for understanding how they behave. Ideas held by 
CSOs and governments in the ideational-material context of the time are important in 
understanding why they have changed their approaches to international trade agendas. 
Institutional make-up, capacity and procedures of CSOs and government bodies are 
important in understanding how CSOs mobilise and how CSOs are able to interact with 
government/regional officials. Institutional factors can also have bearing on why actors 
decide to behave in one way or another. 
 
 Now that the rationale behind the topic of this thesis and the approaches to be 
followed have been unearthed, let us look at an important aspect of this thesis that needs 
to be properly introduced. Specifically, let us look at what is meant by the term “civil 
society organization” (CSO) and the linked term “civil society” (CS). 
 
1.2  INTRODUCING CS AND CSOS 
 
 
We can use Plato’s and then Aristotle’s “Politike Koinonia” with the Latin translation 
“societas civilis” as the early predecessors of the term “civil society”. This term was used 
to speak of a political society comprising plural forms of association (koinonia) of 
civilised individuals and groups acting with a single set of goals derived from common 
 23
norms and values (ethos) (Cohen and Arato 1992: 84-85; Colás 2002: 27; Ehrenberg 
1999: xi). In this view there is no separation of society and Polis. Important facets of this 
view persist, namely the prerequisite of civility; the centrality of forms of association 
and; the view that CS has a role to play in governance. However, this early notion is 
quite different from the meanings of CS that exist today. The evolution of the concept of 
CS is highlighted in some detail in Appendix A. For now though, let us look at its 
contemporary use and at how the terms “CS” and “CSO” will be viewed here. 
 
CS AND CSOS IN THIS THESIS 
 
In contemporary thought CS is commonly taken to refer to a realm of public 
interaction or association that is separate from the state, the economy and (in some 
conceptions) “political society”.8 Contemporary discussions are cognisant of overlaps 
between the spheres designated as state, society, the market/economy and political 
society but see CS as a public space that is mostly autonomous from the other three 
spheres – see Figure 3 following - (Edwards 2004: 24-25; Cox 1999: 10; Martinussen 
1999: 292; Howell and Pearce 2001: chap. 4; Clark 2003: 93).  
Figure 3: Spheres of Social Practice9
 
                                                 
State 
8 Political society includes political parties, parliaments, and political organisations (Edwards 2004: 25). 
9 Adapted from Martinussen 1999: 292 
Civil 
Society 
Political 
Society 
Market / 
Economy 
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Although there is not universal agreement on how to define CS or on how to delineate 
which associations should be viewed as CSOs (these differences in views will be 
discussed in Chapter 2), this thesis aligns with a view that sees CSOs as any voluntary 
association that is largely separate from the state, the economy and political society. In 
taking this approach this thesis includes organisations that represent business, industry 
and workers interests in addition to those that represent social or “grassroots” concerns. 
Some approaches exclude the former sort of associations seeing them as forming part of 
the economy. However, in this thesis these representative associations are viewed as 
lying somewhere in the space between the economy and civil society. This rather broad 
definition is in line with Scottish Enlightenment and Marxist approaches to CS (See 
Appendix A). 
 
Despite the conception of CS and CSOs employed here being broad, the conception 
of CSOs used here is qualified with the requirement that associations termed CSOs do not 
aim to become involved in criminal activities. CSOs should be civil. Therefore, organised 
criminal groups such as gangs and mafias are not CSOs. In defining CSOs in this way, 
this thesis follows John Keane and Michael Edwards who exclude groups that act as 
intentionally destructive forces from the world of CS (Keane 2003: 10, 12-13; Edwards 
2004: 45). In so doing this thesis adheres to the requirement of “civility” implied in the 
term civil society10  and as portrayed in the following quotations: 
 
• “Civility, from Aristotle to Stephen Carter, assumes that we will disagree, 
often profoundly, but calls on us to resolve our disagreements peacefully.” 
(Edwards 2004: 67)  
 
• “Civility is defined as not just ‘good manners’ or ‘polite society’ but as a state 
of affairs where violence has been minimized as a way of organizing social 
relations.” (Kaldor 2003:7) 
 
                                                 
10 The requirement of civility is left out in some approaches such as those that discuss “non-state actors” 
rather than CS. i.e. their approach differs from that taken here by including criminally oriented groups 
(Josselin and Wallace 2001: 4) 
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Political parties are also not seen as CSOs since, even though they may attempt to 
speak to desires of some within CS and even though they include grass roots members, 
their aim of taking control of the state excludes them from being seen as part of CS. 
Political parties, thereby, lie within the sphere of political society with some arms of 
parties (e.g. youth wings or women’s arms) lying somewhere in the space between 
political society, CS and the state. Other examples of groups that lie in-between 
categories are non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that have been initiated by 
governments (the overlap between CS and state)11 or business/industry representative 
associations (the overlap between economy, state and CS)12. 
 
CSO SUB-CATEGORIES IN THIS THESIS 
 
A wide array of organisations exists within CS and for this reason the CSO world will 
not be treated as a monolith. CSOs are broken into two categories here for the purpose of 
delineating general differences between different types of CSO. These sub-categories are 
“economic interest groups” (EIGs) and groups that are not EIGs (non-EIGs). This 
categorisation is analytical in purpose. It separates CSOs in terms of those that tend to be 
viewed as driven by material considerations (EIGs) and those that tend to be seen as 
driven by philosophical or ideational concerns (non-EIGs). Non-EIGs are groups that 
can be seen as “cause groups” or which some such as Keck and Sikkink view as 
motivated by principled beliefs or values. EIGs are groups such as occupational or 
industry/sector specific associations which tend to be viewed as motivated by self-
interests and material concerns (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2, 30; Sell and Parkash 2004: 
150). This classification can be expressed as follows in Figure 4: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Sometimes called Government Organised NGOs (GONGOs) or Quasi NGOs (QUANGOs) 
12 Sometimes called Business Interest NGOs (BINGOs) 
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Figure 4: Association Type and Classifications 
Association Types Classification 
 
Business/ industry/farmers’  
and agricultural  
associations  
 
          Labour/ trade unions  
 
Economic Interest Groups (EIGs)  
Groups seen as motivated by material 
concerns or having instrumental goals 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998: 2, 30) 
 
Development/ gender/ welfare/ 
community based associations,  
social movements, etc. 
 
Non- Economic Interest Groups (non-EIGs) 
 
 
Groups seen as motivated by shared 
values or principled beliefs and having 
goals so linked (Keck and Sikkink 
1998: 2, 30) 
 
 
 
 
 
     
      CSOs 
 
 
 
 
However, classing CSOs as EIGs and non-EIGs is simply an analytical tool for 
studying groups that tend to be seen as acting out of different motivations. As the later 
empirical chapters will show, assumptions about some CSOs falling into one category 
and others into another do not always hold well in reality. So-called non-EIGs are 
motivated by material concerns (e.g. the well-being of the poor, disenfranchised or 
women) and EIGs may place important emphasis on principles and values (e.g. right or 
wrong). Additionally, both EIGs and non-EIGs may mobilise or attempt to mobilise in 
similar ways.  
 
EIG and non-EIG activism or mobilisation may come in the form of advocacy 
(calling for a certain course of policy), research in support of advocated policy and 
outreach/educational work (Sell and Prakash 2004). Forms of activism that are 
supported by research and attempt to incorporate or support wider segments of society 
add what Jan Aart Scholte (2004) terms “competence” to CSOs (65-67). This thesis 
shows that such competence is important in the eyes of governments or officials, who 
seem inclined to consult with CSOs that are able to contribute “meaningful” policy inputs 
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rather than those simply protesting or demonstrating for or against some set of policies or 
structures (see case study chapters). This thesis will highlight that governments can draw 
on CSO research and inputs strategically to compensate for their own internal knowledge 
and institutional capacity gaps. In addition to well-informed and objective oriented 
activism adding legitimacy to CSOs in official eyes, CSOs themselves can gain from the 
acquisition of competence. As Scholte puts it:  
 
Superficial civil society activism…frequently neglects to move from 
purely negative protest to include positive proposal as well. To be sure, 
opposition and destruction of harmful arrangements is an honourable and 
valuable endeavour. However, proposition and reconstruction is also 
required (2004: 66).  
 
Both EIGs and non-EIGs pursue these forms of mobilisation alone or by means of 
domestic coalitions or extra-territorial networking and cooperation. Moreover, both EIGs 
and non-EIGs must find the institutional wherewithal to pursue meaningful activism.  
Thus, despite these CSOs being seen as different in “type”, they pursue similar strategies 
for activism, face similar obstacles to effective mobilisation and inclusion, and may also 
act in pursuit of similarly motivated goals. Despite the similarities between EIGs and 
non-EIGs, let us start with this classification that focuses specifically on the perceived 
differences between different sorts of CSOs. 
 
1.3  OUTLINE, METHODS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
It should be clear by now that this thesis draws on theories and conceptualizations 
about material, ideational and institutional factors. Theories about the importance of these 
factors form the basis for the approach to comprehending why CSO activism and 
inclusion on trade issues has changed in the CARICOM region. These factors also help 
one to understand how changes actually look on the ground. Particularly, looking at how 
CSO mobilisation and activism has changed and has been realised in practice necessitates 
looking at institutions created by CSOs to advance their perceived interests and by 
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governments/regional mechanisms that can help or inhibit CSO inclusion. This thesis also 
values a historical perspective in focusing on the temporal location of ideational-
material occurrences and changes in which CSO and government actions are situated. 
 
Added to theory and history, this thesis uses the empirical findings of three case 
studies and of CARICOM as a whole to advance its argument and in attempts to answer 
the previously outlined “why” and “how” questions. The chapter outline that follows 
helps to explain how this will be done in this research. The outline is followed by a 
section on “case studies” that clarifies the choice of country cases within CARICOM.  
 
CHAPTER OUTLINE 
 
The theoretical underpinnings of this thesis are introduced and explored in depth in 
Chapter 2. This chapter discusses contemporary conceptions of the terms civil society 
(CS) and civil society organisations (CSOs) and connects these to conceptions of interest 
groups. This is done because CSOs are broken into two types of interest groups 
throughout this work and also because interest group literature holds much in common 
with that on CSOs. In Chapter 2 the discussions on CSOs and interest groups are also 
important because they provide rationales for group formation or activism either based on 
materialist grounds or ideational ones. This ideas-interests or ideational-material division 
is then explored with reference to International Political Economy (IPE) and International 
Relations (IR) discussions of state behaviour. Literature that addresses the need to look at 
institutional factors in understanding how these can help or hinder inclusion is also 
discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
Chapter 3 proceeds to present a historical look at CS and CSOs in the CARICOM 
region. This important background chapter discusses the evolution of different sorts of 
CSOs in the region and looks at their involvement in political matters. In so doing, this 
chapter presents a historical sketch of CSOs in the region and of the region’s political and 
socio-economic landscape. This third chapter also looks at the mobilisation and inclusion 
of CSOs on the creation of regional arrangements, including those on trade. Looking at 
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CSO involvement in relation to regional trade matters, here forms a launch pad for 
discussing the activism and consultation of CSOs on trade affairs of extra-regional 
significance. Chapter 3, therefore, allows for a contextually based assessment of CSO 
activism and government consultation of CSOs. 
 
Chapter 4 looks at the lack of CSO activism and involvement surrounding trade 
negotiations in which CARICOM members were involved between the 1970s and the 
1980s.  CSO inaction and non-consultation are framed in relation to the ideational-
material context of the time and ideas and interests held by CSOs and governments in this 
context. Chapter 4 then looks into the shift in the international ideational-material context 
and linked shifts in the regional ideational-material context between the 1980s and 1990s. 
These changes are then connected to the beginning of visible CSO activism on external 
trade issues and government expressions of interest in consulting CSOs from the mid to 
late 1990s.  So, Chapter 4 looks firstly at CSO mobilisation and inclusion in a time period 
in which non-reciprocal trade arrangements were the norm and in which interventionist 
states could appease most sections of society. Secondly, Chapter 4 compares non-
activism prior to the 1990s with activism in a time when the international trade climate 
took a turn for the neo-liberal, in which globalisation is said to have emerged and in 
which emphasis shifted towards good governance. The differences in ideational-material 
contexts are important to consider in comprehending CSO interest perceptions on 
economic policy areas (such as trade) and governments’/regional instiutions’ willingness 
to consult with CSOs.  
 
These three grounding chapters (Chapters 2-4) form Part A of this thesis and serve to 
situate CSO activism and inclusion in the region by looking at the “why” questions that 
focus on ideational, material and, to a lesser extent, institutional considerations.  Part B 
attempts to examine the “why” questions by looking at ideational and material factors via 
CARICOM case studies drawn from the Eastern Caribbean. This part of the thesis also 
pays more attention to institutional considerations in efforts to understand why activism 
and inclusion became visible from the 1990s and to understand how CSO activism and 
government overtures to inclusion have been translated into practice. Thereby, Chapters 
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5, 6, 7 and 8 look at the why questions using case studies. These chapters also introduce 
the how questions more fully by unearthing the links between institutional considerations 
and the character of CSO involvement in trade matters in three countries and at the 
regional level.  
 
The conclusion follows these chapters, pulling together the findings of the cases, 
linking these to the situating chapters, clarifying the findings and, finally, emphasising 
the significance of the arguments of the thesis.  
 
THE CASE STUDIES 
 
The three country studies at hand (Barbados, St. Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago) are 
all located in the Eastern Caribbean. Nonetheless, it is important to note that “Eastern 
Caribbean” here refers to countries geographically located in the East/South East of the 
Caribbean and that are members of CARICOM, rather than referring to the Organisation 
of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)13.  The Eastern Caribbean was chosen as the focal 
sub-region because it comprises both “More Developed Countries” and “Less Developed 
Countries” (using the CARICOM classification) and because it comprises countries with 
different economic make-ups. Looking at the Eastern Caribbean, therefore, allows one to 
take a snap-shot of the picture in the broader CARICOM region. Choosing countries 
within the Eastern Caribbean was also important for logistical reasons since it facilitated 
travel between these countries of geographic proximity.  
 
The three case studies discussed here illustrate some of the diversity within the 
CARICOM region since they are structured differently economically and socially. 
Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago tend to be referred to as “more developed countries” 
(MDCs) whilst St. Lucia represents a “less developed country” (LDCs) and an island 
                                                 
13 The OECS comprises Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, the British Virgin Islands, Dominica, Grenada, 
Montserrat, St. Kitts Nevis, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The British Virgin Islands and 
Anguilla however are not CARICOM members. 
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state within the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) group.14 The term 
“MDC” in the CARICOM context usually refers to the Bahamas, Barbados, Guyana, 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, with Suriname being a more recent edition (only 
joined CARICOM in 1995). If one were to generalise about the MDCs, one could say 
that they diversified away from dependence on agricultural exports from the 1950s, 
focussing instead on tourism, export manufacturing (even if mostly for the regional 
market), and more recently on financial services. In reality though, these countries are 
quite different. In terms of truly being “more developed” than other countries in the 
region this does not hold true, especially in the case of Guyana, whether judged in socio-
economic or strictly economic terms, but also in the case of Jamaica when one considers 
the overall socio-economic picture.  
 
Of the so called MDCs, Barbados is the smallest geographically but has the highest 
level of human development in CARICOM and the highest level of human development 
of all developing countries in the world according to the UNDP (UNDP 2004). As typical 
of the MDCs, Barbados is a country for which agricultural production has waned in 
significance as a foreign exchange earner since the 1970s. Although sugar retains some 
importance, the service sector has become focal due in large part to a well established 
tourism industry (also the case in Jamaica and the Bahamas) and also to the provision of 
financial services. Trinidad and Tobago, on the other hand, has the most significant 
manufacturing sector in the region. In Trinidad and Tobago (and also in particular 
Guyana), tourism is less vital than it is in the rest of the region.15 What is more, in 
Trinidad and Tobago (also in Guyana and Jamaica to lesser extents), extractive sectors 
are key, and Trinidad and Tobago gains much foreign exchange from the lucrative oil and 
petrochemical industry. Looking at two rather different MDCs can allow for an 
understanding of some of the similarities and differences between MDCs in the region 
when it comes to considering regional patterns of CSO activism and inclusion. 
 
                                                 
14 “Development” in the terms MDC and LDC has a lot to do with development based on economic rather 
than social criteria, for when one looks at social factors some of the MDCs would appear be less developed 
than or equally developed as some of the LDCs.  
15 Tourism is also relatively unimportant in Haiti, the newest and most unstable and impoverished 
CARICOM state. 
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St. Lucia on the other hand is one of the “LDCs” in the region. The economy in St. 
Lucia has remained heavily dependent on the export of bananas to Europe but since the 
mid-1990s, like most of the other banana dependent LDCs, has been attempting to 
reposition its economy in the face of declining trade preferences. This process of moving 
from traditional export products is quite new to St. Lucia and the majority of the 
Windward Island16 LDCs in the OECS. Nonetheless, St. Lucia and the other Windward 
Islands have increasingly made inroads in tourism and other services as a means of 
coping. As such CS and CSOs within the LDCs could potentially have different concerns 
and may mobilise differently from those in the MDCs. Moreover, differences between the 
two MDCs to be discussed could also contribute to different rationales for activism and 
patterns of activism.  In light of the differences between these three cases, we should be 
able to see whether the temporally located ideational-material factors outlined in Part A 
of this thesis can plausibly account for CSO mobilisation across countries. Also, these 
case studies can assist in teasing out whether and how institutional considerations played 
into motivations of CSO activism and inclusion. 
 
Looking at these three case studies allows one to consider differing countries within a 
common grouping and to examine a geographical area (the Eastern Caribbean) within the 
CARICOM grouping. As already stated, reference to the Eastern Caribbean in literature 
on the region tends to focus on the OECS countries, but looking at non-OECS countries 
in addition to OECS countries located geographically within the Eastern Caribbean 
allows for a picture that is likely to be more informative from a wider CARICOM 
perspective. However, this focus on three differing Eastern Caribbean countries, does not 
allow for a conclusive examination into why CSO mobilisation/inclusion on trade 
negotiating agendas in the CARICOM region became more evident in the 1990s.  
 
 
Looking at an MDC case study like Guyana in which trade openness skyrocketed 
from the 1990s (note the difference between 1991 and 1992 in Figure 2) could help one 
                                                 
16 Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines comprise the Windward Islands. All 
are OECS members. The Leeward Islands are also all OECS members and comprise Antigua and Barbuda, 
Anguilla, Montserrat, St. Kitts and Nevis and the British Virgin Islands. 
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to examine whether this material factor was more important in understanding CSO 
activism and inclusion than using cases such as Barbados or Trinidad and Tobago. 
However, the case of Guyana is inconsistent with the MDCs, in part because of the 
significance of the underground economy in this country which governments began to 
bring above ground from the 1990s. Additionally, Guyana is atypical of MDCs and of 
most countries in the region because of its status as a Highly Indebted Poor Country 
(HIPC). In essence, Guyana may be seen as more akin to an LDC when considering both 
social and economic factors.  
 
The economies of Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago are to some extent similar, with 
both having significant manufacturing sectors. However, they are different since 
Jamaica’s tourism sector is more important than that of Trinidad and Tobago, because of 
the relative importance of agricultural exports to Jamaica (e.g. coffee and bananas) and 
also because of the significance of revenue from oil production in Trinidad and Tobago. 
The economies of the Bahamas and Barbados are similar because of their tourism and 
other service orientation. Looking at Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados thereby allows 
one to look at the two rough “types” of MDCs in the region.  
 
The St. Lucian case also may not fully represent the scope of the LDCs or the 
OECS. Certainly St. Lucia bears much in common with the LDCs in the Windward 
Islands that have relied on banana production or other forms of agriculture (e.g. spices in 
Grenada) and can therefore be seen as representative of these countries. However, some 
of these so-called LDCs, specifically those in the Leeward Islands, are quite different 
from St. Lucia and would fit better in the MDC characterisation. For instance, the 
Leeward Island of St. Kitts and Nevis has experienced some of the lowest unemployment 
levels in the region and is also in the high HD category according to the UNDP’s Human 
Development report. Antigua and Barbuda is another Leeward Island in the LDC group 
that falls into the high HD category (UNDP 2004). Like St. Kitts and Nevis, Antigua and 
Barbuda is a service-oriented economy. In these respects these two countries are more 
similar to Barbados and the Bahamas than the other LDCs (although having substantially 
smaller populations than Barbados and the Bahamas). As for Haiti, this non-OECS LDC 
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can be seen as an “outlier” within CARICOM because the scale of its social, economic 
and political problems are dramatically dissimilar from those of the other CARICOM 
countries. The following table (Table 4) helps to illustrate some of the similarities and 
differences between the countries in the region by looking at MDC/LDC status, 
CARICOM/OECS status, HD rank, other development classifications and the orientation 
of the economies. 
Table 4: CARICOM Country Classifications17
 
Country CARICOM LDC/MDC 
CARICOM / 
OECS Status 
HD 
Rank 
Other Dev. 
Classification 
Economy 
Orientation 
Barbados MDC CARICOM High WB Upper Middle Income Industry/Services 
Bahamas MDC CARICOM High WB Upper Middle Income Services 
Trinidad & 
Tobago MDC CARICOM High 
WB Upper Middle 
Income Industry/Services 
Suriname MDC CARICOM Medium WB Lower Middle Income 
Industry/Services
/Agriculture 
Jamaica MDC CARICOM Medium WB Lower Middle Income Industry/Services 
Guyana MDC CARICOM Medium HIPC/ WB Lower Middle Income 
Industry/Services
/Agriculture 
Belize LDC CARICOM Medium WB Upper Middle Income 
Industry/Services
/Agriculture 
St. Kitts & 
Nevis LDC 
CARICOM / 
OECS High 
WB Upper Middle 
Income Industry/Services 
Antigua & 
Barbuda LDC 
CARICOM / 
OECS High 
WB Upper Middle 
Income Industry/Services 
Grenada LDC CARICOM / OECS Medium
WB Upper Middle 
Income 
Industry/Services
/Agriculture 
Dominica LDC CARICOM / OECS Medium
WB Upper Middle 
Income Industry/Services 
St. Lucia LDC CARICOM / OECS Medium
WB Upper Middle 
Income 
Industry/Services
/Agriculture 
St. Vincent & 
Grenadines LDC 
CARICOM / 
OECS Medium
WB Upper Middle 
Income 
Industry/Services
/Agriculture 
Montserrat18 LDC CARICOM / OECS N/A N/A N/A 
Haiti LDC CARICOM Low UN LDC/ WB Low Income N/A 
 
                                                 
17 In the “Other Dev. Classification” column: WB = World Bank; UN LDC = United Nations Least 
Developed Country. 
18 Montserrat has been largely evacuated following a volcanic eruption. 
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Looking into CSO activism and government inclusion of CSOs in every country 
in the region would be the best way to thoroughly understand CSO activism and inclusion 
on trade issues. Each of the countries is too unique to attempt to make generalisations for 
the region based on a few, no matter how one combines them. However, looking at all 
fifteen CARICOM members was not possible for the purpose of this research. This 
thesis, therefore, attempts to look at countries that could be seen as exemplifying country 
types rather than simply making choices across the MDC-LDC line or by means of 
looking at economic indicators. This can allow us to at least make a rough sketch of the 
regional picture. Clearly, further research is needed to get a more thorough picture of the 
situation across CARICOM, but, hopefully the observations brought out via this research 
will be insightful for the region and also for looking at CSOs and trade issues in small 
developing countries.  
 
The regional level case study supplements the investigation into CSO activism 
within CARICOM countries by looking at the interaction on trade matters between CSOs 
and regional officials. This is important in looking at CARICOM countries since they 
attempt to prepare joint negotiating agendas.  The regional case study examines the ways 
in which domestically situated CSOs have mobilised at the regional level (either alone or 
working though regional umbrella CSOs) and at the ways in which officials at the 
regional level have consulted CSOs. Like the other country studies, this case study looks 
at the why and the how questions.  
 
METHODS 
 
The analysis of CSO activism and inclusion in the case studies is based on 
qualitative field research, analysing text and theorising. In depth-interviews and analysing 
discourses in the press and produced by CSOs and governments/regional officials 
informs many of the claims about why CSOs mobilise and why governments or regional 
officials consult CSOs. These methods also inform the evaluation of how CSOs mobilise 
and are incorporated by government/regional officials with respect to shaping trade-
negotiating agendas.  
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 Interviewing (and in some cases corresponding with) representatives from 
different CSOs was useful for interpreting rationales for and patterns of CSO 
mobilisation. Interviews were also useful as a triangulation tool (in verifying statements 
made by other interviewees).  As such, representatives of CSOs in St. Lucia, Barbados 
and Trinidad and Tobago and of regional umbrella CSOs fitting into both the EIG and 
non-EIG categories were interviewed. In order to ensure that this analysis was not 
focussed solely on CSO views, national and regional officials were also interviewed (and 
corresponded with). Information and insights gathered from representatives of these 
groups should help in understanding CSO activism and inclusion on external trade 
matters in the region. 
 
Textual sources were also important sources of information for this research 
because they helped to map ideational-material trends; ideas about these trends; and 
group interest perceptions over time. In addition, texts were important for verifying some 
of the statements or views of interviewees. Interviews and texts were crucial here, as they 
helped to shed light on the little documented area of CSO involvement in processes of 
arriving at trade negotiating stances in the CARICOM region. 
 
To be brief, this thesis uses an interpretative methodology, which draws on 
theories and qualitative methods to craft plausible arguments that can account for 
movements towards CSO activism and government inclusion of CSOs on trade matters in 
the CARICOM region. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 
In a nutshell, this thesis looks at ideational-material trends, interest perceptions 
and institutional factors and makes use of interpretation in attempts to offer a credible 
way for understanding CSO activism and inclusion on trade issues in the CARICOM 
region from the mid- to late 1990s.  
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 The intention is to provide insights into CSO activism and inclusion on trade 
issues in CARICOM and to contribute to knowledge on the under-studied interplay 
between CSOs and government/regional mechanisms in the CARICOM region. Despite 
being CARICOM specific though, the findings of this work may be relevant to other 
regions or countries.  
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PART A 
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CHAPTER 2 
CSOS, INTERESTS, IDEAS AND ACTIVISM 
 
 
This chapter presents important literature about CSOs; interest groups; ideas- 
based views about actor behaviour; and materialist conceptions of actor behaviour. This 
chapter presents the approach used to understand why CSO mobilisation in the 
CARICOM region became visible from the (mid/late) 1990s and why CARICOM 
government initiatives and discourses aimed at including CSOs in trade consultations 
emerged from the (mid/late) 1990s.  Looking at literature that discusses ideas based and 
interest-based views about actor behaviour is crucial in this task since this thesis asserts 
that to understand changes in behaviour one must consider: 
 
i. The ideational-material context of the time (internationally 
important theories and material occurrences) which impacts on 
interest perceptions and on actor behaviour.  
 
Hence, CSO mobilisation and government openness to consulting with CSOs 
need to be considered in light of ideational and material influences important in the 
international context of the time. This thesis argues that understanding CSO mobilisation 
and inclusion on trade matters also calls for taking into consideration institutional 
influences since: 
 
ii. The institutional ability of CSOs to mobilise; and the institutional 
context in which CSOs must operate, are important to consider in 
understanding CSO mobilisation and government/regional 
consultation of CSOs. 
 
To do these things, the chapter begins in section 2.1 by discussing literature about 
CS and CSOs, and goes on to link this to literature on interest groups. Section 2.1 then 
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proceeds to look at implicit and explicit reasons behind group activism expressed in both 
genres of literature. This examination throws up an emphasis, on the one hand, on ideas 
as motivating group action and, on the other hand, an emphasis on material interests as 
motivating group action. These two types of factors (interests based and ideas based) are 
discussed in section 2.2 to expose a rationalist-materialist thread of thought about group 
action which can be contrasted with views that see actor behaviour as based on ideas. To 
look at these diverging views more clearly and also to introduce a focus on understanding 
state and governmental policy behaviour, section 2.3 looks at IR literature that discusses 
ideas, interests and institutions (or some combination).  This literature is important both 
for looking at CSO activism in the CARICOM area and for looking at CARICOM / 
government behaviour with respect to consulting CSOs.  
 
In looking at the ideational-material context in which CSO activism and 
CARICOM/government consultation on trade became visible, Chapter 1 highlighted that 
this thesis views the following trends as colouring actor behaviour form the mid/late 
1990s: neo-liberalisation, globalisation and an emphasis on good governance. These 
particular facets of the ideational-material context emerged from the 1980s and by the 
mid/late 1990s came to inform CSO activism and official overtures to CSO consultation. 
The ideational-material context important in the 1990s is introduced at the end of section 
2.3 of this chapter. However, this latter component of the argument “i” will be further 
expanded on in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
2.1  CS, CSOS AND INTEREST GROUPS 
 
In the previous chapter we defined CS, CSOs and the sub-categories of CSOs (EIGs 
and non-EIGs) that will be employed in this thesis. However, it is necessary to explore 
the various discourses about CS/CSOs and those on interest groups to understand the 
assumptions about ideas and interests as motivators for action implicit in both sets of 
literature. 
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CONTEMPORARY CSO SCHOOLS OF THOUGHT 
 
The CS/CSO discourse can be framed in terms of its long history and in terms of 
schools of thought. This section highlights the latter (schools of thought) whilst the 
former (the evolution of the term in historical context) is highlighted in Appendix A of 
this thesis. 
 
• THE MAINSTREAM: CONSERVATIVES AND LIBERAL PLURALISTS  
 
Conservatives see CS as an associational sphere separate from the state. CSOs are 
diverse forms of organisation such as micro-enterprises, credit associations, private 
corporations, bankers’ associations, universities, professional associations, cooperatives, 
trade unions, popular movements, etc. that are autonomous from and morally superior to 
the state. CSOs are seen to foster democracy, entrepreneurship and play social roles in 
this view (Macdonald 1994: 270-271; Edwards 2004: 26). Freedom of choice, self 
interest, private property, patriarchy and distrust of state bureaucracy are inherent in this 
conception and the freedom of CS is seen as akin to that of markets. This conception sees 
the involvement of the (welfare) state in non-political spheres of society as wrong and 
values CSOs as primarily apolitical forms of association (Macdonald 1994: 271; Cohen 
and Arato 1992: 43).  
 
Liberal pluralists19 are somewhat similar in approach and along the conservative-
pluralist continuum the view that CSOs are intrinsically valuable is an important one. 
CSOs are seen as necessary for helping to inculcate a civic spirit and a democratic ethos 
(Clark 2003: 95).  Putnam (1993) calls these values that CSOs generate “social capital”. 
Although valuing the democratic potential of CS, pluralists (like conservatives) accept 
inequalities within CS. Their conceptions remain hierarchical because they privilege 
property rights and competition (in addition to individual freedoms) as the underpinnings 
of democracy, equality and freedom (Macdonald 1994: 271; Cohen and Arato 1992: 75).  
 
                                                 
19 Robert Dahl is a noteworthy example of a pluralist political approach 
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Conservatives value an apolitical CS realm for restoring an ideal and fictive past 
in which moral values were respected and people could govern themselves (they are 
backward looking). Pluralists though differ in asserting the importance of citizens’ ability 
to express views to each other and to the state to reform societies (they are 
progressive/reformist) (Edwards 2004: 19). For pluralists CSOs can be spheres for 
political participation outside of formal electoral politics.  CSOs are seen as groups in 
which specific interests can be aggregated and the existence of a plurality of CSOs allows 
varying interests to compete to assert their political concerns (Macdonald 1994: 271-272; 
Cohen and Arato 1992: 18; Kaldor 2003: 9). In this vein, for instance, John Clark asserts 
that in a strong CS, a variety of CSOs vie against each other for attention and support as 
occurs in a market, but a market driven by interests, ideas and ideologies rather than 
goods and services (2003: 94). Thus, political decision-making is partly the result of CS 
and CSOs participating in politics through competition to influence policy choices 
(Lukes1974: 11-15; Reinalda 2001: 18). This strain of thought holds strong parallels to 
pluralist discussions of interest groups (to be discussed later in this chapter).  
 
Strands of past CS theorising are present in both pluralist and conservative modes 
of thought. The stress on the importance of individual freedoms in these schools draws on 
a host of Enlightenment thought. The links between CS, market considerations and 
competition runs parallels to CS views of the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers. 
Additionally, pluralist thought on CS and CSOs owes much to Tocqueville’s views (see 
Appendix A). 
 
• ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES: CRITICAL THEORISTS, POST-
MARXISTS/ ACTIVISTS 
 
Critical theorists discuss CS/CSOs structurally by focussing on inequalities 
inherent in CS and in the state. These conceptions focus on achieving more radical 
versions of equality, freedom and democratisation than pluralists. Gramsci is an 
important influence here. His assertion that the state and CS are integrally connected, 
since state power is maintained via formal organisations of political society (state and/or 
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political parties) and via the many bourgeois associations of CS such as the church and 
the media (Macdonald 1994: 272; Colás 2002: 42; Cox 1999: 4-5) is rather poignant. 
This trend of thought has been applied by those such as Robert Cox who uses Gramscian 
principles to explain the international economic system in which social relations play an 
important role both for the maintenance of hegemony and for undermining it via the 
creation of new counter-hegemonic historic blocs led by a class of enlightened or 
“organic” individuals and backed by the requisite financial resources (Cox 1983; Cox 
1999). Thus, Cox and others (e.g. as Alejandro Colás) bring to the surface not only the 
status quo functions of CS and CSOs made explicit by Gramsci, but also the 
revolutionary potential of CS (on an international scale) that is only implicit in Gramsci’s 
work.20
 
Post-Marxists21 share the reformist agenda of pluralists in addition to critical 
theorists’ concerns about exploitation. CS for post-Marxists can facilitate radical 
democratisation. This club’s outlook emphasises a broad democratising project based on 
“active citizenship” and opening spaces for more direct citizenship and CSO involvement 
in political decision-making and governance. Post-Marxists may also see their more 
radical version of democratisation as needed in international institutions and even within 
CSOs, in addition to state institutions and domestic governance. Post-Marxists (or 
Activists in Kaldor’s classification) see the importance of daily struggles, activism or 
discourse in combating oppression unlike in Marxism where some grand revolution is 
necessary. Unlike neo-conservatives or liberal pluralists, business organisations are at 
times downplayed in this view (Macdonald 1994: 273; Kaldor 2003: 8; Howell and 
Pearce 2001: 54-55).  
 
It is useful to note parallels between the ideas expressed in these strains of thinking 
on CS and CSOs and those expressed in discussions on interest groups. These parallels 
will now be addressed. 
                                                 
20 Stephen Gill and David Law are two other writers that follow this mode of thought in international 
relations. 
21 Jean Cohen, Andrew Arato, Jürgen Habermas and John Keane can be loosely placed in this school of 
thought 
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 INTEREST GROUPS 
 
In the 1950s there emerged a branch of political science (group theory) that looked at 
the role of interest groups in domestic politics (Ainsworth 2002: 5; Almond 1958: 271). 
David Truman was an important writer in opening up the focus on interest groups which 
he conceived as groups making claims on society on the basis of “shared attitudes” 
(interests being defined as shared attitudes). In his view, when groups make claims on 
others via attempting to shape government policy they are seen as political interest 
groups (1951: 33; Rothman 1960: 17; Macridis 1961: 27; Ainsworth 2002: 12). In more 
contemporary works within political science interest groups continue to be seen as groups 
making claims on the state or as “organizations separate from government…which 
attempt to influence policy” that can provide “the institutionalized linkage between the 
state and major sectors of society” (Wilson 1990: 1).  
 
Therefore, conceptions of interest groups hold parallels to pluralist and particularly 
the Tocquevillean conceptions of CSOs. Indeed, much of this work was pluralist in 
assuming (in Tocquevillean manner) that individual interaction in a plurality of groups 
could build a democratic ethos. Additionally, inter-group competition in decision-making 
processes allowed the involvement of people in decision-making (outlined in Conn 1973: 
238-239 and Rothman 1960: 21-23)  
 
• COMPARATIVE WORK ON INTEREST GROUPS 
 
The focus on interest groups in political science emerged in attempts to look 
beneath formal political institutions and the party system in order to understand political 
systems (Almond 158: 271; Ainsworth 2002: 5). Work on interest groups has tended to 
be very focussed on American politics because of the pluralist bent in the literature and 
the specification of the USA as the embodiment of the ideal of pluralist society (see 
Truman 1951; also outlined in Rothman 1960: 21-23).  
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Other comparative studies on interest groups have looked at Europe and at the 
potential of some dominant interest groups to divert pluralism via corporatism and neo-
corporatism. Unlike in the American pluralist model, important interest groups (usually 
labour unions and business associations) are seen as acting in partnership with 
governments and as holding “insider status” in European systems (outlined in Wilson 
1990: 22-23). In some senses though, interest group activity described in corporatist/neo-
corporatist literature can be viewed as pluralist but not of the disaggregated and 
competitive type. Thus, the terms “corporate pluralism” and “competitive pluralism” 
have been used in addition to terms such as “liberal corporatism”, “democratic 
corporatism” and “pluralistic corporatism” (Thomas 1993: 9-10).  
 
Added to focussing on interest group systems as being either pluralist or 
corporatist, some commentators on the topic came to acknowledge the importance of 
examining formal governmental structures instead of just looking at groups. These works, 
thereby, took an institutionalist perspective in emphasising the differences between 
countries with different governmental structures such as, the importance of multiple 
access points for interest groups to influence policy in the USA in contrast to unitary 
systems with few choices of venues for interest groups to attempt to influence policies as 
in Britain (see comparative studies in Richardson 1993). 
 
This thesis draws on some of the assumptions and conclusions of works on 
interest groups by looking at interest group attempts to impact on governmental 
processes and at the formal institutional factors that can help or hinder this. This thesis 
also draws on interest group literature by using the language of interest groups in 
classifying CSOs as EIGs and non-EIGs.  
 
• DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CSO AND INTEREST GROUP DISCOURSES 
 
Despite drawing on group theory, there are important differences between writing 
on interest groups (or pressure groups) and CSOs. For instance, interest group literature 
tends to focus on politically active groups (Truman’s political interest groups) and as 
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such may exclude associations that mobilise at grassroots or community levels or that 
aim primarily to fulfil individual or community needs (e.g. YWCA and YMCA, 
community groups). Although this thesis does not examine these groups much either, the 
use of the language of CS acknowledges that such groups form integral parts of the 
associational world. In this respect the discourse of CSO differs from that of interest 
groups.  
 
Another difference is that interest group literature tends to focus on membership 
organisations or organisations representing narrow constituencies. Truman’s work 
opened space for a wide range of groups to be considered as interest groups by seeing 
these as based on shared attitudes (1951: 33; Rothman 1960: 17; Macridis 1961: 27) 
rather than a strict material (in this case economic based) conception of interests. 
However, group theory has tended to be focussed on groups acting out of material 
interests (e.g. labour unions, business associations and agricultural groups) (Macridis 
1961: 34; Willetts 2002). Willetts, for instance, notes that the term “interest group” is a 
biased classification because it focuses on economically powerful groups, assumes these 
groups act to guard their economic interests and implies that only these groups can 
impact on politics (Willetts 2002). This tendency to focus on an economic conception of 
interests and on EIGs likely owes much to attempts at formal theorising on interest 
groups based on economistic assumptions as perhaps most notably outlined by Mancur 
Olson (1971)22. 
 
 
 
2.2  MOTIVATIONS FOR CSOS FORMATION AND 
MOBILISATION 
 
The account of CS, CSOs and interest groups presented so far tells us about the 
literature and how it will be drawn on in this thesis. However, this discussion has not 
                                                 
22 To be discussed later in this chapter. 
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given much information about the motivations for CSO formation or mobilisation. We 
do not know why people form CSOs or when CSOs will mobilise. All the same, there are 
some implicit and explicit clues that speak to this in the work on CS and interest groups. 
 
IDEAS OR INTERESTS ATTITUDES AS MOTIVATIONS FOR CSO 
FORMATION AND ACTIVISM 
 
• IDEAS AS MOTIVATIONS 
 
Discussions of CSOs emphasise the need for “space” to allow people to associate, 
form CSOs and to mobilise. The enlightenment image of CS as embodying a space in 
which people are free and equal and in which people may associate freely highlights this. 
Similar thinking is evident in pluralist and activist thought on CS. Some pluralist 
conceptions suggest that healthy CS and the formation of CSOs are facilitated in liberal 
democracies that provide rights and freedoms for individuals. CSOs are as a result, 
provided with an enabling environment (Clark 2003: 94-95; Cohen and Arato 1992: 8-9).  
 
CS and CSOs can also emerge where space needed for them to function has not 
been sanctioned. CSO activism in the 1980s and 1990s democratisation movements in 
Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa are examples which illustrates that people 
create what Lipschutz calls “unauthorized political space” (2001: 334) in which CSOs 
can mobilise. CSOs need space to function (preferably authorised space facilitated in 
democracies) and are important for democratic purposes (Howell and Pearce 2002: 40). 
This however, does not explain why/how CSOs are formed or mobilise to serve these 
purposes.  
 
In some views of CSO activism, people act collectively for a commonly shared 
belief or goal and these voluntary actions bring important benefits to society. Hegel’s, 
Tönnies’s and Parsons’ views of CS as an important realm for situating individuals 
within society through voluntary association, speak to such social benefits (see Cohen 
and Arato 1992: chaps. 2&3; and Howell and Pearce 2001: 24-25). Liberal stands of 
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thought, such as those focussing on social capital and others heavily informed by 
Tocqueville see CSOs as building important “capital” for social stability and democracy 
(e.g. Coleman 1988; Putnam 1993). Truman’s pluralist view of interest groups is similar 
in its claims that “shared attitudes” are important for interest groups. Furthermore, a 
democratic ethos can be built through people’s cross cutting involvement in different 
groups and because diverse interest groups (existing and potential) can mobilise to have 
their interests acknowledged (1951: 23-24; Rothman 1960: 16-18). In critical theory and 
post-Marxist/activist visions, CSOs acting around common beliefs or goals are also seen 
as potentially bettering society because they have emancipatory potential (Cohen and 
Arato 1992: 19; Kaldor 2003: 8, 11). These views imply that CSOs form around and act 
to further shared beliefs, ethics, or goals.  
 
• INTERESTS AS MOTIVATIONS 
 
An alternate view in some thinking on CSOs is that these act and are formed to 
represent individual interests. Acting to represent individual (political, social or 
economic) self-interests that are shared with others may eventually contribute to creating 
the good life just as in liberal-economic views where individuals participating in 
commercial activities for their own benefit can lead to enhancing the wealth of a society 
(see Thomas 1993: 7). This sort of view is particularly evident in some strands of 
pluralism and other work that uses the language of “interest groups” and starts from a 
rational individualist ontology.23  
 
In these conceptions groups are seen as competing to represent conflicting 
interests in politics just as commercial entities compete in markets. Material interests 
drive CSOs and these interests motivate collective action. Collective action is not seen as 
being shaped by moral, normative or other ideational inclinations (such as Truman’s 
shared attitudes). Howell and Pearce summarise this view important in liberal- pluralist 
visions of CS (they state “neo-liberal) by stating: 
 
                                                 
23 Olson’s work on collective action is important in this traditions and will be discussed to follow 
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In the neo-liberal vision of free market economies and liberal 
democracies, civil society was a plurality of interest groups, symbolizing 
the freedoms of association and expression as well as the social energies 
of autonomous, rational individuals. Both market and civil society were 
arenas of self-regulation. (2001: 65) 
 
From one perspective then CS and CSOs are assumed to be intrinsically 
beneficent and seen to emerge from people sharing ideas/attitudes. CSOs promote 
democratic and civic norms, integrate people in societies and are based on commonly 
shared ideas/beliefs.  From an alternative viewpoint CSOs are seen as the collective 
embodiment of individuals pursuing self-interests. In this latter view CSOs may or may 
not democratise and CSOs may or may not bring other social benefits to society.  This 
latter view shares facets in common with some political economy interpretations of group 
activism in general and more specifically with IPE views on CSO activism on economic 
issues (to be discussed later in this chapter).  
 
A third view is that CS and CSOs are formed to maintain the status quo. 
Specifically, CSOs function to maintain the dominance of the ruling elite or to hinder 
resistance to the dominant mode of production. These views expressed in Marxist and 
Gramscian thought conceive of CSOs as little more than pawns used for domination.24 
However, innovations on Gramscian thought in critical theory and post-Marxist views of 
CS see the potential of some CSOs resisting the status quo (e.g. Cox 1983; Cox 1999). As 
a result, some CSOs form in resistance to domination and can be emancipatory. 
 
Some liberal-pluralists and activists see CSOs as existing based on commonly 
held beliefs. Hence, these views see CSO formation and activism as based on ideational 
concerns. In contrast, Marxist/Gramscian views of CSOs as representing class interests 
and pluralist/other conceptions using a rational-individual approach to interests can be 
seen as materialist. These are materialist because they see interests, whether individual or 
class, as determined by social, economic or political facts. Material interests drive CSOs 
                                                 
24 This thought is also expressed in Marxist views of interest groups that focus on the class consciousness 
of interest groups representing the bourgeoisie that are supported by the state (outlined in Thomas 1993: 8-
9) 
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and CSO activism in materialist stands of thought whilst in other views, ideational and 
normative factors are conceived as pivotal factors. This ideas-interests division across 
views on CS and CSOs is therefore important and will be brought out more fully later in 
this chapter. Let us focus now, however, on explicitly rationalist - materialist account of 
CSO action. 
 
• OLSON’S RATIONALIST ACCOUNT OF MOTIVATIONS FOR CSO 
FORMATION AND MOBILIZATION 
 
  Mancur Olson contradicts the assumptions in early pluralist group theory that groups 
will automatically be formed or act based on the possession shared interests or attitudes. 
He argues that if this were true, every interest group would have an organisation and 
every individual would be a member of one. Since, however, there are obstacles to 
collective action that hinder group formation and activism all interests do not form 
groups and all interests do not mobilise (Olson 1982: 17-18).  
 
Individuals and firms in Olson’s conception make rational cost-benefit 
calculations based on economic self-interests when deciding on forming a group or 
acting on an issue. This is because people are unlikely to waste their resources to gain a 
good that will benefit both group members and non-members (Olson 1982: Chaps. 2-3; 
1983: 14). If compulsion is not used to create interest groups and to mobilise their 
activities then “selective incentives” (provision of goods/services or penalties) must be 
put in place to overcome the obstacles to acting collectively (Olson 1971: 51, 60-65; 
1982: 21-24). 
 
Olson’s theory applies specifically to what he terms “distributional coalitions”, 
because these groups organise in their economic interests to obtain a portion of some 
“public good” in the economic realm. For example, for workers it is higher wages and for 
firms it may be greater market share or more favourable prices. These groups, once they 
have overcome the hindrances to acting collectively will act in the interests of the group 
and these are akin to self-interest when discussed with reference to individuals (Olson 
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1982: Chap. 2). Even though creating benefits for society may be beneficial to the group 
at hand, group interests stem from concerns that members of the group have joined to 
represent and do not stem from a need to bring benefits to society. Instrumental goals 
based on (material) interests are important, societal impact aside. In fact Olson’s work 
claims that where interest groups have long been able to thrive (e.g. as in older 
democracies) they may harm public welfare and retard growth rates through the pursuit 
of group special interests (Olson 1982: 77-78; 1983: 18-24). 
 
• CONTRADICTIONS TO OLSON’S ACCOUNT OF MOTIVATIONS FOR 
CSO FORMATION AND MOBILIZATION 
 
Olson’s explanation of when groups act differed from pluralist explanations that 
went before it since these assumed that groups form and act around shared interests, 
without starting from rationalist assumptions about the utility maximising individual. 
Olson’s conclusions also differ from some contemporary pluralist conceptions about the 
benefits of CSOs/interest groups. Notably, Olson’s conclusions stand in stark contrast to 
those drawn by Putnam in his work on CSOs and social capital. Specifically, Putnam 
concludes that a plurality of voluntary associations can, not only build democratic ethics 
and social capital, but can enhance economic growth (Putnam 1993) while Olson finds 
the opposite. Others have explicitly contradicted the focus on rational economic based 
cost-benefit calculation in helping to explain collective action, for if this applied many 
groups would not be formed and many collective actions would not be taken.  For 
instance, Terry Moe’s (1980) efforts to relax Olson’s assumption that groups aim to 
secure public goods and his assumption that rational, perfectly informed, economically 
self-interested individuals are the basis of group action.   
 
Moe sees a rational actor as: “…an individual, who in choosing from a perceived set 
of alternatives, arrives at a transitive preference ordering of all alternatives and chooses 
the best one.” (1980: 14).  Making preference choices depends on value systems and 
people have complex values that should be taken into account. The emphasis on 
economic considerations in Olson’s theory is a mere simplification. Thus, “Rational 
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individuals may be grossly ignorant of the objective context, and they may be motivated 
by the most altruistic of values.” (1980: 14-italics added-)  For Moe, the choices people 
make also depend on the information available to them. Different information can lead 
people to make different rational choices. People must, therefore, base their perceptions 
of alternatives and their valuations of costs and benefits on individual “definitions of the 
situation” (1980: 16-17). In this view many different realities are possible and actions are 
based on “bounded rationality” in which different people define situations differently, 
thereby making ideational considerations potentially as important as material/economic 
ones (1980: 18).  
 
INTERESTS AS MOTIVATIONS FOR EIGS AND IDEAS AS MOTIVATIONS 
FOR NON-EIGS? 
 
 
…studies of small groups and larger voluntary associations have 
consistently shown that values other than economic self-interest are 
often important determinants of individual behaviour. Thus, while it 
seems eminently reasonable that economic self-interest plays a major 
explanatory role in economic interest groups, there are good reasons for 
investigating the behavioral implications of other values as well. (Moe 
1980: 113-italics added-).  
 
 
The above quotation reiterates the point that interests are not the only factors 
important for motivating EIG mobilisation. The following subsection looks at discussions 
relating to whether material interests motivate EIGs more than ideational factors and 
whether ideational factors are more focal for non-EIGs.  
 
• MATERIAL INTERESTS FOR EIGS AND IDEAS FOR NON-EIGS? 
 
Friendship, social interaction, (solidary incentives) and other intangible benefits, 
such as satisfaction, that people gain from support for a cause/belief (purposive 
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incentives)25 can be important for understanding the formation and functioning of groups 
(Moe 1980: 117-118). Moe stresses that even in EIGs economic gain need not be the 
prime motivator for action: workers may mobilise in a union because they value 
solidarity, justice, equality or class based ideologies; business people may act collectively 
because they hold social ideologies based on free enterprise and individualism or; farmers 
because they value the rural landscape and lifestyle (Moe 1980: 116). Moe further 
highlights that ideas/values can be important “purposive” motivations for activism not 
because of the instrumentality of one’s participation in realising goals but because 
participation is itself a benefit (1980: 119). In other words, the interests of a group (either 
a non-EIG or and EIG) and the motivations for group activism can be defined by looking 
factors other than material factors (e.g. ideas).26  
 
In the field of IR, Keck and Sikkink highlight the work of activist networks that 
mobilise on behalf of groups of people (not themselves) or for causes based on “shared 
principled ideas and values” (1998: 30). As in Moe, individual interests and motivations 
for activism can be defined in terms of a cause or a social value. Group identities and 
interests can be constructed around causes or values in contrast to the view that 
associations are likely only to be formed on the basis of economically grounded rational 
utility maximising calculations. Whereas Olson outlines the importance of rational-
material interest based calculations of utility maximising individuals in accounting for 
group formation/mobilisation, Keck and Sikkink outline that ideas can be important in 
understanding group activism.  
 
In contrast to these ideas oriented views, material interest based approaches in 
political science, IR and IPE tend to imply that actors whose material self-interests have 
been directly affected by some material occurrence (or potential occurrence) will 
mobilise. Interests are conceived of as things that exist prior to or independently of ideas. 
                                                 
25 Similar to Olson’s positive selective incentives but solidary and purposive incentives are not tangible as 
are physical goods or services. 
26 Moe also focuses on entrepreneurs as important in the creation of groups, driving their activism and 
helping to maintain groups (1980: chap. 3) 
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Interests are based on material facts/realities (economic, political or social) and are 
seen as the basis of instrumental/rational action.   
 
The following two examples from IPE literature are instructive in illustrating these 
assumptions27: 
 
i. Rogowski discusses the responses of EIG coalitions to trade liberalisation. He 
argues that in an international climate of trade liberalisation there will be 
societal conflict between actors representing factors of production that are 
favoured by liberalisation and those that are not. The make-up of coalitions 
differs depending on the abundance or scarcity of land, labour and capital and 
can lead to rural - urban conflict (with capital and labour forming coalitions 
when they are either the scarce or abundant factors of production) or class 
conflict when capital and land make up either the abundant or scarce factors 
of production (Rogowski 1987; 1990). CSOs mobilise along interest based 
lines and group interests are determined by their location in the economy 
(scarce/abundant factor of production). Therefore, material changes (in this 
case trade liberalisation) impact on interests, which are in a sense 
predetermined by the location of different groups in the economy 
(scarce/abundant factor of production). 
 
ii. Frieden also looks at trade liberalisation but looks at sector based coalitions 
that are affected and influence policy instead of looking at factor based 
coalitions (Frieden 1988). He focuses on sectors because, in the short run, all 
labour interests will not be affected the same way nor will all of the interests 
of capital. Labour in highly competitive industries may favour liberalisation 
because they may see benefits from this whilst labour and capital in less 
competitive industries would likely oppose liberalisation. Even if in the long 
run abundant factors will benefit and scarce ones will not, coalitions are more 
                                                 
27 Although materialist in focus, these two examples are similar to my work in that they focus on group 
involvement on international trade issues. 
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likely to form and influence policy on the basis sectoral interests (Frieden 
1991: 437-439). Group interests are, therefore, determined by location in the 
economy (sector) in the context of material changes (trade liberalisation). 
So, sectoral coalitions mobilise to influence policy in ways that will benefit 
their material interests. 
 
In both of these examples interests are conceived as material (based on economic 
facts/determinants) and they are determined from the location of groups of people in the 
economy and in the context of material changes/occurrences. Neither of these works 
precludes the activism of non-EIGs on trade (or other economic issues) but the way in 
which they focus either on sectoral or factoral motivations for CSO mobilisation in 
response to trade liberalisation imply that only EIGs (groups seen as motivated by 
economic concerns) will mobilise on trade issues.  
 
The activism of a wide array of CSOs on trade issues from the 1990s though 
illustrates that this material interest based premise cannot account for all mobilisation. 
Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) work on the other hand suggests that non-EIGs (they discuss 
networks) mobilise on the basis of principled beliefs and thus are at odds with the 
assumptions in the works or Frieden and Rogowski (outlined above). Nonetheless, even 
though both Moe and Keck and Sikkink emphasise the importance of non-material 
considerations, their views imply that non-material factors tend to be of more importance 
for non-EIGs than for EIGs. Keck and Sikkink highlight that some groups act in pursuit 
of “instrumental goals” or to fulfil the material interests of the group whilst others are 
driven by principled ideas and values (1998: 30). Moe also highlights that “economic 
self-interests” tend to be important in understanding EIG behaviour (1980: 113). Despite 
seeing the importance of non-material considerations in understanding group formation 
and activism these writers still adhere to a dichotomy that classes some groups as acting 
based on material interests (EIGs) and others based on ideas/values (non-EIGs).  
 
This thesis tries to blur this dichotomy by seeing CSOs and CSO activism as 
driven by people with shared interests and by understanding interests as necessarily 
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linked to ideas. Here ideas are viewed as helping to inform the way that people conceive 
of their interests. This goes both for groups that tend to be seen as acting on the basis of 
“principled beliefs” (non-EIGs) and those usually seen as acting instrumentally out of 
material interests (EIGs). Even if individuals make cost-benefit calculations and act as 
rational maximisers and even if some groups can be seen as motivated more by economic 
self-interests than others, the way they estimate their interests and mobilise can be 
informed by a variety of ideas and values. It follows then that both EIGs and non-EIGs 
can be driven by ideational concerns such as norms - defined as shared or “intersubjective 
beliefs about proper behaviour” - (Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002: 14). When CSOs 
mobilise based on concerns about democracy, governance or the distribution of material 
wealth, they do so on the basis of ideas and material concerns (the two being interlinked) 
and they are calling for norms to be upheld or introduced.  
 
Richardson highlights that as people’s material conditions change (wealth, 
education) and/or when they have access to knowledge (ideas) they may recognise their 
interests and mobilise:  
 
As people become more educated, articulate and wealthier, and as 
knowledge and information become more widespread, more people come 
to recognize their own interests in issues which hitherto they were happy 
to ignore and leave to others to resolve. (1993: 7) 
 
Richardson cites the environmental movement and the women’s movement as 
examples of rethinking preferences by some people in Western democracies from the 
1970s. In his estimation, the activism in the environmental movement was linked to 
scientific discovery and, increased information and knowledge about environmental 
effects of activities/processes (causal ideas). In the case of the women’s movement he 
sees activism as due to rising consciousness/awareness of women and the recognition of 
women’s interests in public policies that was previously left to men (1993: 7-8). In other 
words, women’s groups were formed and mobilised in women’s interests but the 
articulation of these interests was linked to the acceptance of certain ideas about right 
about wrong, just and unjust (principled beliefs). Similarly, Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 
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suggest that although the 1990s transnational anti-violence against women campaign was 
in women’s self interests “it also involved new ways of thinking about their roles and 
relationships…” (2002: 12). Along similar lines, this thesis asserts that ideas help to 
shape the way people conceive of their interests and the way people think about the 
importance of activism. 
 
Before coming back to this stance however, let us look at some IR/IPE literature on 
interests and ideas with relation to understanding government behaviour in order to bring 
the focus on CARICOM / government inclusion of CSOs on trade issues into this 
evaluation. This focus on government/official behaviour is necessary because in addition 
to asserting that ideas/interests have driven CSO activism on trade in the 1990s this thesis 
asserts that CARICOM and its governments began to express willingness to consult 
CSOs from around the same time based on ideas/interests. The IR literature on ideas 
based and interest based motivations for actor behaviour is informative on this front and 
can also be applied to the discussion of motivations for CSO activism.  
 
2.3  IDEATIONAL AND MATERIAL FACTORS IN 
UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
 
Although we previously treated rational-materialist approaches as not interested 
in ideational factors (in my examples of Frieden’s and Rogowski’s work), in the field of 
IR there exists material interest based literature that starts from rational assumptions but 
also attempts to look at ideas. Ideas are brought into these works that look at state 
behaviour and government policy decision-making in acknowledgement that material 
interests are not all there is for understanding these phenomena in IR/IPE. Some actions 
cannot be understood simply through the use of models based on rational (economic) 
utility maximising assumptions and that see material interests as determinants of action.  
 
However, as Wendt and Woods make clear, when ideas enter into a rationalist-
materialist framework they do so as residual variables that help to account for variance 
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or actions that cannot be explained using rationalist explanations alone (Wendt 1999: 78; 
Woods 1995: 164). Ideas are also brought into rationalist-materialist frameworks to help 
to explain choices in situations of multiple equilibria (when choices for acting in a 
variety of different ways are equal) or as tools to help to sustain cooperation/collective 
action. Ideas are therefore seen as important because they can be used for utility 
maximisation or for facilitating cooperation (or for various other aims) (Blyth 1997: 241, 
243; Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 12-24). In essence then, material interests still remain 
the important drivers of action.  
 
The following sub-section starts by illustrating this rationalist-materialist 
consideration of ideas, moves on to look at more nuanced approaches to ideas and 
interests and then opens out to consider approaches that can be seen as blurring the ideas-
interest line more radically. 
 
APPROACHES TO IDEAS 
 
• IDEAS AS TOOLS 
 
Goldstein and Keohane’s work illustrates a rational-materialist approach. They 
look at how ideas (“beliefs held by individuals”) can help to explain government policy 
outcomes (1993: 3) and hold that changes in material conditions can allow ideas to have 
impacts that they did not have previously. They also take the view that ideas tend to be 
important with changes in material interests (1993: 25). Goldstein and Keohane concede 
that ideas and interests are linked but wish to separate the two in order to decipher 
whether state actions can be accounted for via “egoistic interests” or via differences in 
ideas (1993: 26-27). Goldstein and Keohane categorise ideas as world-views (perceptions 
about the world, philosophical outlooks), principled beliefs (ideas about right/wrong) and 
causal beliefs (ideas about cause and effect). These ideas serve as: “road maps” helping 
people to strategise where information is incomplete; “focal points” that help in making 
choices in multiple equilibria; or instruments that help to direct outcomes through 
“institutionalization” and prolonging cooperation (1993: 12-24). These conceptions of 
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ideas see them as tools to further interests or to achieve outcomes rather than seeing ideas 
as intrinsically linked to interests. 
 
• IDEAS AS SHAPING INTERESTS 
 
More nuanced versions of this materialist approach see ideas as helping to inform 
preference specification and consider them as more intertwined with interests. The 
following are examples: 
 
i. McNamara states that ideas (“shared causal beliefs”) are important for 
understanding policy change (1998: 4). Changes in the international economy 
in addition to policy failure/crisis open a window for new ideas to be taken up 
and to influence policies that states adopt or pursue. Here the international 
economic structure shapes politics but policy choices and policy content are 
shaped by ideas that help leaders to interpret changes and to define interests 
(1998: 6-8).  
 
ii. Checkel also sees ideas as important in understanding political change. He 
links political changes to ideas (“broad concepts and basic beliefs”) and sees 
carriers of ideas as important (e.g. epistemic communities and NGOs) 
(Checkel 1997: 4-5, 7). He highlights that ideas can impact on decision-
makers by providing a “policy paradigm or road map for interpreting 
international politics and shaping preferences” (Checkel 1997: 5).  
Importantly too, he states that ideas find space to be of influence (as road 
maps) with changes in the international environment that can lead to 
uncertainty (Checkel 1997: 4, 11). As in Goldstein and Keohane with material 
changes (causing uncertainty) ideas can become important tools for directing 
leaders’ policy choices. However, as in McNamara, this view sees ideas as 
helping to shape preferences too. Checkel’s view adds an institutional 
element in addition by seeing political institutions as structuring the way in 
which ideas can impact on decision-makers. He sees weak political 
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structures as allowing space for ideas to penetrate unlike centralised ones that 
insulate policy makers from adopting new ideas (Checkel 1997: 6-7, 11) 
 
• A BRIEF LOOK AT INSTITUTIONS  
 
Chekel’s work is in the institutionalist tradition in IR, IPE and political science that 
sees institutions as important in helping to understand political interactions. This 
institutionalist vein was previously highlighted in this chapter’s discussion of interest 
groups in which it was shown that the activism and impact of interest groups can be 
\influenced by formal government institutional structures.  
 
Therefore, institutions can be important because they can facilitate or constrain 
political action. In IR, IPE and political science institutionalists too have been divided 
amongst those who see ideas as important in allowing for formation, stability and 
changes in institutions and others who see interest calculation and utility maximisation as 
important in understanding institutional formation and disintegration. In this light, 
Goldstein and Keohane’s assertion that ideas can be important for institutionalisation of 
cooperation illustrates how rationalist-materialist strain in institutionalist literature has 
come to incorporate ideas in accounting for institutional continuity where it may 
otherwise be rational for individuals to cease cooperation.  
 
Group theory holds other parallels to work in the institutionalist strain. Both group 
theory and institutionalism tend to look at forms of cooperation/collective action, reasons 
for cooperation and the outcomes/effects of cooperation. However, institutionalist work 
in political science and IR tends to looks mainly at governmental/inter-governmental 
institutions and their impact on policy formation whereas; group theory looks at the 
internal institutional make-up of groups. Looking at governmental/inter-governmental 
institutions is important in this thesis for examining the space opened and planned by 
CARICOM and its constituent governments for consulting CSOs on trade issues. The 
ideas/interests that motivate governments to create institutional space for CSO 
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consultation on trade issues are important here. Nonetheless, important too is looking at 
institutional considerations internal to CSOs.  
 
Specifically, CSOs need to be able to mobilise meaningfully in order to be of impact 
in their own right and so that their contributions come to be considered by governments 
or other relevant officials. In addition to interests/perceived interests based on ideational-
material factors, institutional factors are important. Specifically the requisite human 
resources and funding are needed to mobilise with “competence”. Speaking of 
institutional problems that may face CSOs with respect to efforts to democratise the 
global economy Scholte states: 
 
Most community associations, NGOs, religious groups and trade unions have 
operated with small budgets and limited long-term financial security. They have 
had only a handful of staff specifically dedicated to global economic issues and 
have often relied heavily on volunteer and low-paid labour. Even some business 
forums (especially among small entrepreneurs) and think tanks (especially in the 
South) have led a precarious existence. (2004: 49) 
 
Institutional factors, and in particular the funding and human resources aspects of 
capacity, are important to consider in understanding CSO mobilisation and consultation 
on trade matters. The institutional space made available by governments and pertinent 
bodies for incorporating CSOs is important to consider too. Hence, institutional factors 
are vital for any understanding of CSO activism and consultation on trade matters, in 
CARICOM and beyond. For now though let us leave the issue of institutions aside, as 
this will be explored more fully as the thesis progresses. Instead the following sub-section 
will look at literature that considers ideas, but in doing so, goes beyond rationalist-
materialist and other more nuanced treatments of ideas already highlighted. 
 
• IDEAS AS CONSTITUTIVE 
 
The writings of Blyth (2002, 2003) Woods (1995) and Wendt (1999) are examples of 
works that are near polar opposites of materialist thought about actor behaviour (or 
action). Such materialist work was previously highlighted using the IPE examples of 
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Frieden and Rogowski who see group interests as determined by international economic 
structures (they look at trade specifically). Similar interest based persuasions can be seen 
in more general (non-IPE) IR too. For instance, there is work that sees states as acting in 
their interests as determined by the international structure/system (international structure 
= material fact), notably Waltz (1979). Work along the realist-liberal continuum (e.g. 
hegemonic stability theory) that sees international cooperation/institutions as responses to 
state interests as determined by the international system, is also predominantly materialist 
in orientation.  
 
Blyth (2002, 2003) Woods (1995) and Wendt (1999) critique the interest-based focus 
of such thought. They also critique the ideas-interest division and the conception of ideas 
as tools used to further interests, evident in some efforts to tack on ideas (e.g. Goldstein 
and Keohane 1993). These authors want ideas to be taken seriously and see them as 
constitutive of interests. For instance, Wendt states: “We want what we want because of 
how we think about it” (1999:119) and Blyth expresses that “cognates of interests, such 
as wants, beliefs and desires” are inherent in interests and, therefore, “… must be 
considered as part of the concept of interest itself.” (2002: 29). Ideas and interests are 
seen as inseparable. Such views, thus, go much further than those that see ideas and 
interests as inherently connected (e.g. McNamara 1998: 8; Checkel 1997: 5).  
 
IDEATIONAL-MATERIAL CONTEXT 
 
These discussions of CSOs, interest groups, understanding state action or policy 
change in IR are connected because they speak about the behaviour of actors. The 
literature addressed so far has considered ideas, interests or some combination of the two 
as important for motivating both CSO activism and government policy choices. The 
discussion has also preliminarily introduced the importance of institutional factors for 
understanding CSO activism and consultation. However, the discussion has not looked at 
the contexts in which actor behaviours (CSO activism or government behaviour) are 
located. In order to understand the timing of CSO activism on trade and government 
inclusion and overtures to inclusion of CSOs, in this thesis it is important to look at the 
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intersection between ideas-interests and changes in international economic conditions 
in the 1990s. In so doing, this research takes an approach similar to McNamara’s in 
viewing “economic structure” and “human agency” as important in understanding 
action.28   
 
On the one hand, this approach implies that material factors form the important 
context in which CSOs decide to act or governments behave in one way or another. In 
other words, this approach appears to assume that material facts/occurrences affect 
material interests and, by extension, precipitate CSO or government action. So, as the 
works of Frieden or Rogowski highlighted earlier suggest, real or proposed changes in 
international trade policy thrust actors whose interests are affected to mobilise in support 
of varying material interests. However, the approach here is not materialist. Just as 
material interests are not viewed as separable from ideas in motivating action in this 
thesis, observable international political/economic occurrences or changes are not 
conceived as material alone in setting the stage for actor behaviour. 
 
International political/economic occurrences are partly ideationally based just as 
interests are constituted at least in part by ideas. For instance, causal beliefs about how 
political and economic affairs should be conducted to enhance prosperity that become 
popular and that are espoused in policy proposals can be made into reality through 
practices. In this way, neo-liberal market oriented ideas about economic growth and trade 
underpinned the creation of the WTO and the liberalising world trading atmosphere. In 
consequence, it is fair to say that ideas are important in constructing material realities. It 
follows then that changes in material conditions are, at least to some extent, linked to 
changes in ideas about cause and effect, about the rightness/wrongness of a course of 
action, or by philosophical views about the world (causal ideas, principled ideas and 
world views). Hence, throughout this thesis international changes/occurrences are 
referred to as ideational-material.29 Therefore, CSOs and governments can be seen to 
                                                 
28 McNamara however discusses these with reference to international cooperation. 
29 This last point will be brought out more thoroughly in Chapters 3 and 4 to follow, which actually 
highlight important ideational-material occurrences and trends. 
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act, not only on the basis of ideas/interests that are internally held or generated, but in the 
context of specific ideational-material settings. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
To close this chapter, let us look back at what has been discussed, how this 
discussion will feed into this thesis and then link these ideas to what will be discussed in 
the chapter to follow. 
 
This chapter presented a discussion of CSOs and interest groups and in doing so 
emphasised that this thesis is not in accord with views that see some EIGs as motivated 
solely by material interests and non-EIGs as motivated solely by ideas. Instead, ideas and 
interests are viewed as connected and important in understanding the activism of EIGs 
and non-EIGs. So, in looking at CSO mobilisation in the CARICOM region, the interests 
of all CSOs are portrayed as intertwined with ideas about the world (world views), 
right/wrong (principled beliefs) and about cause and effect (causal beliefs).  
 
Without rehashing the argument, similar assertions can be made for understanding 
government/ CARICOM interests, which form the basis of decisions to act in one way or 
another. In separating ideas in this way this thesis draws on Goldstein and Keohane’s 
classification, but, does not disconnect ideas from interests as they do. Within the ideas-
interests debate, this work aligns with views that see ideas as of great significance in 
contextualising actor behaviour and in constructing actor preferences. This view informs 
the approach taken throughout this thesis in looking at the activism of CSOs in 
CARICOM on trade from the 1990s and in looking at government inclusion/overtures to 
inclusion of CSOs from the 1990s.  
 
In short, this research focuses on ideas and interests as interlinked and important 
in helping to understand the government and CSO actions and this cannot be separated 
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from the ideational-material context of international occurrences in which actor 
behaviour is situated. 
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CHAPTER 3 
CSO EVOLUTION AND ACTIVISM IN THE ANGLO-
CARIBBEAN FROM THE 19TH CENTURY 
 
 
The principal CSOs that have been active in CARICOM politics (as early as the 
1950s) have been EIGs representing labour and the private sector. However, this thesis 
asserts that these CSOs did not attempt to participate in shaping trade relations for most 
of this history, nor did government officials incorporate them systematically on trade 
issues. Instead, activism by these CSOs and others (notably non-EIGs) consolidated in 
the 1990s. Governments also began efforts to engage with CSOs on trade affairs from 
around this time period. This shift toward CSO activism on trade matters occurred in the 
context of changing ideational-material trends that were important from the 1980s and 
that opened “space” for the involvement of CSOs in governance by the mid-1990s. 
 
In order to advance these arguments it is important to understand CS participation 
in governance in the region. Therefore, this chapter looks at the evolution of CSO 
activism in the region and at the ways in which CSOs have participated in politics in the 
region over time. This chapter will, in so doing, illustrate that CS writ large became able 
to participate in political decision-making a century after emancipation, when “space” 
was opened for political participation and for a variety of CSOs to operate freely.  The 
opening of space for CSO activism is important to consider in understanding CSO 
activism, both in the Caribbean context and in general. This chapter also shows that for 
most of the history of the region, the concerns of CSOs were transported into policy 
spheres through protest or indirectly via a silent bargain between the government, labour 
and private sector (and their EIGs) rather than through consultation. The move towards 
CSOs placing an emphasis on engagement with governments through research, advocacy 
and consultation emerged as novel in the mid/late 1990s. Also novel were 
government/official proposals for consulting with CSOs in more structured and serious 
ways than in the past. 
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 Hence, this chapter focuses on: the evolution of the CSO world and CSO 
activism; reasons for CSO mobilisation on certain issues; and the ways in which CSOs 
mobilised in certain political or economic arenas between the 19th century and the early 
1970s. This allows us to look at the: (a) material, (b) institutional and (c) ideational 
factors that were important in time-specific ideational-material contexts. One can thereby 
begin to evaluate the extent to which and the reasons why CSO activism in CARICOM 
has changed over time, which aids in understanding why CSOs from the 1990s became 
active in governance and specifically the politics of international trade. 
 
 This chapter proceeds in the following manner: section 3.1 discusses the 
existence and the emergence of politically and socially important CSOs in the region 
between the 19th century and the end of World War II. Section 3.2 discusses the activism 
of CSOs on the British West Indies Federation, CARIFTA and CARICOM. This section 
looks at CSO ideas, interests and at the institutional factors that coloured CSO activism 
with respect to these regional arrangements. Section 3.2 specifically emphasises the 
importance of labour activism (between the 1930s and the 1950s) on the formation of the 
Federation and private sector EIG activism (in the late 1960s and early 1970s) on the 
formation of CARIFTA and CARICOM.  Section 3.3 then proceeds to look at the 
changes in the variety and character of CSOs in the region from the 1970s up until the 
end of the 20th century by looking at private sector/industry specific EIGs, radical CSOs, 
women’s organisations and other NGO type CSOs. 
 
 
3.1  CSOS AND THEIR ACTIVISM: THE 19TH CENTURY TO MID-20TH 
CENTURY 
 
Chapter 2 discussed CSOs and stated that space for CSO formation and 
mobilisation (either authorised or unauthorised) has been viewed as necessary for CSO 
activism/impact. In this section we look at the space opened for CSOs within the 
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Anglophone Caribbean. This space was opened when the majority populations in the 
region gained their freedom with the end of slavery in the 19th century. Space was further 
expanded following the Moyne Report of 194030 that established a legal basis for political 
parties, trade unions and cooperatives, opened doors for the free pursuit of 
entrepreneurial and professional activities, and (as a result) opened space for further 
development of a middle class (Marshall 1998:57; Crassweller 1972: 239-240).  
 
CSOS TO THE END OF THE 19TH CENTURY  
 
Caribbean economies under colonisation were based on plantation production of 
sugar (and other crops) using slave labour. These production arrangements shaped 
economic activities and social/class/race relations in the region. There were enslaved 
“black” majorities, small pockets of free “coloured” people and the well-off “white” 
elites who usually owned and managed plantations or controlled commerce (Knowles 
1959: 6-10; Scarano, 1989: 56).  
 
In addition to economic activities shaping social relations and economic activities 
in the region, ideas were important. Specifically, racist ideas that were held by colonisers 
and plantation owners contributed to the exploitation of Africans and persons of African 
descent as slave labourers in this plantation based economic system. So low was the view 
of people of African origin that they were seen as little more than property (chattel) to be 
bought and sold for commercial and household purposes. Additionally, the idea that 
“New World” territories were little more than resource bases for production geared 
towards enriching European colonisers within mercantilist systems cannot be forgotten 
either. 
 
In this colonial ideational-material context commercial and agricultural 
associations were formed to represent the concerns of the merchant traders and plantation 
                                                 
30The Moyne Commission, prior commissions sent to the region by the Colonial Office, and their 
contribution to CSO development will be discussed more later on in this section.  
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owners/managers’ (merchant-planter elite), who dominated the economic and political 
landscape in the region up until the mid-20th century, towards relevant colonial officials. 
Commercial associations were established in the Bahamas (1797), Jamaica (1779), 
Barbados (1825), and Trinidad and Tobago (1879); agricultural societies were founded in 
Trinidad and Tobago (1839), Barbados (1845), Jamaica (1895); and a combination of the 
two was created in St. Lucia in 1884 (the St. Lucia Agricultural and Commercial 
Society).31 In contrast, there was little space for associations representing other segments 
of society within the region; specifically slaves had little space for association and 
women (even from the planter/merchant elite) tended to be restricted to playing private 
roles. 
 
By the 19th century though, slavery became untenable. Slave based plantation 
sugar production declined in profitability, notably, with a shift in British orientation from 
mercantilist policies and towards liberal ones in the trade realm.32 Continued slave 
rebellion and resistance was important too, as also was the activism of CSOs within the 
UK (specifically the Anti-slavery Society) that called for an end of slavery based on the 
principled idea that it was an unjust and inhumane system (Scarano, 1989:55, 65). In this 
context, slavery in the British West Indies was abolished in 1834, with a period of 
apprenticeship lasting until 1838.  
 
Ex-slaves remained poor and disadvantaged following emancipation particularly 
since social welfare provisions that were previously provided by plantations evaporated. 
Plantations were no longer obliged to take the same responsibilities for their work forces 
as they were obligated to for their slaves. In this setting, welfare-type groups (non-EIGs) 
grew within ex-slave communities in the form of friendly societies, burial societies, credit 
associations and women’s groups (Senior 1991: 151; Hunte 2001: 134; Bolland 2001: 
190-193). Additionally, church, religious associations and charitable organisations 
                                                 
31 These tended to be predecessors of modern Chambers of Commerce and Agricultural Societies that today 
are not so “elitist” in aiming to represent and inform business and agricultural interests throughout society. 
32 In the 19th century sugar production in the British West Indies became less profitable when sugar prices 
fell with competition from other sugar producers. Also, Britain liberalised trade, cutting much of its 
preferential treatment of colonial produce between1846-1854. (Sherlock et. al, 1987: 172; Scarano, 1989: 
55-56; Knight and Palmer 1989: 8) 
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became very important in supporting communities. Some charitable organisations were 
run by wealthy or middle-class white or coloured women for whom voluntary work was 
one of the few acceptable forms of work available to them33 and for whom such work 
was also seen as a status symbol (Reddock 1994: 162-163; Senior 1991: 151).  
 
The end of slavery opened some space for a shift away from political and 
economic affairs in the region being dominated by the state and the planter-merchant elite 
and for broader CS association. However, this was at extremely slow pace. So slow was 
the pace that Brereton (1989) described the years between emancipation and the early 
20th century as “quiet times” (86). By the early 20th century, and particularly from the 
1930s, the pace of change quickened in part because CSOs and social movements 
emerged from wider realms of society and mobilised to change the status quo. A labour 
movement grew and politically oriented CSOs became important by the end of the 19th 
century. These CSOs were empowered by and built on the work of small clusters of 
constitutional and workers’ rights advocates that went before them (Brereton 1989: 86; 
Bolland 2001: 155; Lewis 1977: 18). Such CSO formation and the beginnings of activism 
must be understood against the ideational-material backdrop of the time. 
 
CSOS FROM THE EARLY TO MID-20TH CENTURY 
 
• LABOUR ASSOCIATIONS 
 
Small unions were formed in the region from the early 19th century. In Jamaica there 
was the Bricklayers and Painters Union (Artisans Union) founded in 1898, there was the 
Trinidad Workingmen’s Association formed in 1897 and in Guyana the British Guiana 
Labour Union was formed in 1919 (Bolland 2001: 190-193; Randall 2003: 74-75; Lewis 
1977: 18). Strikes were prevalent in many British Caribbean colonies between 1916 and 
1924 in: Jamaica, Trinidad, St. Lucia, the Bahamas, Antigua, Grenada, Barbados, British 
                                                 
33 Although women were active in the labour movement in the 1930s and 1940s they tended to play 
supportive roles while these organisations were run by males and often centred around male employment as 
suggested in the presence of “Workingmen’s Associations”. 
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Guiana (now Guyana), and British Honduras (now Belize). Nonetheless, very few unions 
existed since these were illegal. Friendly societies and self-help organisations in existence 
throughout the 19th century, however, often acted in similar ways to unions by providing 
benefits, looking after social and welfare concerns and acting as training grounds for 
workers to develop advocacy and organisational skills (Bolland 2001: 175-177; Randall 
2003: 74-75; Lewis 1977: 18; Howe 2001: 123).  
 
By the mid-1930s, working class disturbances spread across the British Caribbean 
with economic recession that caused decreases in wage and employment levels. In 
addition workers were vexed by the heavy tax burdens that they bore. Consequently, 
there were strikes in St. Kitts, British Guiana, St. Vincent and St. Lucia in 1935, in 
Trinidad, British Guiana, St. Lucia, Jamaica and Barbados in 1937, and further strike 
action in 1938 by workers in Jamaica and British Guiana (Lewis 1977: 18; Knowles 
1959: 44; Brereton 1989: 87).  
 
By the 1940s a labour movement began in earnest in the British West Indies with 
unions established across the region some years following the creation of a regional 
umbrella labour association (the British Guiana and the West Indies Labour Congress) in 
1926, at the first regional labour conference (Bolland 2001: 506, Arthur 2005: 6).34 
Workers acted collectively in efforts to improve working standards and wage levels. The 
labour movement within the region was also concerned with constitutional matters in 
light of the inequalities that existed under colonial rule. 
 
Despite having linked the emergence of unions in the region to world economic 
recession, poverty and inequality under colonialism (material factors) it is important to 
note that ideational concerns were pivotal in this movement too. For instance unions 
believed that self-government by means of regional integration was the best way to 
pursue independence and equity and therefore pursued an integrationist strategy. This 
idea was expressed in 1926 at the first regional labour conference in British Guiana, and 
upheld into the 1950s with the Caribbean Labour Congress’s (CLC) submission of 
                                                 
34 This umbrella association would become the Caribbean Labour Congress (CLC) in 1945 
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proposals on the constitutions for a mooted of a regional confederation (Arthur 2005: 6-7; 
Bolland 2001: 506-507; Lewis 1977: 42) 
 
Workers also constituted their interests in part based on ideas that they held about the 
material world which was characterized by colonialism, inequality and poverty. Unions, 
therefore, mobilized in pursuit of principled beliefs in equality and social justice which 
were connected to their material interests. Workers’ unions saw bettering working 
conditions and remuneration, decreasing social inequality, making constitutional 
advances through self-governance and regional integration as in their interests, but these 
interests cannot be understood as simply material self-interests. Instead they were 
entangled with broader ideas about injustice and moral obligation.  
 
• MIDDLE-CLASS CSOs 
 
In the region, there also existed distinctly middle-class political associations aimed at 
enhancing the representation in legislative councils and improving access to civil service 
employment for people who had risen up the social ladder no matter their race or colour. 
These associations were called “Representative Government Associations” and were 
present throughout the Eastern Caribbean. Additionally, despite their middle-class goals 
and membership they were able to obtain working class support in demonstrations, 
petitions and at meetings (Lewis 1977: 41; Bolland 2001: 164). 
 
Middle-class (“brown” or “coloured”) members of society wanted to break 
through the racial barriers that prohibited their full political and economic participation in 
society and also limited their abilities for socio-economic advancement in society. In 
other words, members of Representative Government Associations acted in pursuit of 
their material interests (socio-economic advancement). Nevertheless, these interests 
cannot be considered without once more considering principled ideas about the unjust 
nature of racial and class discrimination. These principled beliefs coloured the character 
of these CSOs and the way these CSOs perceived and articulated their interests.  
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 • RACIAL AWARENESS CSOS 
 
The United Negro’s Improvement Association (UNIA) was founded by Marcus 
Garvey in Jamaica in 1914. This CSO is the important predecessor of the 1960s/1970s 
“Black Power” movements in the region and Pan-African associations and movements 
that continue to exist in the region. It was based on a Pan-African philosophy, and 
spawned branches throughout the Caribbean, in Central America and in New York and 
operated a publication (Negro World) and an ocean liner (the Black Star Line). This CSO 
aimed at mobilising black entrepreneurs to be the financial engines for a pan-African 
movement whilst also having a popular base (Bolland 167-171; Desmangles et. al, 2003: 
287-288).  
 
UNIA revolved around ideas about race and ethnic origins rather than around 
constitutional or labour issues. Nonetheless, some workers’ rights issues were addressed 
within UNIA, with members becoming active in the labour and political movements in 
the 1930s and 1940s when many people chose political action for nation rather than race 
(Bolland 2001: 172; Knowles 1959: 59-60). Once more, ideas and material concerns were 
important in understanding UNIA. The interests of UNIA members were linked both to a 
Pan-African philosophy and the material facts of political and economic exclusion in the 
colonial Caribbean. 
 
Following World War I, soldiers from the British West Indian Regiment returned to 
the Caribbean. These soldiers formed the Caribbean League, whilst deployed in 1917 and 
this association called for black rights, self-determination and closer West Indian 
integration (Howe 2001: 120). Their disillusionment at the economic and political 
circumstances to which they returned intensified their political engagement and 
contributed to their involvement in protests in Belize, Grenada, Jamaica and Trinidad in 
1919 and their membership of UNIA and Workingmen’s Associations in the region. 
Material conditions of economic and political marginalisation were expressed in their 
interests, but so too were ideas such as those about justice. These soldiers came to realise 
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the importance of mobilising in pursuit of principles such as social, economic and 
political justice during the war and they also came to emphasise the idea of self-
determination (Bolland 2001: 196-198; Howe 2001: 126). 
 
In addition to considering ideas and interests in understanding CSO activism and 
formation we should acknowledge institutional factors that facilitated the formation and 
activism of CSOs and that helped or hindered CSO abilities to be heard. The abolition of 
the institution of slavery was important for creating a climate in which free people could 
mobilise. Colonial Office enquiries aimed at examining the socio-economic conditions 
within the region were important too. The Colonial Office commissions should be given a 
bit of coverage here because of their role in opening institutional space for CSOs and CS 
in general. 
 
In 1938 a Colonial Office investigation (the Moyne Commission) into the conditions 
in the British Colonies began in light of poor economic conditions and labour uprisings. 
This Moyne Commission considered the views of a broader spectrum of the populations 
in the British Caribbean than the traditionally important planter-merchant elite. The 
Moyne Commission produced an important report that opened space for trade union 
activity and opened space for economic and political activities by marginalized segments 
of Anglo-Caribbean societies (Marshall 1998:57; Crassweller 1972: 239-240; Knowles 
1959: 49). Before 1938, other Colonial Office Commissions were sent to the region too. 
A 1932 commission investigated the possibility of allowing the West Indian colonies 
extended constitutional advances through the creation of a political confederation. Also, 
in 1921 the Wood Commission investigated the conditions causing unrest in the region 
following World War I. The resulting Wood Report (1922) recommended constitutional 
changes for Trinidad, the Windward Islands and Dominica to allow increased political 
participation in the colonies (Lewis 1977: 41-42; Payne 1989: 6-8; Howard, 1989: 5; 
Bolland 2001: 143).  
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The emergence of politically important CSOs must be linked to wider time-specific 
occurrences too such as: the First World War and Wilsonian ideas about equality, justice 
and self-determination espoused in its aftermath. Additionally, according to W. A. Lewis, 
examples of strike action abroad were important in propelling the British Caribbean 
labour movement. In particular, strike action in the French, American and British labour 
movements were important examples for the West Indian region of the potentials of 
labour mobilisation (Lewis 1977: 19). These occurrences impacted on the ideas and 
interests promoted by CSOs in the region, fed into labour activism in the aftermath of 
1929/30 recession and provided the ideational-material context in which people’s 
interests in creating organisations to deal with workers’ discontent and political/social 
inequality were sharpened.  
 
• EMERGING SELF-GOVERNANCE AND GOVERNMENT-CSO TIES 
 
Although by the end of World War II Caribbean societies became more open and 
formal political institutions become more accessible to a wider range of people, the 
planter-merchant elite in society remained important because of its control of economic 
resources. However, the working-classes grew in political significance with the 
broadening of constitutional rights by the mid-20th century. With the emergence of self-
governance, leaders in the region focussed on electoral politics, creating social stability 
and fostering economic development (Knowles 1959: 183; Marshall 1998: 63).  
 
These leaders focussed heavily on development in their politics and policies and were 
primarily informed by the “modernisation and growth” approach to development35, 
which constituted the dominant development policy paradigm of the time. In particular, 
the region’s MDCs attempted to develop using Lewis’s modernisation and growth 
                                                 
35 In using the term “modernisation and growth” this thesis follows Martinussen’s categorisation of schools 
of development in which he combines theories that speak to the necessity of economic growth and those on 
sociological and political  modernisation. These two sets of theoretical approaches are combined into one 
school of thought by Martiussen because of their similar emphasis on development as a process of 
modernisation (1999: 50-51, 56, 167-168). The interventionist modernisation and growth approaches to 
development can be contrasted to the neo-liberal approaches that came to dominate mainstream 
development thinking by the 1980s. 
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prescriptions for development that were linked to the Puerto Rican model (Mandle 1989: 
243; Marshall 1998: 64-65). The development processes advocated along these lines 
prescribed government involvement in economic activities and making use of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in order to promote industrialisation. So, governments intervened 
in domestic economic activities via para-statals and governments enticed FDI into the 
region. Both of these strategies aimed at promoting industrialisation, economic 
diversification and economic growth (Mandle 1989: 243-244; Marshall 1998: 63-65, 67: 
Bennett 1999: 129-131). 
 
Governments in the region also attempted to appease important socio-economic 
groups within society to create social stability and in efforts to win votes at election time. 
One part of this effort entailed providing relief from unemployment through public sector 
employment. The other part entailed governments advancing economic diversification 
and bailing out struggling private producers involved in important economic activities 
(e.g. those producing flagging agricultural exports) whilst allowing the wealthy planter-
merchant classes to focus on other lucrative economic activities such as export trading 
(Marshall 1998: 64-65; D’Agostino 2003: 123; CDB/Mellon Foundation 1997: 8).  
 
Thereby, political leaders attempted to satisfy the working classes, the middle classes 
and the wealthy by trying to please everyone but consulting with no one.36  Some 
students of Caribbean politics have referred to this state-society bargain, in which 
governments acted as patrons and interest groups as clients, as “populist-statism” or 
“state sponsored patron-clientelism (Marshall 1998: 75; D’Agostino 2003: 123). This 
governance bargain is also in some respects similar to various definitions corporatism37 in 
which the state maintains harmony between labour and private sector interests (Thomas 
1993:9). 
 
                                                 
36 However, governments have not always been successful at this balancing act particularly with persistent 
high unemployment and poverty in some countries. 
37 This differs from neo-corporatism/democratic corporatism which entails tripartite interest group 
negotiations. 
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Added to patterns of “populist-statism”, CS/CSO activism and consultation was 
lacking because self-governance structures that emerged in the region in the 1940s and 
1950s mirrored the Westminster parliamentary system. In this system, the executive and 
legislative branches of government are fused, party discipline is strong, majorities in 
parliament are exaggerated through the First Past the Post System and there are few 
access points at which CSOs can intervene to influence policies (Richardson 1993: 89). 
This has meant that in the CARICOM region governments have been able to operate as 
unitary entities with few entry points for CSOs. Where CSOs have had access to policy 
spheres this has been through committees or “task force” mechanisms created on an ad 
hoc basis (CDB/Mellon Foundation 1997: 21). In other words, the degree of 
centralisation of political powers and institutions has placed limits on political 
participation by CS and CSOs in the region. 
 
This point notwithstanding, at the level of regional political and economic 
arrangements there were instances in which CSOs became involved in trying to shape 
political arrangements. The following section highlights these instances.  
 
3.2  CSO ACTIVISM ON REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS FROM 
FEDERATION TO CARICOM 
 
THE BRITISH WEST INDIES FEDERATION 
 
The formation of the British West Indies Federation in 1958 is an example of a 
process that was (in part) called for by Caribbean workers’ unions and in which they had 
some input. Labour EIGs supported the creation of a regional confederation from the 
1930s. In 1938 Moyne Commission raised the question of confederation but officials in 
the Colonial Office, planters and merchants and officials in the colonies were not in 
favour. Planter-class resistance to regional unification strategies had roots as far back as 
their disapproval of the 1871 Leeward Islands Federation and in persistent failed attempts 
to unite the Windward Islands (Payne 1989: 5-8; Sherlock et. al. 1987: 260). The lack of 
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links between the plantations in the West Indies was an important reason for the lack of 
planter class support, as plantations tended to be in competition with each other and all 
production geared towards Britain. This lack of linkages was also a result of the British 
prohibition of trade between the territories (Payne 1990: 25).  
 
On the other hand, support for federal government came from the emerging West 
Indian middle class, political and labour groups. Delegates from the British Guiana and 
West Indies Labour Congress were invited to make contributions to the Moyne 
Commission’s investigations and used the opportunity to submit a draft bill for the 
creation of a confederation in the region, highlighting the importance of self-government 
and adult suffrage (Lewis 1977: 42; Arthur 2005: 6; Bolland 2001: 506-507; Payne 1989: 
7-8).  
 
Following the Second World War the British Government was in favour of 
divesting itself of the responsibilities for its Caribbean territories. Creating a political 
confederation was seen as the only viable self-governance option for these small 
territories (Crassweller 1972: 666; Sherlock et. al. 1987: 261). Additionally, the 
Caribbean’s new popularly elected political figures generally believed regional 
integration was useful, particularly for functional cooperation (Payne 1989: 13-14; 
Sherlock et. al 1987: 261-262; Marshall 1998: 59). So, discussions on the issue of 
forming a confederation began at a conference in Montego Bay, Jamaica in 1947 (Lewis 
1999: 3; Erisman 1992: 59).  
 
In this context, labour EIG activism on the issue of a regional confederation 
continued. Notably, the Caribbean Labour Congress (CLC)38 submitted a draft bill for a 
federal constitution in 1947 at the initial meeting on the creation of a confederation 
(Arthur 2005: 7).  
 
Although it was supposed to be an answer to various CS calls (particularly by the 
regional labour and political movements) for independence, the Federation brought little 
                                                 
38 The CLC was the successor to the British Guiana and West Indies Labour Congress 
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new in the way of governance, since constitutional advances such as universal adult 
suffrage and ministerial government were granted between 1945 and 1956 in Jamaica, 
Trinidad, Barbados, and the Windward and Leeward Islands (Payne 1989: 14-15; 
Crassweller 1972: 239-240). Moreover, discord between political leadership within the 
Federation was abundant, specifically in relation to the degree of power to be exercised 
nationally and federally. For instance, Jamaican leaders opposed strong federal powers, 
while those in Trinidad, and in most of the other territories to varying degrees, were in 
favour of a strong federal government (Erisman 1992: 60-61). Little emphasis was placed 
on trade aspects of integration in the Federal context, which meant that there were no 
significant changes from the regionally disconnected agriculture export-oriented 
economies (Lewis 1999: 10; CARICOM 1998). Added to this, economic changes such as 
increasing industrial production and tourism development in some countries, but not in 
others, further divided the region’s leaders and thereby contributed to the political 
complexity of the arrangement. 
 
Economic conditions in some countries improved from the 1950s due to 
economic diversification that was promoted through development programmes 
encouraging “industrialisation by invitation” along the lines suggested by W. Arthur 
Lewis. In particular, Jamaica and Trinidad did very well, with Jamaica’s bauxite and 
Trinidad’s oil refining industries booming. However, since changes in economic 
conditions were uneven in the region, some of the more advanced countries (i.e. Jamaica) 
believed that the Federation was to their detriment. This was compounded by the 
continued lack of economic interconnectedness in this region that geared production 
towards North American and British markets and the fact that in attempts to seduce FDI 
from the USA and the UK the region’s countries competed against each other instead of 
cooperating (Marshall 1998: 45-60; Payne 1989: 15-16; Sherlock et. al. 1987: 269-270; 
Bolland 2001: 506-507). So, despite the CLC’s advocacy of regional integration and 
cooperation political divides dominated Federal politics.  
 
These political and economic differences in the region contributed to the 
disintegration of the Federation.  Jamaica (the Federation’s largest country) decided to 
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leave the group 1961 and Trinidad and Tobago exited shortly thereafter (Lewis 1999: 15, 
Chernick 1978: 5, Erisman 1992: 61, CARICOM 1998), with its Premier Eric Williams 
calculating that “Ten minus one equals zero” (cited in Crasssweller 1972: 268). The 
Federation fizzled in April 1962 and Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago gained 
independence in August of that year (Erisman 1992: 60-61; Lewis 1999: 15; CARICOM 
1998). 
 
CARIFTA AND CARICOM 
 
Following the demise of the Federation, the creation of a Caribbean Free Trade 
Area (CARIFTA) was proposed in 1965. It was not until 1967, however, that negotiations 
for the creation of CARIFTA were resuscitated. In the case of CARIFTA, a regional 
umbrella private sector EIG, the Incorporated Caribbean Chambers of Industry and 
Commerce (ICCC), was the important CSO that mobilised in favour of regional 
economic integration.  
 
The ICCC wanted to reach larger markets, since incentives established in the 
1950s to encourage industrial development had, by the 1960s, created industries (in the 
MDCs) that were quickly outgrowing their local markets. So, the ICCC created a 
committee that toured the region and met with heads of government to test their views 
(Payne 1989: 68-69; Axline 1979: 92). In August 1967, when an inter-territory meeting 
was held in Georgetown Guyana to discuss CARIFTA, government officials, academics 
(commissioned to undertake feasibility studies) and ICCC representatives discussed and 
agreed the outline for CARIFTA. This is an instance where there was indeed CSO 
activism and consultation on trade issues and where this was significant. However, this 
activism on trade was limited to a regional focus.  
 
Apart from the ICCC, no other CSOs mobilised in efforts to shape this region-
wide trade agreement. This may be viewed as consistent with material interest-based 
views on involvement in trade and economic realms. However, ideas held within the 
ICCC were important in precipitating this EIG’s mobilisation.  
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 As previously noted, leaders in the region for the most part accepted the causal 
beliefs expressed in the modernisation and growth paradigm. As a result, policies that 
facilitated the growth of manufacturing sectors in attempts to foster import substitution 
industrialisation (ISI) were implemented. In Lewis’s version of the modernisation and 
growth approach, expanding industrial capacity within a protective regional atmosphere 
and making use of foreign investment were important ingredients for Caribbean 
industrialisation and development. The belief in the importance of a regional infant 
industry strategy and the need to attract foreign investment coloured views of 
governments and private sector entities represented by the ICCC so that a regional 
trading area became a feasible follow-up to the failed Federation. Ideas about how to 
develop economically and about how to pursue profitability shaped interest perceptions 
of leaders and some producers in the region (Axline 1979: 70-71; Erisman 1992: 61-62).  
 
Evidence of the importance that regional leaders and the ICCC attached to the 
modernisation and growth paradigm can be seen in their rejection of proposals from 
academics invited to the 1967 meeting. These academics advocated the creation of a 
CARIFTA based on ideas drawn from a paradigm different from the modernisation and 
growth school.  
 
Caribbean scholars of the 1960s-1970s from the University of the West Indies 
(UWI) who called themselves the “New World Group”, recommended regional 
integration as a possible response to unemployment and economic development 
problems. They recommended organising the production and the promotion of 
manufacturing industries on a regional scale to deal with these economic development 
concerns in order to enhance ISI and to increase levels of inter-island commerce 
(Bennett: 1999: 129-131; Erisman 1992: 61).  Lewis’s view and variations of this, 
notably the view espoused in the region by economist William Demas, favoured FDI 
(Axline 1979: 17). However, New World Group scholars viewed FDI as contributing 
little to the economies in the region. They saw most FDI in the region as draining 
economies through repatriated profits and charges incurred. They also saw assembly 
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manufacturing implemented using FDI as using few regional inputs, creating limited new 
employment and benefiting multinationals disproportionately.39 These views that broke 
with the mainstream modernisation and growth development prescriptions of the 1950s 
were put forth at the 1967 meeting on CARIFTA by Havelock Brewster and Clive 
Thomas who presented their study:  The Dynamics of West Indian Integration (Axline 
1979: 19-20; Marshall 1998: 64-65). 
 
So far then, this section has highlighted that the ICCC’s material interests and 
ideas about development were in line with the mainstream development paradigm and 
were important for understanding their activism on CARIFTA. Another factor important 
in understanding their activism and their being consulted was the placement of the private 
sector in the unofficial populist-statist stability bargain that tended to be followed by 
governments in the region.  
 
This bargain was similar to a corporatist interest group strategy in which private 
sector and labour harmony is maintained though catering to concerns of each of these 
groups in governance. The importance of this stability bargain was reflected in the 
ICCC’s focus on increasing employment in its proposals for the creation of CARIFTA. 
This focus on employment concerns could be seen as the instrumental use of ideas about 
employment as a tool to further the group’s material interests in creating regional 
arrangements to increase their profits through regional expansion. Yet, even if such ideas 
were used strategically this illustrates that they were of sufficient salience to merit use 
and were therefore important. Added to this, conceiving of ideas as little more than tools 
used for interest advancement implies that it is impossible for CSOs to mobilise and 
construct their interests on the basis of ideas. However, the discussion of CSO 
mobilisation and formation in this chapter tries to illustrate that policy ideas (causal 
beliefs) and principled beliefs can be of real salience for CSOs in combination with 
interests. 
 
                                                 
39 Academics writing along these lines included Kari Levitt, Lloyd Best and Clive Thomas (Axline 1979: 
19) 
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Although concerns about employment were expressed by the ICCC and by 
governments in the region in discussions about CARIFTA, labour EIGs did not appear to 
mobilise with respect to CARIFTA. Furthermore, unlike the ICCC, labour was not 
incorporated in the 1967 talks on CARIFTA (despite government-labour-private sector 
bargain/patron client relationships). Nonetheless, workers’ EIGs remained important in 
their continual support for and advocacy of regional integration into the 1960s and 1970s. 
According to Owen Arthur: “…the vision embodied in the post-Federation integration 
process is one which the political leaders have inherited from our workers’ unions” 
(Arthur 2005: 7). This philosophical influence, though, is where union impact stopped, as 
they appear to have been inactive in presenting proposals or voicing their interests with 
respect to the creation of CARIFTA. 
 
Despite having visions for regional integration along different lines, W. Arthur 
Lewis’s and New World Group views asserted that regional economic integration could 
reduce chronic unemployment problems in the Caribbean (Bennett 1999: 129; Axline 
1979: 19). So, the material interests of workers in employment matters were at stake in 
talks surrounding the proposed CARIFTA, yet unions did not mobilise to ensure that the 
CARIFTA arrangements would properly address labour needs. This paradox can be 
accounted for by considering that unions either did not perceive trade affairs as 
priorities around which to organise mobilisation efforts or perceived governments as 
meeting labour needs in light of the labour-government-private sector governance 
bargain.  
 
Yet, it was not simply the belief that governments would take care of worker and 
private sector concerns (as part of the corporatist type stability bargain/populist-statism) 
that contributed to lack of labour EIG activism with respect to CARIFTA negotiations. If 
this were the case, why would the ICCC mobilise with respect to CARIFTA? Wouldn’t 
private sector interests represented by the ICCC be taken care of by governments too if 
this were the case? The easy answer to these questions would be that it was in the ICCC’s 
members’ material interests to mobilise, but that it was not in the interests of unions (e.g. 
the CLC). Nonetheless, as has been highlighted, workers could have been affected 
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materially by the creation of CARIFTA too. Therefore, one cannot boil activism down to 
interests alone but should look at other factors such as CSO interest perception and the 
beliefs and ideas (causal and principled) expressed by CSOs. Moreover, the institutional 
wherewithal of CSOs to organise effectively around and to prioritise all issues in their 
material interests should be considered too 
 
Four years into the life of CARIFTA at the seventh Heads of Government 
Conference in 1972 the leaders of member states decided to take their cooperative 
endeavours a step further by creating the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) which was 
also to include a Common Market (CARICOM 1998; Bennett 1999: 133-135; Lewis 
1999: 17-19). Once more the regional umbrella private sector organisation played an 
important role, whilst labour EIGs did not. 
 
The Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce (CAIC)40 helped to 
broker an important compromise between the LDCs and the MDCs. The CAIC helped to 
ease political discord over how to create a CARICOM that would not replicate the 
CARIFTA problems of the MDCs benefiting far more than the LDCs. Although intra-
regional trade increased between 1967 and 1974 (from 6.0% to 7.2% of the region’s 
trade) and all the countries saw gains in intra-regional trade over the period, the 
distribution was skewed in favour of the MDCs (Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, Trinidad 
and Tobago), which accounted for 96.0% of intra-CARIFTA exports and 90.0% of 
imports in 1974 (Chernick 1978: 29-31). The CAIC helped to broker a compromise 
through helping to fund the Caribbean Investment Cooperation (CIC) that would transfer 
equity capital from the MDCs to the LDCs in order to appease the LDCs. This was 
important since the LDC governments wanted to ensure increased investment to their 
countries before agreeing on a common external tariff (CET) (Axline 1979: 114, 123, 
131). In spite of the private sector members of the CAIC being ambivalent as to the costs 
and benefits of the CET (according to Axline 1979: 114) they helped to make this 
important aspect of CARICOM a reality. 
 
                                                 
40 The CAIC was the successor to the of the ICCC 
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As in the case of CARIFTA, the regional umbrella private sector EIG mobilised 
in line with ideas consistent with modernisation and growth theories rather than more 
radical stucturalist views implied in the LDC’s desires for regional industrial planning to 
ensure investment in their countries. However, as Axline claims, they were not certain as 
to whether this arrangement would protect private sector interests. Assuming that Axline 
is correct, the CAIC mobilised based on perceived interests linked to ideas about the 
benefits of regional economic integration. Mainstream ideas about modernisation, growth 
and regional integration were therefore important in the specification of the CAIC’s 
interests.  
 
Also, as in the CARIFTA case, the capacity of the CAIC to broker an agreement 
for the creation of the CARICOM was important. The CAIC agreed that its members 
would contribute 40% of the CIC’s funds for investment (Axline 1979: 131). The 
financial capacity of the CAIC and its members to broker such an arrangement was not 
shared in common with the regional labour umbrella association (or its members) that 
once more was inactive on the CARICOM issue. 
 
As was the case with CARIFTA, labour EIGs had material interests that could 
have been affected by the creation of CARICOM but did not mobilise. Without 
rehearsing the assertions about labour EIG inaction on CARIFTA too much, once more 
this inaction can be attributed to beliefs about where priorities lay (interest perception) 
rather than the possession of material interests alone. This inaction of labour EIGs was 
also in line with CSO activism throughout the region in the 1970s that focussed on a 
relatively myopic set of domestic issues (though important issues) whilst not prioritising 
other important issues such as external trade arrangements, not perceiving these as 
important, or being institutionally unable to mobilise on these fronts (or some 
combination of these).  
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 3.3  CSOS IN THE 1970S, 1980S AND ONWARDS 
 
So far this chapter has looked at important CSOs in the region (from welfare-
oriented CSOs, to labour and private sector EIGs); at the significance of ideational-
material occurrences for understanding CSO formation and activism; and at ideas, 
interests and institutions also important in comprehending CSO formation and activism. 
The chapter has shown that labour EIGs and private-sector EIGs emerged as CSOs of 
particular importance in the state-society bargains used for Caribbean governance in the 
post-World War II era. The previous section of this chapter also looked at the activism of 
these two types of EIGs on important regional political and trade arrangements.  
 
This chapter will now proceed to look at the evolution of important CSOs 
between the 1960s/1970s and the end of the 20th century and will also briefly discuss the 
activism of these CSOs in general and with respect to trade matters of regional 
importance. 
 
PRIVATE SECTOR/INDUSTRY SPECIFIC EIGS  
 
The ICCC’s focus on CARIFTA speaks to the growing importance of industrial or 
manufacturing sectors (particularly in the MDCs) that emerged from governmental focus 
on diversification and industrialisation based on the (causal) belief that this was the 
viable path to economic development (Axline 1979: 131). In the 19th century and early 
20th century activism in the private sector remained largely centred around the planter-
merchant elites in the region and was linked to race-class cleavages. In contrast, with the 
emergence of internal self-governance by the middle of the 20th century, development 
strategies that were pursued in the region resulted in other sectors and groups within 
society growing in importance. Commercial associations such as Chambers of Commerce 
began to change, becoming more racially diverse,41 and evolved to become Chambers of 
                                                 
41 The race-class cleavages however have by no means disappeared altogether. 
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Commerce and Industry (Raul Harris interview: 15-07-03; Lawrence Placide Interview: 
14-04-05).  
 
Also, as the manufacturing sub-sector of the private sector became important, 
manufacturers’ associations began to spring up across the region, particularly in the 
MDCs. For instance, the Jamaica Manufactures’ Association was founded in 1947, the 
Trinidad and Tobago Manufacturers’ Association was established in 1956 and the 
Barbados Manufacturers’ Association was formed in 1964. In the 1960s and 1970s these 
associations began to form throughout the LDCs too.  
 
Some countries focussed diversification efforts away from agriculture and 
towards tourism. Consequently, tourism-related associations formed throughout the 
region from the 1950s. In the 1970s and into the early 1980s small business associations 
emerged as well. The small business association emerged in parallel with government 
attempts throughout the region to continually open space for economic activity to wider 
sections of society. Into the 1980s private sector/industry specific CSOs persisted and 
new ones emerged. Small business associations, manufacturing associations and other 
industry or sector specific associations continued to emerge into the 1980s (specifically in 
the LDCs) across the region. In addition, from the 1990s private sector associations 
emerged to deal with trade issues and their impact on private sector entities (to be 
highlighted in Chapter 4 and Part B of the thesis) 
 
These EIGs were created and evolved in order to represent specific material 
interests within the private sector. However, they also emerged alongside government 
policies purporting to be aimed at increasing social equity (a principled belief). Even 
though material self-interests are important for understanding the creation of these EIGs, 
these cannot be de-linked from the ideational context in which they emerged and indeed 
were encouraged (by governments) to emerge.  
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 LABOUR EIGS 
 
From the 1970s to the end of the 1990s, workers’ unions continued to be 
important throughout the region, focussing specifically on industrial relations and labour 
legislation both within individual CARICOM countries but also at the CARICOM level. 
Unions tended to focus on sector specific and industry specific issues or on day-to-day 
labour matters rather than focussing most of their energies on broader political matters. 
This narrowing of focus occurred as political aspirants moved out of unions and into 
party politics from the 1950s when the franchise expanded (Henry 1999: 94; Nurse 1980: 
17).  
 
However, unions have continued to be important in mobilising politically on 
pressing socio-economic issues in the region (Nurse 1980: 17; George De Peana 
interview: 07-04-05). Mobilisation on socio-economic issues remained important into the 
1980s and 1990s, especially since the relationship between governments/political parties 
and unions, inherent in the labour-government-private sector bargains that characterised 
regional governance, started to become strained from the 1980s. This became the case 
specifically from the 1980s, when policies implemented and policy ideas adopted by 
governments / political figures in line with international ideational-material trends 
conflicted with the ideas and interests valued by labour (Henry 1997: 98).  
 
In addition, at the regional level the Caribbean Congress of Labour (CCL)42 
continues to support the integrationist vision espoused by the early 20th century regional 
umbrella association both in philosophy and in advocating the necessity of allowing the 
free-movement of people for work purposes within the CARICOM region under the 
Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME) (George De Peana interview: 07-04-05).  
 
                                                 
42 The CCL is the descendent of the CLC 
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Therefore, as unions in the region have evolved, they have continued to mobilise 
based on philosophies and beliefs and to represent worker’s interests. 
 
RADICAL CSOS 
 
 
The Black Power Movement emerged by the 1970s, building on ideas espoused in 
Garveyism, ideas advanced by the New World Group and drew on other ideas and 
occurrences important at the time, for instance in the American civil rights movement or 
African Black nationalism. The “Black Power” movement mobilised through strikes in 
attempts to overturn the racially unequal power balance in the region (Ryan et. al. 1995)  
This movement drew popular support from the working poor and marginalised with 
interests in improving their conditions (as in the labour movement of the 1930s) and had 
revolutionary economic and social objectives (Ryan 1995: 41, 46-47). In fact the 
revolutionary nature of the movement was exposed in Trinidad and Tobago when there 
was a failed “Black Power Revolution” between February and April of 1970 (Ryan et. al. 
1995). 43
 
Although the “Black Power” movement within CS was politically important and 
did address issues directly relating to regional integration, and trade relations in general, 
there is nothing that suggests that members of this movement tried to mobilise or to be 
consulted by political leaders or state officials on shaping proposed regional trade 
arrangements. This, however, is unsurprising considering the militant nature of this 
movement’s proposals and their rejection of the relatively conservative or pragmatic way 
in which the region was governed and conducted political and economic affairs. To 
include such groups in consultation on regional affairs could be politically disruptive, 
especially because of the radical character of their beliefs. Cooperation with such groups 
could also affect the region’s standing during the Cold War. Added to this, the content of 
this movement’s aims made consultation difficult as well, since the movement did not 
                                                 
43 This Revolution is examined in depth in Ryan, Selwyn et. al (1995) 
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seek reform but drastic structural change. This example points out the pragmatic stance of 
regional governments that mostly adhered to mainstream policy ideas and did not want 
to upset the status quo.44
 
With changes in the international politico-economic atmosphere towards neo-
liberal economic policy from the 1980s and in the context of the post-Cold War World 
(that emerged in the 1990s), the activities of such radical racial awareness began to wane 
in importance. As a result, CSOs of the radical sort that emerged from the Black Power 
Movement virtually (but not entirely) disappeared and certainly became of limited 
importance in policy spheres. 
 
The discussion of radical CSOs here hints at the liberal slant of this thesis, 
therefore a short digression to lay bare this orientation is in order here. In examining CS 
activism and consultation on trade areas, this thesis takes a view somewhere between 
Critical Theorists and Post-Marxists. Consultation between various non-state actors and 
government officials in addition to compromise by all sides are seen here as having the 
ability to create trade arrangements that are society friendly and equitable. Cooperation 
and compromise are also seen here as serving important democratic, educational and 
empowerment functions.  
 
Of course, external factors may contradict these attempts, since states comprising 
CARICOM must negotiate with those outside of the region. However, so long as the 
region’s positions begin to consider and include various CS positions in their negotiating 
agendas, there is some chance of creating more socially acceptable arrangements. The 
emphasis here therefore, does not leave room for change through all-out-revolution of the 
Marxian or Gramscian sort, indeed such types of potentially violent aims are contrary to 
the sort of activities defined in Chapter 1 of this thesis as within the realm of CSOs (i.e. 
non-violent). Instead, change here is viewed as sustainable principally through 
                                                 
44 Except in the cases of Guyana and Grenada (most explicitly) and also in Jamaica to a lesser extent under 
Manley in the 1970s. 
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incremental changes in groups’ abilities to participate in and impact on political processes 
and (eventually) political outcomes. 
 
With this aside out of the way, the focus on CSO types in the region will continue 
with a discussion of women’s organisations and a brief peek into the types of CSOs that 
emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
WOMEN’S ORGANISATIONS  
 
The women’s movement spawned several women’s organisations in the region in 
attempts to raise awareness about the needs and rights of women; the role of women in 
development; and in efforts to ensure that these issues were recognised by governments. 
In this respect National Councils of Women and umbrella organisations to represent 
diverse women’s organisations and to increase awareness on women’s conditions, were 
formed throughout the West Indies. Also, in 1970 country representatives from these 
CSOs decided to create a regional umbrella organisation called the Caribbean Women’s 
Association (CARIWA) (Ellis 2003: 71-73). 
 
This does not mean that women’s organisations were not present prior to the 
1970s. Indeed women’s organisations grew in importance from the 1940s with 
organisations concerned with increasing voting rights for women and participation in 
party politics (e.g. League of Women Voters-Jamaica- , Women’s Political and Education 
Organisation- Guyana-) or welfare type organisations concerned with personal and  moral 
improvement, care taking matters or charity work (e.g. Young Women’s Christian 
Associations -YWCAs- and Mothers Unions). Nonetheless, it was not until the 1970s that 
new women’s organisations attempted to mobilise so that policy making and policy 
processes in the Caribbean would be cognisant of women-specific concerns (Ellis 2003: 
71-73, Senior 1991: 154).  
 
 92
In this case a materialist conception of activism and interests does not help one to 
understand CSOs emerging out of the women’s movement and mobilising to mainstream 
women’s issues in policy spheres. Put differently, material conditions affecting the lives 
of women did not somehow change in the 1970s. Instead, women participating within 
these groups became empowered to challenge discrimination and inequality based on the 
view that such was wrong (principled beliefs) at a time when this ideational trend was 
growing in the Western world. Women involved in these CSOs came to perceive 
government policies as perpetuating injustices that disadvantaged them and, based on 
beliefs about inequality, came to advocate the mainstreaming of women’s issues into 
policy making as necessary for creating more equitable societies and as vital for 
economic and social development (i.e. causal beliefs linked to principled beliefs).  
 
Between 1974 and 1976, the governments of Barbados, Antigua, Jamaica and 
Grenada were encouraged to establish machineries to deal with women’s issues and one 
such machinery was established within the CARICOM Secretariat in 1981. These 
machineries were almost universally implemented across CARICOM by the end of the 
UN’s decade dedicated to women in 1985 (Ellis 2003: 92-93; Senior 1991: 155). The 
activities of women’s non-EIGs in the region and the ideational-material context in 
which women’s issues were promoted internationally (via the UN) enabled these CSOs to 
be consulted by governments through women’s bureaus. Therefore, there was a policy 
paradigm shift in the international ideational-material context of the 1970s and 1980s that 
opened space for women’s CSO activism and consultation on policy issues. Despite this 
change in women’s activism though, between the 1970s and 1990s women’s 
organisations did not move beyond dealing with domestic/regional economic, social and 
political concerns. However, this inactivity on trade matters began to change into the 
1990s when women’s organisations evolved, forming NGOs and gender-based CSOs.  
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CSOS EMERGING IN THE 1980S AND 1990S 
 
In addition to the CSOs highlighted thus far, other CSOs and social movements 
focussing on human rights, indigenous rights, and environmental protection sprang up 
and became important in the Caribbean, notably from the 1990s (Serbin 1998: 113). 
Some examples of these at the regional level are the Caribbean Policy Development 
Centre (CPDC), the Caribbean Human Rights Network, and the Caribbean Association 
for Integrated Rural Development. These CSOs emerged and mobilised in light of 1990s 
shifts in ideational-material context and in light of ideas emerging within the region and 
beyond about NGOs and NGO activism.  
 
A more in-depth focus on these CSOs will be taken up when this thesis moves on 
to focus on CARICOM and CARICOM CSOs in the 1980s and 1990s (in Chapters 4 and 
5). For now though, this is where the introduction to CSOs in the region and the 
discussion of their evolution stops.  
 
CONCLUSION: FEEDING HISTORY INTO THE 
CONTEMPORARY 
 
This chapter has attempted to show that from emancipation to the turn of the 21st 
century various CSOs have emerged and have been important socially and politically. 
CSOs emerged when ideational-material atmospheres were accommodating or 
compelling and with CSOs defining their interests based on perceptions, principled ideas 
and causal ideas. We also see that the activism of CSOs coincided with the opening of 
space for impacting on policy processes. For instance, the Colonial Office Commissions 
began to consult workers and political associations at a time when these CSOs were 
becoming rather active, which opened the potential for these groups to impact on policy 
outcomes (enhancing labour rights, constitutional rights, and self-governance). In 
addition, the activism of the regional labour association with respect to the British West 
Indies Federation, of the ICCC with relation to CARIFTA, and of women’s organisations 
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with respect to domestic policy were actions that in themselves contributed to widening 
the participatory space and enhancing the potential for CSOs to impact on policy 
outcomes.  
 
This chapter has preliminarily introduced the fact that CSOs in the Anglophone 
Caribbean have been for the most part inactive on trade issues. Looking at activism on 
the negotiations surrounding the formation of the British West Indies Federation, 
CARIFTA and CARICOM illustrated that, despite some activism on regional political 
and trade matters, activism was lacking on external matters. Chapter 4 will look more 
closely at the lack of CSO mobilisation on trade matters by contrasting emerging 
activism from the mid/late 1990s with that prior to the mid/late 1990s.  
 
In looking at CSOs and their activism, this chapter also highlighted some 
important aspects of economic, social and political developments of countries in the 
region as a means of presenting important background information. The overview of 
CSOs and CSO activism in this chapter, though, has not been exhaustive. It did not 
highlight the whole spectrum of CSOs in the region. For instance, this chapter did not 
discuss the persistence and evolution of agricultural associations from elitist associations 
in the 19th century towards organisations that came to include government para-statals 
(with the emergence of heightened government involvement in agricultural activities) or 
that became more small farmer or grass-roots oriented (as the fate in agricultural exports 
began to suffer from the 1970s). However, some of the exclusions made in presenting this 
brief history will be made up for in chapters to follow (especially in the case studies). 
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CHAPTER 4 
DIFFERENCES IN IDEATIONAL-MATERIAL CONTEXT, 
DIFFERENCES IN CSO MOBILISATION AND INCLUSION 
 
 
The introductory chapter of this thesis illustrated that the CARICOM region did 
not become drastically more open to trade in the 1990s than it was in the 1970s (see 
Figures1 and 2). Since material changes in the trade sphere cannot account for more 
visible CSO activism on trade issues and more openness to consulting with CSOs on 
trade matters what can?  
 
This thesis argues that a focus on good governance; a shift towards neo-liberal 
economic policy thought and practice; and the emergence of globalisation as process and 
discourse are important ideational-material trends that emerged by the 1990s to influence 
changes in activism and inclusion. This current chapter contributes to the above-
mentioned argument by looking at the ideational-material trends important from the 
1980s and into the 1990s and at those important from the end of the Second World War 
to the 1970s. CSO activism and consultation on trade arrangements in the 1970s and 
1980s was close to non-existent (despite the negotiation of consecutive Lomé 
Conventions and other trade agreements) partly because the ideational-material context of 
the time was not conducive to such. So, in understanding differences between CSO and 
government approaches to trade issues in the 1970s and mid/late 1990s, one must keep in 
mind the differences in time specific ideational-material contexts. 
 
To bring out these points this chapter begins in section 4.1 by looking at the 
ideational-material context of the 1970s and at CSO non-activism and non-inclusion on 
trade issues in CARICOM against this backdrop. Section 4.2 then highlights important 
ideational-material changes in policy spheres that began to surface from the 1980s and 
examines the ways in which these impacted on trade arrangements negotiated and 
implemented during the 1980s and 1990s. Section 4.2 also looks at the ways in which 
CSOs and governments in the CARICOM region began to change their attitudes and 
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behaviours with respect to trade matters in the context of these ideational-material 
changes. 
 
4.1  THE 1970S CSOs AND CARICOM POLITICO-ECONOMIC 
RELATIONS 
 
The EEC/EU - ACP trade relationship represents the sole negotiating forum on 
trade in which CARICOM countries have been involved from the 1970s right through to 
the present, beginning with the Lomé Accords that have been replaced by the Cotonou 
Agreement/ European Partnership Agreements -EPAs.45  In the agenda-setting processes 
leading up to negotiations of the Lomé agreement in the 1970s, CSO activism was non-
existent and neither governments nor the collective CARICOM mechanism consulted 
with CSOs. This section will look at this CSO non-mobilisation and non-inclusion in the 
context of the international ideational-material context of the 1970s in which the Lomé 
negotiations were located. 
 
THE IDEATIONAL-MATERIAL CONTEXT OF THE 1970S 
• WELFARISM AND DEVELOPMENTALISM 
 
In the international economic climate of the 1960s and 1970s neo-liberal ideas 
about the beneficence of a market-led economy or of universal trade liberalisation were 
not dominant in western thought or policy. On the contrary, welfarist or socialist outlooks 
based on economic planning and government intervention in economies that aimed to 
achieve full employment were more important from the 1930s and into the post-World 
War II period, particularly in the USA and the UK (Backhouse 2002: 290; Martinussen 
1999: 50). Also, in Nazi Germany and in the Soviet Union, control economies and 
socialist economic planning, though of a different nature than in the USA and Britain, 
were important forms of economic management (Backhouse 2002: 290). In fact, Robert 
                                                 
45 Other trade arrangements were the CBI initiated by the government of the USA and the CARIBCAN 
agreement with Canada; both began in the 1980s. 
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Backhouse asserts that welfare economics and socialism were important in mainstream 
economic thought from the late 19th century and only faced significant challenges from 
the 1970s  (2002: chap. 12). With relation to development thought, Martinussen similarly 
asserts that into the 1970s “… Latin American and Western researchers expressly 
rejected central components of the neo-classical legacy…” (1999: 50). Through to the 
1970s then, economic interventionism was accepted practice.  
 
Let us focus a bit more closely on this context by commencing with a look at 
ideas important in American and British thought and policy spheres, particularly because 
these ideas were subscribed to in the pragmatic English-speaking Caribbean more than 
communist ideas were. 
 
Welfarism was important in the USA from the 1930s following the Depression 
beginning with Roosevelt’s New Deal (1933-1937) and then followed by theories put 
forth by John Maynard Keynes in his 1936 book The General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money. Following the war the UK implemented Keynesian policies (in the 
1940s and the1950s) and the Kennedy government in the USA made use of similar full 
employment policies (Backhouse 2002: 229, 290-291). Also in the U.K., state 
interventionism in the form of nationalisations of industries or companies was sanctioned 
by the 1945 Labour Party Government that announced plans for nationalisation in coal, 
steel, electricity gas and transport (Howard 1989: 23). John G. Ruggie summarises the 
approach of governments to economic affairs from the 1930s in stating:  
 
 Governments everywhere had developed increasingly active forms of 
intervention in the domestic economy in order to affect the level of prices 
and employment, and to protect them against external dislocation (1982: 
390). 
 
In developing countries similar planning was attempted too but was linked closely 
to concerns about development. In mainstream development thought that emerged to 
address post-War reconstruction (in the 1940s) and then to speak to the problems of 
“underdeveloped countries” (from the 1950s); it was believed that governments should 
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intervene in economies to kick-start industrial modernisation and balanced economic 
growth (Backhouse 2002: 302-303; Axline 1979: 10-11; Martinussen 1999: chap. 5)46. 
The post-war experiences of interventionism that helped to rebuild Germany and Japan 
seemed to illustrate this point. Hence, governments were seen as needing to intervene in 
underdeveloped economies because of the assumed weakness of the entrepreneurial 
classes in these countries and because these countries were seen as possessing 
“backward” economies (Howell and Pearce 2002: 14; Martinussen 1999:258-259).  
 
As in Keynesian thought, it was believed that governments should plan and 
intervene in their domestic economies in order to provide for important economic and 
social welfare needs in societies. This was necessary since markets did not always 
operate in advantageous ways (Backhouse 2002: 304, Martinussen 1999: 259).  Marshall 
(2001) highlights that, for the Caribbean region, Keynesian type policies were aimed at 
maintaining peace between capital and organised labour in the region based on 
redistribution in exchange for worker cooperation. As a result, welfare benefits were used 
to create social peace and legitimise the state (279). Keynesian type approaches to 
economic management thereby facilitated a corporatist style bargain between the state, 
labour and the private sector which Marshall terms “populist-statism” (2001: 271). 
 
In addition to these mainstream views on development, by the 1950s structuralist 
ideas purported by Raúl Prebisch of UNECLA saw inequalities between industrialised 
and developing countries as perpetuating underdevelopment. To change this situation, 
governments needed to intervene in the economies of underdeveloped countries to 
develop industries under protective tariff barriers (Backhouse 2002: 303; Erisman 1992: 
10; Axline 1979: 10; Brown 2001: 197-199; Martinussen 1999: chap. 6). More radical 
dependency views took this view further by conceiving developing countries as trapped 
in a state of underdevelopment as a result of participating in capitalist world system. 
Countries could only emerge from underdevelopment if their governments took steps: to 
strengthen domestic economies; to become self-reliant, to focus on exchanges with other 
                                                 
46 Development economists such as Ragnar Nurkse, Paul Rosenstein Rodan, Walter Rostow and W. Arthur 
Lewis prescribed these “Big Push”,  “Modernisation” and “Growth” theories. 
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developing countries (South-South Cooperation); and to alter the capitalist system 
(Erisman 1992: 10-16; 24-26; Axline 1979: 15-16; Brown 2001: 198-200; Martinussen 
1999: chap. 6). These alternative views about development involved government 
economic planning and intervention but also attempted to change international economic 
relations through advocating a New International Economic Order (NIEO) (Samuel 1999: 
158-159; Erisman 1992: 46; Serbin 1990: 125; Brown 2001: 201-204).  As discussed 
briefly in Chapter 3, scholarly thinkers who made up the New World Group advanced 
views of this sort in the CARICOM region. 
 
The combination of mainstream, structuralist and dependency ideas, accepted by 
different leaders and policy makers in both developing and industrialised countries, 
contributed to a new chapter being incorporated into the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT in 1964). This chapter allowed for exceptions to the GATT principle 
of reciprocity in the conduct of trade between industrialised and developing countries. 
Also, by the 1970s, preferences could be unilaterally granted to developing countries by 
industrialised ones under the General System of Preferences (GSP) (Kenwood and 
Lougheed 1999: 286; Acharya and Daly 2004: 10; Brown 2001: 202). All this meant that 
redistributive mechanisms, akin to social redistribution at domestic levels, were built into 
multilateral trade rules. 
  
These exceptions to the liberal trading regime allowed concerns of less developed 
countries to be factored into trade arrangements and gave developing country 
governments some leeway to accommodate important societal concerns within their 
countries. Since the concerns of important social groups were incorporated in trade 
agreements at this time and since the region’s governments attempted to appease 
important socio-economic groups, it is plausible that CSOs within the CARICOM region 
“were happy to ignore and leave to others to resolve” (Richardson 1993: 7) their trade 
related concerns instead of prioritising or mobilising on trade issues. 
 
Although under the GATT sectoral negotiations reduced tariff levels between 
industrialised countries between 1945 and the 1970s, many exceptions were written into 
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this agreement in order to accommodate important concerns expressed by industrialised 
countries. As a result, John Ruggie has defined the ideas upheld within the GATT as 
“embedded liberalism”. This label describes a social-democratic framework in which 
governments had the latitude to facilitate the welfare needs of important domestic groups 
whilst signing up to a mostly liberalising multilateral trade agreement (Ruggie 1982: 397-
398).  For industrialised countries too, then, welfarist provisions were incorporated into 
the GATT. 
 
As a consequence, between World War II and the 1970s, welfarism and 
developmentalism47 formed important facets of the ideational-material context.  
 
• THE COLD WAR AND GOVERNANCE 
 
During the 1960s and 1970s, Cold War divides that pitted communist states 
against non-communist ones, opened space for developing countries to align with one 
side or another (Marshall 1998: 61). The emphasis in thought on governance in the 
western world (particularly of the USA and western European countries) was on 
maintaining non-communist governments (rather than democracy per se) and pursuing 
non-communist paths to development. The converse was true for the Soviet sphere of 
influence.   
 
In this context, forms of governance between democracies and right-wing 
autocracies were condoned, whilst communist ones were shunned. By extension, non-
communist interventionist approaches to development were seen as favourable within 
developing countries under the western sphere of influence, whilst communist-type 
developmental strategies were viewed as unfavourable. In contrast, communist forms of 
governance, economic planning and development strategies were recommended for 
countries aligning with the Soviet pole. Ideational conflict was important in the 
ideational-material context of the time and because of these divides developing countries 
                                                 
47 Developmentalism here refers to state economic interventionism for development as was embodied in the 
modernisation and growth framework of thought. 
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became “pawns to be won or lost in the battle between “Pax Americana” and world 
socialism” (Payne and Sutton 1992: 40). As a result, developing countries could gain 
trade and aid concessions from one side or another in the divide depending on their 
ideational bent and English-speaking Caribbean countries were not exceptions. Countries 
in the region gained financial support, technical advice and trade preferences (notably 
under the 1980s Caribbean Basin Initiative-CBI-) from the USA to decrease the 
likelihood of communism taking root (Erisman 2003: 159; Marshall 2001: 277-278) 
 
So, in this ideational-material climate, Caribbean governance and development 
strategies were acceptable either on one side of the Cold War divide or the other. 
However, in most of the Anglophone Caribbean governance was usually characterised by 
supporting welfare concerns, facilitating the private sector, and state economic 
interventionism in a liberal mode rather than communist one. Material considerations, 
such as the political, military and financial power of the two major hegemonic blocs, 
were important in understanding international affairs and impacted on CARICOM actions 
and approaches to internal policies and external relations. Ideational factors were 
important too. More to the point, committing ideologically to align with one pole or 
another, deciding to follow one development path another, and seeking to govern in one 
way or another, were all decisions made in consideration of ideational standpoints.  
 
Although CARICOM countries tended to be more liberal than communist in their 
orientations, countries within the region usually decided not to align exclusively with one 
side or another during the Cold War. Instead, CARICOM countries tended to maintain 
links with both sides and also to place emphasis on South-South cooperation (Serbin 
1990: 127-128). The CARICOM countries as a group in fact stated their commitment to 
ideological pluralism within the region (Moore 1993: 210). Moreover, some governments 
in the region were radical in their international political views by criticising Anglo-
American imperialism, lauding African independence, and being vocally anti-apartheid. 
This came in more hard line forms as in Guyana (under Forbes Burnham) and Jamaica 
(under Michael Manley) and in more subtle ways as in Barbados (under Errol Barrow) 
(Beckles 2001: 228). These non-aligned and radical outlooks, however, did not mean that 
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some countries in the region were not closer to one pole or another. Divides within the 
region over the issue of Grenada’s radical choice of governance model in the early 1980s 
and over the invasion of the country in 1983 illustrated this clearly (Moore 1993: 213).  
What is important to note here is that ideational and material factors in the context 
of the time matter for understanding approaches to governance, development and trade. 
No matter where countries stood in the Cold War context, the ideational-material context 
of the time was one in which state-directed political governance (versus CSO 
participation) and interventionism for economic governance (versus neo-liberalism) 
were accepted. 
 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS  
 
As previously stated, the Lomé negotiations represented the primary trade-
negotiating arena in which CARICOM members were involved. The Lomé arrangements 
allowed for preferential trade with the industrialised countries of the EEC (now EU) on a 
non-reciprocal basis. In fact, the ACP countries insisted on non-reciprocity in the Lomé 
negotiations, stating that this was their right according to the GATT’s allowance for non-
reciprocity between developing and developed countries (Babarinde 1994: 20; Kenwood 
and Lougheed 1999: 286; Acharya and Daly 2004: 10).  
 
Despite these demands, there is no evidence that CSOs were consulted on these 
trade matters that would affect Caribbean societies and economies; nor is there evidence 
that CSOs tried to become involved. Instead, government evaluations of countries’ 
interests were the important factor and this was acceptable in the ideational-material 
context of time. 
 
The first Lomé Convention was agreed in 1975. This agreement was negotiated in 
part because of the UK’s proposed entry into the EEC, which prompted the governments 
of former colonies to try to ensure that trade and economic assistance would continue at 
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previous levels. These developing countries perceived improving trade and aid 
arrangements with their former colonisers as vital to their national interests. Moreover, 
some countries in the EEC (namely France) insisted on maintaining preferential 
arrangements with ex-colonies and overseas territories (Babarinde 1994: 15-18; Erisman 
2003; 168). Also, in analysing the efforts of the ACP countries to negotiate a trade 
agreement on terms that favoured them, attempts to foster South-South cooperation and 
an NIEO cannot be forgotten either (Gonzales 1989: 65-66; Payne and Sutton 1992: 46). 
 
The resulting Lomé agreements focussed mainly on promoting trade and 
investment in the ACP countries and also entailed provisions for the delivery of 
development assistance.  
 
Under Lomé I (1975-1980) CARICOM countries (along with all other ACP 
countries) gained trade concessions in important areas such as sugar, rum and bananas in 
protocols to the Convention. The Lomé included measures aimed at export diversification 
by encouraging industrial and technical cooperation with European entrepreneurs and 
using foreign direct investment (FDI). The CARICOM countries also benefited from the 
export stabilisation scheme (STABEX), which maintained price levels, and they had 
access to the European Development Fund (EDF) (Babarinde 1994: 21-22; Payne and 
Sutton 1992: 46-48). Therefore, ACP countries traded with the EEC on a non-reciprocal 
basis, gained guaranteed market access and guaranteed prices for their exports and were 
granted investment incentives. 
 
Under the second Lomé agreement (1980-1985) a system called the SYSMIN 
(similar to the STABEX) was introduced to stabilise the prices of mineral products. 
Provisions geared towards increasing foreign direct investment (FDI) into the ACP 
countries, new provisions for special assistance needed by least developed, landlocked 
and small island states and those to increase expertise in agricultural and rural 
development programmes were also introduced (Babarinde 1994: 24-26).  
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Although farmers, workers, business persons and other social groups saw benefits 
from the provisions of the Lomé, CSOs representing them did not mobilise to make sure 
that this occurred in arriving at negotiating agendas for the Lomé agreements in the 
1970s. Additionally, there is no evidence of government-initiated consultation of CSOs in 
the region. 
 
CSO NON ACTIVISM ON LOMÉ NEGOTIATING AGENDAS IN THE 1970S 
 
Welfare-oriented non-EIGs did not mobilise on the issues negotiated in the Lomé 
context during the 1970s. These organisations focused on development and welfare 
related domestic policy issues as well as the delivery of social services. As for women’s 
organisations that emerged in the 1970s, these mobilised when it came to policy areas 
relating to equality and to ensure that women’s concerns were represented in all domestic 
economic and social policy initiatives. For both welfare-oriented and women-specific 
non-EIGs mobilisation on other areas was absent. How does one account for this non-
mobilisation?  
 
There is also little to suggest that consultation between EIGs 
(business/industry/workers’ specific) and governments/regional officials occurred with 
respect to the Lomé arrangements. Yet, these EIGs would be impacted by trade 
arrangements and should have been interested in attempting to make sure these 
arrangements met their needs. Why then did these EIGs not mobilise in the 1970s either?  
 
However, CSO non-activism was not because CSOs in the region lacked material 
interests in trade affairs. Negotiated trade arrangements could impact on the profitability 
of firms, industries and workers operating in traded sectors. Trade arrangements also 
could impact on the lives of most people in the region because of the high levels of 
exposure of CARICOM economies and societies to trade. The activism of developmental 
or welfare-oriented NGOs and women’s associations (later feminist or gender-based 
organisations) in the 1990s illustrates this and so does that of business/industry and 
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workers’ EIGs. When in the 1990s members of these CSOs began to view trade 
agreements as impacting on them and, by extension, came to view themselves as having 
interests in shaping trade agendas, then activism began.  
 
In the 1990s women’s and developmental non-EIGs focussed and began to 
mobilise so that their concerns relating to the gendered and the developmental impacts of 
trade arrangements could be heard. Additionally, EIGs began to assert their concerns 
about the impact of trade on businesses, industries and workers. This sort of activism 
could also have occurred in the 1970s. However, in the 1960s and 1970s the idea that 
CSOs should activate on or prioritise trade issues was lacking within the CSO world.  
 
Material factors also played into this limited activism. Preferential trade 
arrangements were acceptable in the 1970s and even into the early 1980s as evidenced by 
preferences granted to regional producers under the CBI with the USA and Caribean-
Canada Trade Agreement (CARIBCAN) (Moore 1993: 207-208). These arrangements 
allowed for governments to protect important socio-economic groups in their countries 
(i.e. groups represented by EIGs and non-EIGs) that could potentially be ill impacted by 
negotiated trade arrangements. In other words, governments could protect important 
socio-economic groups and as a result CSOs did not see themselves as needing to 
mobilise on trade issues.  So, the ideational- material context in which preferences were 
acceptable is important in helping to understand a limited CSOs need to mobilise.  
 
However, even if governments were able to accommodate concerns that may have 
been important to welfare oriented associations, women’s associations, business/industry 
representative associations and workers unions, these CSOs could have decided to 
mobilise on trade matters. CSOs of these sorts could have acted to ensure that the 
concerns they represented were thoroughly understood by governments and that they 
were accounted for in trade negotiations. Therefore it is plausible that, in addition to the 
non-reciprocal trade atmosphere of the time limiting CSOs’ material needs to mobilise, 
the ideational-material context also impacted on CSO perceptions about their interests in 
mobilising on trade issues. 
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 As for activism by more radical CSOs in the region, to some extent, this existed 
on trade matters. Structuralist and dependency views about inequality were popularised 
by the “Black Power” movement and presented to regional leaders by the UWI’s New 
World Group members from the 1960s. The “Black Power” movement led by UWI 
students and influenced by the ideas of the New World Group, led strikes in Curacao, 
Bermuda, the Bahamas, Jamaica, Aruba and Anguilla between 1968 and 1970. As stated 
in the previous chapter, CSOs rising out of this movement had specific revolutionary 
economic and social aims. Some of these included positioning “black” people at the 
centre of the economy through political reorganisation of the countries in the Caribbean 
on a regional scale; severing the subordinate relationship that Caribbean countries had 
with past colonisers and the USA; reconstructing the educational systems in the region to 
be more Afro-centric; and encouraging direct participation in decision-making by people 
in the region (Ryan 1995: 41, 46-47). These more radical CSOs mobilised in support of 
ideas about racial inequalities and the perpetuation on underdevelopment at a time when 
race issues were being firmly dealt with around the world and at a time when structuralist 
and dependency views were important radical alternatives to mainstream developmental 
thought. In the end though, none of the CSOs arising out of these radical movements 
were consulted in the region with respect to the issues up for negotiation in the Lomé 
processes.  
 
It is important to make a statement here about actors from within the academic 
community. Although members from the region’s epistemic community were not 
formally consulted on trade matters, there is evidence to suggest that they have been 
important in impacting on the thought and actions of governments and inter-
governmental organisations within the region. There has been and there continues to be, 
interchange between the academics and officials within government bureaucracies and 
regional institutions. For instance, William Demas moved out of academia and into 
important positions in the domestic public service (Central Bank) and in regional 
economic policy making mechanisms (CARIFTA, CARICOM, CDB). Similarly from the 
1970s into the present Sir Alister McIntyre of Grenada moved in and out of important 
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positions at UWI campuses in Jamaica and Trinidad, into regional institutions such as 
CARICOM. Of note too is Norman Girvan who has, from 1970s, moved between the 
academy and important regional institutions, most recently as the second Secretary 
General of the Association of Caribbean States (ACS). 
 
A list of this sort could be expanded to include many people from across the 
region who have moved (and continue to move) between academia and official posts in 
domestic and regional institutions. They are valued because of their expertise and ability 
to provide ideas (especially causal ideas) on which government officials can draw. Ideas 
espoused by these people may have been (and may continue to be) important in shaping 
approaches to trade negotiations in the region. However, academics will not be examined 
closely in this thesis because of the focus on activism and consultation of CSOs rather 
than on individuals from within CS. What is important to take away from this look at 
scholars is that causal ideas and expertise are seen important to governments.   
 
As we will see in the case studies of Part B of this thesis, the ability to provide 
expertise tends to provide legitimacy to CSOs that mobilise with respect to trade agendas 
also. CSOs that are able to present themselves as having expertise to contribute are 
consulted and have their ideas heeded.  Part B of this thesis will also show that linked to 
the ability of CSOs to present themselves as having expertise and to transmit their ideas 
to governments, is the possession by these CSOs of the institutional wherewithal to 
produce well founded research and “informed” policy inputs.  
 
Institutional capacity levels of CSOs should also be seen as important because 
capacity levels have fed into groups’ perceptions of their interests.  For instance, EIGs 
representing small businesspersons or small farmers in the region have tended to focus on 
day-to-day issues of survival and service provision for members (access to credit, 
farming technology etc.) rather than on trade issues such as the Lomé  (St. Lucia 
Anonymous interview: 22-07-04; James Paul interview: 09-07-03). More long-term 
international trade related issues could be left to the governments, even though trade 
issues up for negotiation were in the material interests of these CSOs. These CSOs did 
 108
not perceive trade negotiating issues as issues they should prioritise, in part because they 
were institutionally unable to prioritise these issues or make them into their interests.  
 
This point can be extended to most EIGs in the region, according to a 
representative from the Caribbean Export and Development Agency and as reiterated by 
Malcolm Spence of the RNM. These two interviewees emphasised that EIGs in the 
region have tended to focus on domestic issues (whether labour organisation or private 
sector) rather than on shaping international economic arrangements, in part because they 
lacked the institutional facilities and in part because they viewed governments as 
representing their concerns (Anonymous interview 29-07-03; Malcolm Spence interview: 
10-08-03). Part B of this thesis will further assert that this point about the institutional 
wherewithal is vital in understanding the activism or non-activism of both EIGs and non-
EIGs in the region, just as are ideational and material factors. 
 
We will leave aside this point for now, but it is important to keep in mind that in 
addition to CSO beliefs about their interests and perceptions about activism in the 
specific of the ideational-material contexts impacting on their activism (or lack thereof); 
institutional factors impact on CSO behaviour too. So, limitations faced by various CSOs 
circumscribed the areas which they could prioritise and around which they could mobilise 
as did CSO beliefs about mobilisation on various issues. 
 
4.2  THE 1980S INTO THE 1990S: ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SEA 
CHANGE 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s there were three political and economic occurrences 
important in shaping involvement by CARICOM countries in the world economy and 
CSO activism and consultation in the region. These changes, that were material facts and 
that also entailed paradigm shifts, are set out below in Table 5. 
 
 
 109
Table 5: Changed factors in international setting and type of factor 
Factors/Trends Type 
The end of the Cold War and the attendant emphasis on 
governance issues; 
Neo-liberal emphasis on economic liberalisation in 
internal economic affairs and external trade  
Economic, social and cultural changes alluded to by the 
term globalisation 
 
 
  Material 48
 
                      Ideational49  
 
 
Each of these impacted on the relationships between governments and societies in 
CARICOM and on trade arrangements and ideas about trade arrangements held by both 
governments and CSOs. This section will deal with each of these in turn; the impact of 
these three factors on CARICOM-EEC/EU and CARICOM-USA trade arrangements; 
and the impact of these on CSO activism and government consultation of CSOs.  
 
DEMOCRATISATION AND GOVERNANCE 
 
By the end of the 1980s governance issues became important in policy parlance 
with the emergence of the so-called third wave of democratisation.  Democratisation 
processes spread across Latin America, Asia and Africa, and were also evident with the 
dissolution of communism in Eastern Europe. Various explanations have been broached 
in attempts to understand the specific reasons for the change in focus towards 
democratisation50 and “good governance”. No matter what explanations are given, all 
speak of democratisation, good governance and CSO roles in good governance that 
emerged with the withering of the Cold War by the end of the 1980s (Willetts 2002; 
Edwards 2004: 15; Kaldor 2003: 1, 4-5; chap 3). As communism was meeting its demise, 
the liberal democratic political model gained resonance and there was a shift in 
ideational paradigms. Donor governments began placing emphasis on ‘good 
                                                 
48 Material realities created via policy implementation and action. 
49 Ideational in underlying assumptions or in foundations 
50 For some of these see the following: Martinussen 1999: 197-198; Eade 2000: 11; Thijn and Bernard 
1998: 17; Whaites 2000: 126. 
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governance” with respect to developing countries as opposed to the Cold War practice of 
doing business with “corrupt Southern elites in the struggle against communism” (Brown 
2001: 210). A by-product of this paradigm shift was an emphasis on the importance of 
CS and CSOs. 
 
CS and CSOs came to be perceived as important for maintaining or fostering 
democracy as the following statement emblematic of this strain of thought shows: 
 
…democratic consolidation is difficult to achieve without a strong 
associational ecosystem, since independent associations provide the 
channels or mediating structures through which political participation is 
mobilized and states are held accountable by their citizens… The 
influence of popular movements in helping to overturn authoritarian rule 
in Africa, Asia and Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s testifies to 
the importance of these effects even where associations have been 
relatively weak. (Edwards 2004: 74-75). 51
 
In addition, CSOs came to be viewed by donor governments as important for 
delivering official developmental assistance to developing countries. The following 
quotation expresses this strain of thought:  
 
The policy community was searching for tools of development practice 
that did not depend on such a state and that might actively foster the non-
state arena…Housed within civil society was a potential agency in the 
form of NGOs and, later other non-state groups. They were the ones who 
campaigned for human rights, against corruption and who sought to ensure 
that governments were accountable to society.  (Howell and Pearce 2001: 
40-41)   
 
Both ways of thinking emphasised CSOs as important, in the former case, for 
democratic governance purposes and, in the latter, for decreasing state economic 
interventionism and increasing transparency in development programming. This 
movement away from populist- statism and towards non-state or CSO mechanisms 
became evident in the CARICOM region too. For instance, there emerged an ideational 
swing towards emphasising the importance of “Social Partners” and CSO involvement 
                                                 
51 Refer to Chapter 1: CS Discourse and Democratisation. 
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in development, decision-making and governance in regional Head of Governments 
declarations beginning in 1991 (e.g. in CARICOM 1991a: 2 and CARICOM 1995: 5). 52
 
This shift in ideas was partly driven by prescriptions from industrialised countries 
(i.e. aid donor countries and organisations) and was also partly driven by CSO activism 
(e.g. that in the third wave democratisation movements). On the CSO side the CPDC 
notes the efforts of CSOs to enhance participation in governance in the region: 
 
For more than a quarter of a century non-governmental organizations and 
more broadly civil society organizations have been at the forefront of 
efforts to mainstream the participation of ordinary people across the 
Caribbean in the economic, social and cultural development of the region 
(CPDC Participation). 
 
Whilst in official policy thought, CSOs have been viewed as having somewhat 
limited roles in democratisation and good governance, from the perspective of CSOs 
(particularly non-EIGs) democratisation and good governance have often been conceived 
of in more radical terms. Notably, various non-EIGs across the globe have attempted to 
extend and expand the remit of the good governance and democratisation by focussing on 
democratising global governance. James V. Riker for instance noted in a paper presented 
at the Montreal International Forum Conference 2005 on “Global Democracy: Civil 
Society Visions and Strategies”: 
 
…leading civil society organizations and networks have engaged in 
advocacy for democratizing key global institutions such as the United 
Nations and the World Trade Organization (WTO) and have created new 
alternate institutions such as the World Social Forum (WSF) and regional 
forums to enable new democratic forms of citizen empowerment (Riker 
2005: 3). 
 
Some examples of CSO efforts to democratise global governance from the 1980s 
have been highlighted by Dawson and Bhatt, who chart the course of CSO-IMF 
interactions starting in the early 1980s and increasing investigations into the work of the 
IMF by various CSOs from 1989 (Dawson and Bhatt 2001: 6-12). The involvement of 
                                                 
52 To be looked at in Chapter 5 
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CSOs in a range of UN conferences during the 1990s also illustrates the efforts of CSOs 
to democratise global governance (Cammaerts 2004: 4; Cardoso 2003: 2). 
  
 Now let us look at another shift in the ideational-material context that emerged from 
the 1980s. 
 
THE NEO-LIBERAL SHIFT 
 
The debt crisis began in 1982 when Mexico defaulted on its debt and other 
countries began to find it extremely difficult to repay their debts without recourse to the 
IMF and World Bank. These international financial institutions (IFIs) recommended 
scaling back state bureaucracies and reversal of state involvement in the economy 
(including in the provision of some social services) and prescribed a move towards 
economic liberalisation both internally and externally.  These prescriptions represented a 
break from state-managed development within the developing world that was accepted up 
until the late 1970s.  
 
This change was part of the rise of a neo-liberal (sometimes called neo-classical) 
paradigm shift in economics, which harkened back to nineteenth century laissez-faire 
views and were used in criticism of Keynesian interventionist welfare state policies. Neo-
liberalism and related policy prescriptions thereby gained acceptance within the OECD, 
the IMF and the World Bank from the late 1970s and by the 1980s started to transform 
mainstream thought and policy practice (Martinussen 1999: 260, Soros 1998: 127).  
 
The neo-liberal shift was based on empirical research that argued the inadequacies 
of state involvement in various economies evident in research published by economists 
such as Deepak Lal, Bela Belassa, Jagdish Bhagwati and Ian Little in the early 1980s 
(Martinussen 1999: 262). However, this shift was also based on ideas. Empirical research 
showed the inadequacies of state intervention, but this did not mean that the only 
alternative was non-intervention and recourse to market mechanisms. Indeed more 
efficient state-led development and management strategies could have been viewed as an 
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alternative. According to Soros, who terms this ideological standpoint as based on 
“market fundamentalism”: 
 
State intervention in the economy has always produced some negative 
results. This has been true not only of central planning but also of the 
welfare state and of Keynesian demand management. From this banal 
observation, market fundamentalists jump to a totally illogical conclusion: 
if state intervention is faulty, free markets must be perfect. Therefore the 
state must not be allowed to intervene in the economy. (Soros 1998: 127-
128) 
 
This shift can therefore be seen as ideational, as a paradigm shift or change in 
beliefs about cause and effect (causal beliefs). The shift was further supported by the 
election of governments supportive of the ideas within this paradigm in some of the 
politically important industrialised countries around the early 1980s, namely:  Reagan in 
the USA, Thatcher in the UK and Kohl in West Germany (Martinussen 1999:262; Soros 
1998: 128). Hence, we see the decline of ideas linked to state interventionism with the 
emergence of a new set of ideas dominating thought in the international context. 
 
A focus on trade liberalisation also came with this shift towards neo-liberalism. 
The liberalising measures that IFIs prescribed to developing countries included reducing 
barriers to trade. Trade openness was linked to development, as the following quotation 
illustrates:  
 
Trade liberalization has been a central part of mainstream policy advice 
for at least 20 years and one of the most prominent characteristics of 
recent globalization… There has been a dramatic growth in world trade in 
the last 50 years as successive rounds of multilateral negotiations have 
progressively reduced barriers to trade. This has made international trade 
one of the most important engines of growth in the world economy, 
underpinning the unprecedented increases in living standards in so many 
countries since the Second World War. (McCulloch et. al, 2001: 5) 
 
By 1986 the Uruguay Round began efforts to further trade liberalisation (both in 
goods and in services) and to further liberalisation in other trade related areas (e.g. 
investment and government procurement). In the run up to creating the World Trade 
 114
Organisation (WTO) ministers made overt references to this link and to the necessity of 
trade liberalisation for economic growth in all countries no matter their size or level of 
development: 
  
The Agreements reached in the Uruguay Round show that all the 
participating governments recognize the contribution that liberal trading 
policies can make to the healthy growth and development of their own 
economies and of the world economy as a whole. (WTO TNC 1993) 
 
Even though the shift towards trade liberalisation can be seen as a material change 
in the international economic structure, it is ideational in its underpinnings because of its 
links to neo-liberal trends in economic policy thought. This ideational shift that 
underpinned material changes can be seen within CARICOM. For instance Walker tells 
that at the UWI in the 1980s, dependency economists of the New World Group left the 
St. Augustine campus and were succeeded by neo-liberal economists (2002: 7). 
 
CONTESTED GLOBALISATION  
 
A “globalisation” discourse emerged around the 1990s in the context of the neo-
liberal shift, but the processes of interconnectedness this term describes reach further into 
history than the 1990s. The 1950s and 1960s saw increasing prosperity in the 
industrialised world and advances in communications and technology. Such advances 
facilitated increasing connectedness in trade, investment and finance on the economic 
side and the ease with which individuals could communicate and travel irrespective or 
national borders during the 1960s and 1970s. As market-oriented approaches to economic 
affairs intensified in the 1980s and began to be implemented around the world (including 
in developing countries and former communist ones) so too did these processes of 
interconnectedness. Growing interconnectedness, facilitated and complemented by 
technological advances began to be seen as evidence of “globalisation”, particularly with 
the end of the Cold War (Spero and Hart 2003: 6-9; Hirst and Thompson 1999: 1-6; 
Keohane and Nye 2001: Chapter 10).  
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“Globalisation” though has been used both to describe interconnectedness in 
economic and social realms and to prescribe the direction in which societies should 
move. Globalisation is not only a material fact resulting from technological advances, 
changes in trade and financial flows or increased world travel. For instance, globalisation 
is not truly global in the economic sense (in terms of trade and financial flows). Near 
non-existent levels of foreign investment in sub-Saharan Africa suggest this point, as 
does the fact that although more and more countries participate in cross-border trade and 
financial transactions these transactions still tend to be dominated by a small cluster of 
countries (Hirst and Thompson 1999: chapter 2; Gilpin 2000: 171). The unevenness of 
economic processes described as economic globalisation then may lead one to interpret 
the term not just as a descriptor but as a prescribed a neo-liberal policy course (Gilpin 
2000: 296-297). Caribbean academic, Clive Thomas, expresses this view in stating that 
globalisation can be seen:  
 
…as process on the one hand, and policies of deregulation and 
liberalisation of markets, which accompany it. This identity of process 
and policy is at the heart of many of the fundamental issues of 
development, democracy and social justice in the global economy today 
(Thomas 2005: 11 -emphasis added) 
 
Therefore, globalisation does not describe material occurrences alone; it is a set of 
discourses. Some globalisation discourses see market-oriented policies implicit in the 
term as progressive and necessary, other discourses frame these policies as problematic 
but unavoidable and yet others see globalisation as problematic, unnecessary and to be 
resisted.  Varying sorts of CSOs have responded to globalisation according to differing 
views about processes and policies encompassed by the term. Some CSOs have 
responded in opposition as evidenced by the protestors from “anti-globalisation” 
movements and others by trying to shape the course of globalisation with groups calling 
for greater transparency in global governance, attacking “corporate globalisation” and a 
range of other issues of “global” salience (Desai and Said 2001: 51; Krut 1997: 3-6; 
Riker 2005; Scholte 2004a).  
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The processes of globalisation, specifically advances in information and 
communications technology and the increasing affordability and ease of world travel, 
have allowed various social movements and CSOs (both EIGs and non-EIGs) to share 
ideas, network and mobilise with other CSOs across borders (Hurrell 1995: 55; Kaldor 
2003: 94-97; Keck and Sikkink 1998). This interconnectivity and its impact on CSO 
activism is evident when one considers the growing discourse on “Global Civil Society” 
in the contemporary context (e.g. Kaldor 2003; Desai and Said 2001: 51). Therefore, in 
addition to Thomas’s notion of globalisation as processes and policies, Desai and Said’s 
view of globalisation as “a symbiotic relationship between global capitalism and global 
civil society” (2001: 51) seems apt. In other words, the term globalisation encompasses 
policies and processes to which CSOs from around the world have responded and also 
cross-border networking and solidarity-building activities that CSOs have helped to 
create. 
 
These interlinked ideational-material changes became visible in the content of 
trade arrangements in which CARICOM members were involved. The following sub-
section explores the discourses and policies linked to good governance, liberalisation and 
globalisation evident within trade arrangements that CARICOM has negotiated from the 
1980s. 
 
TRADE ARRANGEMENTS IN THE 1980S AND 1990S 
 
• LOMÉ III, LOMÉ IV AND THE COTONOU AGREEMENT 
 
The Lomé Convention was renewed with Lomé III (1985-1990). The novel aspect 
of this agreement however, was the inclusion of references to the need to respect human 
rights and a call to increase social and cultural cooperation between the two groups of 
countries (Babarinde 1994: 26-28).  In other words we see here a shift towards 
emphasising non-trade issues (one of which is governance) in a trade agreement. 
However, this does not illustrate an emphasis on CSO involvement in trade agreements 
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between the EEC and the ACP. However, a CSO focus surfaced in the Lomé IV and 
more markedly so within the EU-ACP trade talks that succeeded the Lomé framework. 
 
The Lomé IV (negotiated in 1989) addressed non-trade issues such as human 
rights violations, seeking to preserve the environment and focussing on structural 
adjustment. It also, in attempts to promote sound management of financial resources, 
placed conditionality on accessing EDF funding and set aside 15% of EDF funding to 
encourage states to embrace structural adjustment measures (Babarinde 1994: 30-31). 
 
That this last Lomé began to focus on governance issues and neo-liberal 
structural adjustment reforms when it did speaks to the new prevalence of views that 
emphasised liberal governance, in the political arena, and the efficiency of liberalisation 
in the economic arena (also espoused by the so-called “Washington Consensus”).  
 
The concerns for good governance signalled a newer dimension in the trade and 
economic relationship between the ACP and EEC that were emblematic of changes in the 
world linked to calls for better governance from various “Western” CSOs. These changes 
became further entrenched when Lomé IV was reviewed after five years of its existence 
to include provisions allowing for greater involvement of NGOs/CBOs in development 
via “Decentralised Cooperation”. Decentralised Cooperation allowed for participation 
by non-governmental bodies proposing programmes and activities with the assistance of 
EU donors who provided funding and assistance in terms of capacity building within the 
various NGOs/CBOs (Banana Link 1999).  
 
Thus, by the middle of the 1990s governance issues and civil/political liberties 
became visible in the EU-ACP context of trade and economic arrangements. Attempting 
to bring CSOs into consultations here may be viewed as strategically aimed at 
implementing development programmes in cost-efficient ways. Nonetheless, this 
instrumentality was based on ideas. Donor governments came to believe that some CSOs 
could be a viable means for implementing development programmes cost effectively and 
avoiding some of the problems of opacity and mismanagement of development funding 
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disbursed to governments. This idea was not significant prior to the 1980s/1990s and only 
became important when an emphasis on good governance emerged as significant. 
Therefore, although this causal idea was used for strategic purposes, its use illustrates the 
prevalence and importance of ideas about CSOs at the time.  
 
Additionally, changes in the trade arrangements between the EU and ACP 
illustrated the importance of the neo-liberal shift in economic policy thought. An aspect 
of this market-oriented leaning, inherent in neo-liberal economic thought, was official 
advocacy of private sector led development rather than state interventionism. As a 
consequence, Lomé IV advised that the role of the private in development be enhanced 
via decentralised cooperation too. Like NGOs/CBOs, the private sector was to gain 
funding, but in the private sector this was to enable businesses and industries to 
contribute to development by increasing competitiveness, diversification, meeting 
international standards and the like. In this respect private sector EIGs (business/industry 
specific/producer associations) became important actors too (Huybrechts, 1998).   
 
Despite its newer neo-liberal slant, the Lomé IV continued to provide non-
reciprocal trade access to products from the ACP.  However, in the 1990s, non-reciprocal 
trade relations between the EU and the CARICOM countries came into question due to 
incompatibilities between the Lomé IV and the WTO. In 1994, Chiquita brands and the 
Hawaii Banana Association applied to the US government (under Section 301 of the US 
Trade Act) claiming that the EU import regime for bananas was detrimental to their trade 
(Barclay 1999: 9; Sutton 1997). In May of 1996 the WTO Dispute Settlement Body 
established a panel to deal with this case, which the USA won. The EU was thus 
obligated to liberalise its import regime for bananas to be WTO compatible by 1 January 
1999 (WTO 2000: 2, 7-8). This ruling precipitated changes to the EU-ACP trade and 
economic arrangements that would virtually put an end to non-reciprocal trade relations 
between the two regions.  
 
In 1998 negotiations between the EU and the ACP on the future of their trade 
relationships began in light of the termination of Lomé IV in 2000. Consequently the 
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countries involved signed the EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreement in June 2000 
(referred to as the Cotonou Agreement) that committed countries to agree regional WTO-
compliant Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) by 2008. The Cotonou Agreement 
emphasised development concerns such as poverty reduction and economic growth, as 
did previous agreements, and spoke to the importance of good governance and asserted 
the necessity of including non-state actors (CSOs, private sector actors/firms, etc.) as 
partners in the consultation processes (European Commission 2004).  
 
Increasing liberalisation can be seen as an attribute of economic globalisation and 
was important in prompting CSOs to rethink their interests in shaping trade-negotiating 
priorities. In the face of decreasing preferential access to markets and increasing trade 
liberalisation, CSOs in the Caribbean, like others in the world, came to mobilise on trade 
issues whether in support, opposition, or seeking alternatives to the liberalising 
globalising policy context. Moreover, in the ideational-material context in which good 
governance became important, these CSOs had some authority to demand consultation by 
governments in their mobilisation efforts.  
 
In the Cotonou process, for example, the CSO inclusive focus became important. 
A CSO inclusive approach was advocated in the European Council’s Green Paper of 
November 1996 that focussed on the need for participation by non-governmental actors 
through dialogue and access to EDF funding in the post-Lomé IV context (Huybrechts 
1998). The need for CSO inclusion was further expressed in a European Parliament 
report on the post-Lomé IV framework. Here the need to include CS and private sector 
actors more effectively in decision-making was made explicit with the Parliament stating 
that it: 
 
Considers that the effective inclusion of organizations of civil society 
(associations for the defence of human rights, young people, women, the 
rural population, NGOs, trade unions, economic and social partners, 
churches, religious and philosophical organizations, etc.), the private 
sector, universities and teaching and training establishments, decentralized 
and local communities, must be a prerequisite of Lomé V (Martens 1997).  
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However, despite this focus on CSOs in governance appearing to come from the 
EU side of the EU-ACP relationship, it would be difficult to state certainly that this was 
nothing more than an EU-driven initiative, since a focus on good governance was also 
present in the broader international ideational-material context (as made clear 
previously). At the CARICOM level the importance of CSOs in good governance became 
important in the 1990s too. For instance, a Charter of Civil Society was signed in 1997 
and a social partnership between CARICOM and the major regional umbrella labour, 
private sector and developmental CSOs was established in 1996.  
 
With changing ideational-material trends some CSOs in CARICOM came to 
conceive of themselves as needing to mobilise on trade issues by the end of the 1990s. 
Additionally, policy thought as expressed within both the EU and the CARICOM spheres 
began to focus on CSO inclusion in decision-making and governance. So, the shift 
towards advocating CSO consultation on trade and economic matters in the EU-ACP 
setting can be seen as multidirectional. 
 
• OTHER TRADE ARRANGEMENTS  
 
In terms of other substantial trade agreements, in the Western Hemisphere there 
was the introduction of the NAFTA. The NAFTA threatened the CBI trade preferences 
that “Caribbean Basin” products gained into the USA’s market. In addition, CBI 
preferences were being eroded in the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations. In response 
the USA’s president, George Bush (Senior), initiated the Enterprise of the Americas 
Initiative (EAI) in June 1990 to link trade, investment and debt relief in a coordinated 
approach to Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).  
 
The EAI aimed to increase foreign capital inflows into LAC, because it was 
thought that continued economic growth in LAC was needed in order to bolster nascent 
political and economic reforms in process in the region. This focus on locking in political 
and economic reforms was in addition to creating the EAI to compensate for commercial 
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tensions and distortions to regional trade and investment flows that trade liberalisation 
between the USA and Mexico could bring (Schott 2001: 10).  
 
After the US Congress ratified the NAFTA in 1993, Vice President Albert Gore 
(under the Clinton Administration) proposed a hemispheric meeting to discuss political 
and economic issues including hemispheric free trade. At the first Summit of the 
Americas held in Miami in 1994, trade became a central issue and plans for the creation 
of an FTAA were declared (Schott 2001: 11). However, trade was not the only issue. 
Governments spoke to democracy and sustainable development too. To quote the heading 
of the Miami Summit of the Americas Declaration of Principles, what was established 
was a “Partnership for Development and Prosperity: Democracy, Free Trade and 
Sustainable Development in the Americas” (Ministerial Declaration of Miami 1994).  
 
The Miami Declaration illustrated the belief in both the neo-liberal market 
oriented trend and a focus on democratic governance. This declaration also made 
reference to including CS and CSOs in so doing: 
…we invite the cooperation and participation of the private sector, labor, 
political parties, academic institutions and other non-governmental actors 
and organizations in both our national and regional efforts, thus 
strengthening the partnership between governments and society. 
(Ministerial Declaration of Miami 1994) 
Like arrangements with the EEC/EU, proposed arrangements in the Western 
Hemisphere signalled a commitment to CSO consultation on trade and economic 
matters. In the trade arrangements established via the Summit of the Americas Process 
(the FTAA), input by CSOs was countenanced in 1998 at the fourth FTAA Ministerial 
Meeting (i.e. the ministerial which signalled the start of negotiations). A Special 
Committee of Government Representatives on the Participation of Civil Society was 
established and extended an open invitation to Civil Society from 1 November 1998 until 
31 March 1999. This initiative encouraged CSO input via written contributions to the 
FTAA Secretariat and was converted into a permanent mechanism in 2001.  
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Prior to 1998 though, some CSOs had access to consultative channels on the 
FTAA, specifically, private sector EIGs. Business representative organisations gave 
feedback from as early as the first FTAA Ministerial Summit via a mechanism called the 
Americas Business Forum (Gill 1999: 3). With the initial invitation to CSOs in 1998, 
business-related EIGs were encouraged to continue their participation in tandem with that 
of other types of CSOs. The FTAA ministerial declaration of 1998 specifically spoke to 
this in stating: 
We recognize and welcome the interests and concerns that different 
sectors of society have expressed in relation to the FTAA. Business and 
other sectors of production, labor, environmental and academic groups 
have been particularly active in this matter. We encourage these and other 
sectors of civil societies to present their views on trade matters in a 
constructive manner. (Ministerial Declaration of San Jose 1998) 
As in the EU-ACP context, proposed trade agreements in the Western 
Hemisphere emphasised trade liberalisation, economic liberalisation within individual 
countries through structural adjustment and a focus on governance issues that included 
space for CSO participation in matters once solely the preserve of governments. Again, 
the ideational-material context of the 1980s and 1990s must be considered in efforts to 
comprehend these changes.  
 
4.3  CARICOM AND CSO RESPONSES TO THE TURNING TIDE 
 
Now let us turn to the responses of CARICOM governments and CSOs to these 
changes in the international political economy during the 1980s and 1990s.  
 
THE IDEATIONAL-MATERIAL CONTEXT AND CARICOM RESPONSES 
 
Neo-liberal structural adjustment measures were introduced into the region from 
the 1980s. Countries in the region faced serious balance of payments problems, with the 
debt crisis of the 1980s, with world sugar prices falling, and with the USA taking steps to 
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protect its domestic sugar producers in response (which was to the detriment of 
Caribbean exporters) (Heron 2004: 47). In this context, some countries sought help from 
the IFIs that prescribed neo-liberal adjustment measures to correct balance of payments 
problems. The following examples illustrate the prevalence of neo-liberal adjustment 
measures in the region in the 1980s and 1990s: 
 
? Jamaica entered into arrangements with the IMF in almost every year between 
1977 and 1990 (Downes 1992);  
? Dominica entered into loan agreements with the IMF in 1982 and 1987 (Country 
Studies US 2003);  
? Trinidad and Tobago entered into two arrangements with the IMF in 1989 and 
1991 and took a structural adjustment loan from the World Bank in 1991 (Central 
Bank Trinidad and Tobago 1998: 62);  
? Guyana went to the IMF in 1990;  
? Barbados sought IMF assistance in 1991; and  
? Other countries in the region, particularly in the OECS, took on the task of 
adjusting independently of the IFIs (Downes 1992).  
 
In this context, heads of governments in the region came to view structural 
adjustment as important and began to accept neo-liberal economic policy ideas. For 
instance, in 1984 they jointly stated that: 
 
…[S]tructural adjustment is an integral part of the development process.  
It essentially involves a conscious and determined shift to a new 
development path to accelerate development, while adapting to major 
external or internal shocks to the economic system. (CARICOM 1984b- 
emphasis added-) 
 
Within CARICOM there, therefore, emerged a shift in thinking about economic 
development and consequently, CARICOM governments began to move away from 
heavy involvement in their countries’ economies in efforts to “adjust”. The liberalising 
trend meant making economic activity more market-oriented rather than state-driven. As 
part of governments’ strategies to decrease their economic activities, CSOs were at times 
 124
brought to the forefront of development initiatives. Governments came to emphasise the 
importance of “self-help” or “self-reliance” for development and the importance of 
“NGOs” and private organisations in providing some social services and other important 
goods and services that were formerly the remit of governments (Robinson 1989: 55; 
Brown 2000: xi-xiii).  
 
At the regional level, trade liberalisation also became important, most notably in 
efforts to revitalise regionalism within CARICOM. At the tenth Heads of Government 
Meeting in Grenada in 1989, a clear focus and a specific commitment to regionalism that 
was in line with the shift towards increasing trade liberalisation (what has been termed 
“open regionalism”) was announced (CARICOM 1989). The aim of enhancing regional 
economic integration was both a goal in itself and a means of adapting and fitting into a 
more liberal multilateral trade system. The declaration of this meeting also made explicit 
that including CSOs in this process was important:  
 
We acknowledge the special roles of the private sector, the trade union 
movement, the regional universities, the religious organisations, women 
and youth organisations, the various professions, other non-governmental 
organisations and people of all walks and conditions of life in moving 
CARICOM forward. (CARICOM 1989) 
 
That this declaration came in 1989, when Cold War divides were fading and just 
three years after the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations began, is significant. These 
allusions to CSOs in the Grand Anse Declaration speak to an emerging emphasis on the 
importance of CSOs within the region and for advancing regionalism. So too did the 
creation of the West Indian Commission (WIC), proposed at the 1989 Heads of 
Governments meeting. The WIC was tasked with suggesting ways of advancing the goals 
of the Treaty of Chaguaramas (the treaty establishing CARICOM ) and attempted to 
“listen to the people” (WIC 1990: 4) in so doing. The recommendations of the WIC led 
to the creation of the Charter of Civil Society of the Caribbean Community in 1997, thus 
further enhanced the role of CS and CSOs in regional processes. 
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With the end of the Cold War and the fall from grace of command economies by 
the late 1980s, good governance, economic liberalisation and increasing trade, financial 
flows and technological advances (globalisation) all came to be seen as important in 
international spheres. Within CARICOM, policy advisers and academics viewed these 
ideational-material changes in the international sphere as reiterating the need to intensify 
political and economic integration (deepening integration) in the region. They also saw 
the need to expand integration (widening integration) in order to include more countries 
in the Caribbean, as CARICOM was too small a grouping to pull significant international 
political or economic weight (Bennett 1999: 142).53 CARICOM thereby enhanced 
internal liberalisation when, in 1989 member governments agreed to create a single 
market and a single economy (CARICOM Single Market and Economy-CSME) which 
would entail the free movement of goods, capital and labour within CARICOM whilst 
maintaining a higher (GATT/WTO compatible) tariff against extra-regional goods. This 
was “…an attempt to facilitate economic development of the Member States in an 
increasingly open and competitive global environment” (CARICOM 1999: 2). 54
 
Another attempt to cope with the emerging ideational-material changes of the 
time was the creation, in 1992, of a CARICOM Working Group to deal with 
consolidating regional negotiating positions in the context of trade liberalisation 
arrangements. In 1993 this working group evolved to become the “Prime Ministerial Sub-
Committee on External Negotiations”, a committee that was supported by an “Advisory 
Group” comprised of trade experts. However, with the creation of the WTO, potential 
changes in the ACP-EU trade relations, and the beginning of the FTAA process, the 
Prime Ministers of the Sub-Committee and consultants in the Advisory Group believed 
that a separate negotiating machinery based on Caribbean technical expertise was needed 
to unify negotiating efforts of the region. As a consequence, the Caribbean Regional 
Negotiating Machinery (RNM) was established on 1 April 1997 (CARICOM 2003). 
 
                                                 
53 These views were stated in the recommendations of the West Indian Commission (WIC). 
54 Indeed CARICOM has not been alone in this regard as since the 1980s Latin American and Caribbean 
countries have developed or reactivated regional integration initiative as a way of responding to threats 
posed by globalisation (Serbin 1998: 111; Wedderburn 1998: 61). 
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The RNM was created as a mechanism to deal with trade liberalisation in a 
globalising atmosphere. CARICOM created the RNM as a regional response to the 
ideational-material changes of trade liberalisation (and neo-liberal economic management 
more broadly). The references to the inclusion of “stakeholders”, “transparency” and 
“consultation” that were expressed in the mandate of the RNM, also illustrate the 
importance of the ideational-material shift towards emphasising good governance and 
CSO involvement in policy/decision-making (CARICOM 2002: 41). The RNM was 
created in the same year as the Charter on Civil Society, so its commitment to CSO 
consultation must be considered with this in mind. These government expressions of 
commitment to CSO consultation in general and with respect to trade matters, emerged as 
a drastic break with past trends. This break must be considered in light of the ideational-
material context of time. 
 
So far then, we see that ideational-material trends towards liberalisation, good 
governance/CS importance and globalisation that grew in importance in the 1980s and 
1990s impacted on the actions of the CARICOM grouping. Now let us look at the impact 
of these ideational-material trends on the actions of CSOs within the region. 
 
EIG ACTIVISM AND INCLUSION ON TRADE FROM THE 1990S 
 
In the 1980s and into the 1990s the emphasis on privatisation and private sector-
led development placed the private sector and CSOs representing various sections of the 
private sector in a good position to address trade and development concerns.  
 
Traditionally important EIGs (e.g. Chambers of Commerce and unions) 
consolidated, new EIGs were formed (e.g. service coalitions) and other less traditionally 
active ones (e.g. small farmers’ and small business associations) attempted to become 
involved in international trade affairs where previously they had not. These private sector 
EIG actions emerged in response to the changing world ideational-material climate and 
were also reflections of CSOs’ perceptions of this climate. Ideas formed the background 
for these politico-economic occurrences and were important because they framed the 
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ways that EIGs perceived of their interests. In this setting, a range of business/industry-
specific EIGs came to prioritise activism on international trade negotiating issues rather 
than leaving deliberations on trade in the hands of government representatives. In other 
words, these EIGs became less myopic and broadened the scope of their interests. In 
efforts to work towards effective activism, based on these reconstituted interests, some 
EIGs went about altering their institutional arrangements or creating new mechanisms.  
 
Private sector umbrella groups with arms geared specifically towards examining 
and making representations to government and CARICOM officials began to be 
established from the late 1990s onwards. For instance: 
 
? The Committee on Trade Policy was created within the Private Sector 
Organisation of Jamaica (PSOJ);  
? The International Trade Negotiations Unit comprising representatives of various 
private sector organisations in Trinidad and Tobago was officially established in 
2002;  
? The Private Sector Trade Team (PSTT) in Barbados was established in 2003 as an 
outgrowth of the Barbados Private Sector Agency (PSA).  
 
Other examples illustrating private sector EIG interests in trade affairs into the early 
21st century were the private sector conference of the OECS in 2003 and the Caribbean 
Association of Industry and Commerce Conference in 2000. Both addressed trade and 
development specifically with reference to the WTO, FTAA and CSME (Antigua Star 
22-09-03).  
 
Some groups representing small private sector interests, such as small farmers or 
small businesses, also began to see themselves as needing to become involved in trade 
issues, at times in association with developmental CSOs. Small farmers’ associations in 
the Windward Islands joined together to form the Windward Island Farmers Association 
(WINFA) in 1982. This organisation began activism on the trade front in the 1990s in 
response to the creation of the Single European Market and liberalisation of the banana 
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trade. This EIG mobilised fervently to represent member interests when these were 
threatened yet more by the WTO trade dispute over the entry of ACP bananas into the EU 
market. WINFA obviously responded to material interests being threatened. However, 
the occurrences to which WINFA responded cannot be disconnected from ideas. Neo-
liberal ideas informed the creation of the WTO and were put into practice, thereby 
placing preferential arrangements that governed the exchange of bananas between the 
Windward Islands and the EU under threat. WINFA’s activism occurred in line with the 
material impact of threats to the banana trade on producer interests.  
 
Hence, WINFA’s activism in calling for “fair trade” can be viewed as strategic 
and based on self-interests/instrumental goals.  Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged 
that this material threat to producer interests occurred in a specific ideational-material 
context; a context in which specific ideas inform policy and action. Furthermore, in 
rejecting the ideas espoused in neo-liberal trade prescriptions and through WINFA’s 
commitment to sustaining small farming for broader social and economic development 
reasons, we can see that the group’s interests were not only material but based on 
principled beliefs and values. The philosophy of WINFA emphasised the importance of 
developmental concerns and is illustrated in the association’s partnering with 
development focussed non-EIGs in their activism (to be discussed further in Chapter 7).  
   
SAPs and the linked emphasis on privatisation, deregulation and increasing 
competitiveness in the face of trade liberalisation and globalisation also impacted on the 
relationship between governments and unions. Traditional links were mostly broken as 
states were less able (though not entirely unable) to grant the traditional pay-offs to 
workers or continue to provide large amounts of jobs at high wages via public sector 
employment. Moreover, private sector entities began to restructure in order to enhance 
competitiveness in the face of “globalisation”, which often meant that there had to be 
employment cuts. These changes impacted on unions coming to see themselves as 
needing to place more emphasis on trade matters and were discussed, for instance by 
representatives of unions, private sector representatives, academics and government 
officials at a January 1999 ILO Symposium on “Labour Issues in the Context of 
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Economic Integration and Free Trade – A Caribbean Perspective” (Momm 1999: 235-
238). 
 
It would appear then, that ideational-material forces kick-started involvement of 
CSOs in attempting to steer the direction of trade negotiating agendas pursued by the 
CARICOM regional group.  
 
NON-EIG ACTIVISM AND INCLUSION ON TRADE FROM THE 1990s 
 
The mobilisation of non-EIGs around trade issues and their involvement in 
consultative processes is more of a break with tradition in the Caribbean than that of 
EIGs. Brown (2000) speaks of the reinvigoration of traditional non-EIGs and the birth of 
new “people-oriented” NGOs in the 1980s and 1990s. During this time period, traditional 
welfare-oriented organisations and newer developmental NGOs were being called on to 
provide services and assistance within the Caribbean in the face of economic adjustments 
(xi-xiii). Including these non-EIGs in consultative processes with governments where 
labour and the private sector were exclusively included in the past began to transform 
processes of interaction between governments and CSOs.  
 
Accompanying SAPs and the commencement of the Uruguay Round were beliefs 
within some spheres of CS that the liberal philosophy espoused in SAPs and attempts at 
codifying trade rules often ran counter to important societal needs. For instance, 
enhancing social well-being for the poor or marginalised and considering environmental 
protection as part of any developmental strategy were perceived as underemphasised 
within mainstream policy practices. Some within CS did not agree with the view that saw 
mainstream neo-liberal policy prescriptions or framings of globalisation as vital and 
unavoidable. Therefore, the recommended inclusion of non-EIGs in governmental 
processes as partners in development on the part of the same IFIs that advocated cuts in 
public spending on social welfare and also by CSOs opposed to IFI policies is ironic 
(Brown 2000: xiii). On the part of IFIs a focus on neo-liberal economic beliefs existed in 
tandem with an emphasis on making use of non-EIGs for implementing development 
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programmes and providing services. This view in some respects coincided with some 
CSO and international organisations’ (e.g. the UNDP) beliefs in participation by CSOs in 
governance or developmental purposes.  
 
Newer CSOs focussing on development and involved in implementing 
development programmes began to be formed in light of the need to further social 
welfare concerns and to address the needs of marginalised groups who could be ill-
impacted by adjustment initiatives and increased liberalisation in international economic 
spheres. These newer NGOs grew in importance across the CARICOM region from the 
1980s both in the MDCs and the LDCs (Brown 2000: xii; Veron 2000: 8; Dumas-
Sanchez 2000: 155-157; Garrity 1996: 53-54). Development NGOs from industrialised 
countries also expanded their involvement and increasingly became accepted partners in 
development in developing countries from around the same general time (Mitlin 1998: 
81-82). In the CARICOM context, OXFAM has been an important partner of the CPDC, 
the CGTN and WINFA by the start of the 1990s in assisting them with development and 
trade related mobilisation.  
 
Also feeding into greater involvement of non-EIGs in CARICOM affairs was the 
involvement of CSOs in international relations from the late 1980s in efforts to impact on 
global governance. For instance, and as already noted, CSO-IMF interactions 
commenced in the early 1980s (Dawson and Bhatt 2001: 6-12), and increased 
involvement by CSOs in international affairs can be seen in their participation in the UN 
conferences of the 1990s (Cammaerts 2004: 4).   
 
CARICOM non-EIGs were part of the trend of increasing involvement in 
international matters. Some CSOs (e.g. the Caribbean Association for Feminist Research 
and Action) attended various UN conferences in the 1990s. Non-EIGs also gained the 
support of the region’s leaders and of the CARICOM Secretariat who invited CSOs to 
assist with creating regional positions for these 1990’s UN conferences.  For example, in 
1991 the CARICOM Conference of the Heads of Governments acknowledged the 
importance of NGOs in consultations to prepare for the 1992 UN Conference on 
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Environment and Development and in 1995 they spoke of liaising with women’s 
organisations in preparation for the Fourth World Conference on Women (CARICOM 
1991b; CARICOM 1995). 
 
Hence, non-EIGs in the region gained a boost from trends in international CSO 
activism and were also part of this trend. It is plausible then, that some non-EIGs were 
empowered by occurrences within the international NGO movement to become active in 
areas beyond social welfare and development conceived in narrow terms. One could say 
that this represents the start of CARICOM non-EIGs changing their perceptions. In 
response these CSOs began to create institutional methods of operating and organising so 
that their activities would not be limited to local level welfare type activities.  
 
In sum, not only have various types of CSOs (EIGs and non-EIGs) amplified their 
voices with relation to regional and domestic affairs, non-traditional CSOs have grown in 
importance within the world of CS and with relation to regional governments and 
officials. Some examples of these at the regional level will be discussed more in Chapter 
5. 
 
Despite government and regional decision-makers consulting with CSOs (EIGs 
and non-EIGs), decision-making remains in the hands of government mandated 
officials. However, CSOs of varying ilks have come to perceive themselves as having 
interests linked to trade politics and thereby see themselves as having interests in shaping 
approaches to trade affairs. Although CSOs began to become involved in decision-
making activities, changes in CSO activism and inclusion across the CARICOM region 
have not been uniform. Also, although non-EIG action has emerged via various 
organisations and movements, according to Wedderburn and Serbin, these have had less 
voice than (private sector) EIGs in CARICOM (Wedderburn 1998: 61; Serbin 1998: 112-
113). The rest of this thesis will therefore look at these matters with reference to three 
countries after examining the regional level of CARICOM.  
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 CONCLUSION: THE IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
The rationale of this chapter was to demonstrate that understanding the ways in which 
CSOs acted on and conceived of their interests from the 1990s was coloured by 
ideational-material changes that emerged from the 1980s. The same can be said for 
understanding some shifts in governmental acceptance of the requirement for CSO 
consultation. In contrast, the limited activism and inclusion of CSOs in the 1970s should 
be considered in light of the ideational-material context of that time period. Not only is 
the ideational-material context important, so too are ideas held about what ideational-
material trends mean (or could mean) and ideas about how actors should respond to these 
trends. The ideational-material context, material impacts that resulted and ideas held 
about the ideational-material context help us to understand why CSOs became more 
active and why governments included them more from the 1990s on a range of areas 
including trade.  
 
Although this chapter asserted that the international ideational-material climate began 
to change from the 1980s, the mid to late 1990s was the point when changes began to 
show themselves within the CARICOM context and specifically with relation to CSO 
activism and participation in shaping international trade and economic arrangements. 
Nonetheless, CSO activism and the inclusion of CSOs in consultation processes has been 
and continues to be slow and uneven, despite changes in behaviour and attitudes. This 
point will be brought out in the case studies to follow in Part B of this thesis. 
 
The importance of institutional factors in understanding how actors responded to 
trade issues, will also be more fully developed in Part B. Institutional factors help us to 
understand how ideas and interests constructed in a specific ideational-material context 
were translated into strategies for mobilisation. Institutional arrangements were 
developed to facilitate interaction between governments/regional mechanisms and 
societal groups. These institutional mechanisms were created in the context of the 
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ideational-material setting of the 1980s and 1990s. Within CSOs there were important 
institutional changes that came with changing interest perception as well, specifically 
attempts to fortify CSOs through creating umbrella organisations or through networking 
for activism.  
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PART B 
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 CHAPTER 5 
TRADE NEGOTIATING AGENDA SETTING AT THE 
REGIONAL LEVEL: CSO MOBILISATION AND 
INCLUSION 
 
The previous chapter posited that shifts in the international ideational-material 
context from the 1980s (liberalisation, globalisation and a focus on good governance) 
began to impact on CSO activism and on government inclusion of CSOs on trade issues 
by the 1990s. The emerging focus on CSOs was a break with trends in governance in the 
region that have tended to be government-dominated. Therefore, CSO inclusion and 
activism on trade issues are actions situated in a specific historical time in which changes 
in the international sphere contributed to breaks with the past. These external factors of 
importance from the 1990s are not all that need be considered though. Interests, the ideas 
that structure them and institutional factors help one to understand CSO activism on trade 
issues and government inclusion of varying sorts of CSOs.  
 
In light of these arguments, this chapter looks at CARICOM-level discourses 
about CSO consultation and at CARICOM-level mechanisms geared towards including 
CSOs. This chapter also looks at CSO activism which is geared towards region level 
officials. In looking at CSO activism and consultation, this chapter, additionally, 
examines the character and differences between EIG and non-EIG activism and inclusion 
on trade issues at the region level. The chapter is laid out as follows. 
 
Section 5.1 looks at the incorporation of CSOs at the regional level and at the shift 
in discourse and ideas towards emphasising CSOs. After doing so, Section 5.2 goes on to 
examine how and why various CSOs mobilise and have mobilised on trade issues at the 
regional level. This section, thereby, looks at the ideas that constitute interests and the 
institutions that direct activism as important for both EIGs and non-EIGs.  
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5.1 WORKING REGIONALLY 
 
 
CARICOM was created because the small fledgling Caribbean states comprising 
the group saw the need to cooperate in efforts to integrate and survive in the world 
economy and in world politics. Institutional constraints were important in deciding to 
create CARIFTA and then CARICOM, especially considering the size of the individual 
countries (area wise, population wise, market wise or all three) and resource constraints 
(human, natural and financial). CARICOM was also crafted at a time when regional 
arrangements were seen as an option for developing countries wanting to cope with 
international economic relations (Egoumé 2002: 6; Andriamananjara and Schiff 1998: 3).  
 
Regional trade areas (RTAs) or preferential trade areas (PTAs) were 
recommended in some strains of structuralist, dependency and modernisation and growth 
schools of development thought. West Indian scholars also advanced some important 
approaches to regional trade and economic integration. For instance, W. Arthur Lewis 
recommended regional economic cooperation for economic growth and in order to 
modernise the region’s economies. Sir Alister McIntyre and William Demas also 
advocated economic cooperation and some regional planning, but in a more structuralist 
vein. Then there were the New World Group academics (e.g. Best, Levitt, Beckford and 
Girvan) that took up a more radical dependency line in calling for intense region wide 
planning and government economic intervention as part of any regional economic 
arrangement (see Bennett 1999: 129-135).  
 
1960s and 1970s views on customs unions and economic advancement in tandem 
with neo-functionalist thinking about cooperation, based specifically on the European 
experience, also impacted on CARICOM approaches to regional integration  (Brown 
2001: 136-138; Axline 1979: 1-2). CARIFTA and CARICOM must, therefore, be viewed 
as both institutional responses to perceived interests of states and as located within a 
specific international ideational-material context. Both CARIFTA and CARICOM were 
initiated in an ideational-material context amenable to such arrangements and in which 
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states and regional officials were placed as the principal actors in regional and 
international affairs. 
 
Faced with the trend towards neo-liberalism in economic and development 
thinking and the emergence of an increasingly complex multilateral trade-negotiating 
arena in the 1980s and 1990s, these countries saw a need to adapt the regional institution. 
This time, however, regional arrangements were to be arranged in a more liberal vein 
which was in line with moves towards “open regionalism” and aimed to promote a liberal 
trade and economic environment (rather than a protective one) (Egoumé-Bogosso and 
Mendis 2002: 6). Efforts to create the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) 
from 1989 were touted as one way of helping the region adapt to the more open economic 
sphere. Additionally, with relation to trade negotiations, the RNM was established to pool 
negotiating expertise across the region and, thereby, to overcome some of the institutional 
hindrances faced in attempts to handle multiple liberalising trade negotiations (see 
Chapter 4).  
 
In response to liberalising trends CARICOM saw bolstering regional 
arrangements as the appropriate institutional coping mechanism. The region interpreted 
changes as requiring a regionally integrated response that built on the region’s legacy of 
integration. CARICOM leaders and officials conceived deeper economic cooperation 
(negotiating using united regional positions) and drawing on CSO input as important for 
dealing with these changes. None of these attempts at coping, though, would by necessity 
help CARICOM countries. Countries could have, alternately, perceived of themselves as 
being able to fit into the liberalising world more effectively by negotiating their interests 
and by liberalising trade individually in multilateral processes (e.g. within the WTO). So, 
from the 1990s changes in CARICOM must be understood with reference to ideational-
material landscape. Moreover, it is important to consider ideas held about the ideational-
material context. 
 
Around the same time that CARICOM attempted to foster open regionalism in 
efforts to cope with ideational-material shifts in a neo-liberal direction and in response to 
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the linked globalisation, the regional body also moved towards emphasising good 
governance and CSO partnerships.  
  
SPEAKING OF SOCIAL PARTNERS, CS AND CSOS AND NGOS  
 
In looking at the shift in CARICOM emphasis on CSOs, it is useful to look at the 
emergence of language pertaining to CSOs and then practices for including CSOs in the 
workings of CARICOM. 
 
CSO discourses emerged in communiqués of the CARICOM Conference of 
Heads of Governments meetings from 1991. Following 1991 this became common in all 
communiqués issued up to February 2005. In fact, the term civil society appeared 
seventy-one (71) times in the thirty-five (35) communiqués issued between the first 
appearance of the term in a communiqué of October1992 and February 2005. 
 
To look more closely let us start with the findings of the West Indian Commission 
(WIC). From 1989 the WIC attempted to “listen to the people” (WIC 1990) in order to 
make suggestions on how best to enhance CARICOM.  This emphasis on CS was 
extended in 1991 when the CARICOM Conference of Heads of Governments first made 
reference to “Social Partners” in the communiqué of an inter-sessional meeting. These 
social partners comprised the Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce (CAIC) 
and the Caribbean Congress of Labour (CCL). By 1996 a non-EIG (the Caribbean Policy 
Development Centre -CPDC) also came to be included as a CARICOM-level social 
partner (CARICOM 1991a: 2; CARICOM 1995: 5).  
 
According to CARICOM statements, the social partners were to participate in the 
run up to negotiating external trade agreements. The following excerpts from the 
CARICOM Conference of Heads of Governments communiqués issued in 1996 and 1997 
show this: 
  
Heads of Government agreed on the composition of a negotiating team 
which would include representatives of Member States, Regional 
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Institutions (CARICOM and OECS Secretariats and the CDB) and the 
social partners: business, labour and the appropriate NGO’s. (CARICOM 
1996a: 2-emphasis added-) 
 
Heads of Government held discussions with the Social Partners – it was 
essential to maintain fluid lines of communication and consultation with 
these partners particularly with regard to their involvement on negotiation 
processes. (CARICOM 1996b: 4- emphasis added-) 
 
The Heads of Government determined that the Caribbean preparatory 
process for negotiations on the future arrangements [between the EU and 
ACP] would involve, in addition to governments, the Associated States 
and the social partners. (CARICOM 1997: 4- emphasis and bracketed text 
added-) 
 
Starting in the 1990s a focus on CS using the actual term “civil society” also 
emerged. Following recommendations made by the WIC, in 1992 government leaders 
agreed to create a Charter of Civil Society of the Caribbean Community. The Charter 
was agreed in 1997 (CARICOM 1992: 2; CARICOM 1997: 1). In 2002 a further step was 
taken in adopting the Lilendaal Statement of Principles, which was slated to 
operationalise consultations between CSOs and CARICOM. The following excerpt from 
The Lilendaal Statement of Principles on the Forward Together Conference is worth 
referring to. In this statement, CSO representatives and the CARICOM Governments: 
EMPHASIZE the need for more constructive participation of Civil Society 
representatives in appropriate decisions making Organs of the Community 
such as the Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED), the 
Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP), the Council for Human and 
Social Development (COHSOD), etc; (CARICOM 2002) 
The drive for incorporating CSOs in the workings of CARICOM came from 
CSOs as well as from regional officials. The CSO thrust for greater consultation is noted 
in the following extract from a CPDC speech delivered at the 2004 Conference of the 
Heads of Government Meeting: 
 
The CPDC wants to put on record that we are very encouraged by the 
progressive steps that have brought the NGO stakeholders from crying out 
to be recognized as “social partners in development” a decade and a half 
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ago, to the current gradual forging of a partnership with our governments, 
trade unions and private sector organisations. (CPDC 2004: 2) 
 
Another example of CSOs emphasising and pushing for consultation on regional 
matters is set out in the following statement made by the Caribbean Association for 
Feminist Research and Action (CAFRA): 
We the members of CAFRA therefore call for: 
• Institutionalized entry points for the participation of civil society at the 
national, regional and international level. In particular recognizing that 
women are specially disadvantaged in the process, resources must be allocated 
to facilitate the participation of women and women’s organizations. (CAFRA 
2002) 
Therefore, CARICOM official discourses spoke to the importance of CSO inclusion 
in regional affairs and regional CSOs also advocated this. However, this CSO focus 
within the CARICOM region must be linked to broader external tendencies too. 
Specifically, the trend towards CSO consultation in efforts to foster “good governance”, 
as (in part) advised by donor governments and IFIs, must be heeded. The trend across the 
world towards CSO mobilisation and networking with respect to international agreements 
and issues such as globalisation, structural adjustment and trade liberalisation (amongst 
other issues), should be noted also in understanding the context of CSO activism on trade 
issues and official discourses and actions in acquiescence to this.  
 
THE IDEA OF CSOS IN RELATION TO CONSULTATION ON TRADE  
 
Commitment to CSO consultation has been expressed within the RNM, which 
focuses solely on trade negotiating issues as opposed to the broader mandate of the 
Conference of the Heads of Governments. For instance, Malcolm Spence from the RNM 
is of the opinion that the inclusion of CSOs and the consideration of views from CSOs 
are important. He further asserted that building institutional capacity within the RNM has 
helped to accommodate this in the region since:  
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[Officials in the region] are all so busy trying to keep pace with the 
negotiations themselves that it is difficult for them to fit in consultations 
that are critical for them to be effective at the negotiating table. 
(Malcolm Spence interview: 07-08-03- emphasis and bracketed text 
added-) 
 
Consulting with CSOs is important in his words because: 
  
It does very much affect, not only how we strategise about the 
negotiations and the technical work that is required to inform those 
negotiations, but more fundamentally it affects the policy makers who 
have to sign off on all the positions and strategies that we propose 
(Malcolm Spence interview: 07-08-03). 
 
This sentiment is further borne out by the statement of the Director General of the 
RNM (Dr. Richard Bernal) who, speaking of the formation of a Caribbean Non-State 
Actors Network in November 2004, said that such a network is “key to deepening the 
process of consultation with civil society stakeholders” (RNM 2004b). These are but 
examples of the stated commitments to broad-based consultation on trade-negotiating 
agendas at the regional level. However, this inclusion may be seen as facilitated by 
governments or regional officials for strategic purposes.55
 
The FTAA Secretariat has recognised the commitment at the CARICOM level to 
consultation by considering consultations conducted by the CARICOM Secretariat and 
the RNM as examples of “Best Practice”.  The FTAA Secretariat in particular cited 
consultations with respect to the CSME, external trade negotiations and the establishment 
of a Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ) as worthy of note. In discussing consultations on 
trade specifically, the FTAA Secretariat highlighted the role of private sector 
representative associations in trade forums in the COTED context and the involvement of 
business, labour and other CSOs in the annual Conference of Heads of Governments’ 
meetings. The FTAA Secretariat also praised the RNM’s Communication and Partnership 
Strategy (CPS); weekly newsletters; technical working groups; and workshops all of 
which speak to attempts at CSO inclusion within CARICOM (FTAA 2003).   
                                                 
55 The strategic versus ideationally based focus on CSO consultation will be discussed further on in this 
chapter. 
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 Nonetheless, there is a bias towards EIG consultation in these processes. 
Specifically, private sector EIGs were singled out by the FTAA Secretariat as the CSOs 
consulted on trade negotiating issues in the COTED context, whilst “other social groups” 
such as those representing labour, youth and women were represented solely in the 
COHSOD context (FTAA 2003). This point hints that some CSOs are viewed as 
stakeholders on trade/economic issues more so than others.  
 
Hence, despite expressing the idea that CSOs should be consulted, there remains 
the view that some CSOs (i.e. EIGs) should be consulted more, or in more depth than 
others, when it comes to trade topics. The rationale behind this EIG focus is that these are 
the CSOs seen as “stakeholders” on trade issues. Starting from a material interest based 
logic and assuming that EIGs will be more likely to mobilise on trade issues than non-
EIGs seems to inform this view of stakeholders on trade issues. Although material 
interest based assumptions (e.g. those of Frieden and Rogowski highlighted in Chapter 2) 
do not tell us which groups governments are likely to consult, they do imply that some 
groups are more apt to mobilise on trade issues than others based on material interests 
being impacted (positively or negatively). Taking these sorts of views as a starting point, 
officials in the region appear to see EIGs as the prime stakeholders (those likely to 
mobilise and be directly affected) on trade issues. Added to this is the legacy of opaque 
consultative patterns embodied in the state, labour and private sector bargain (akin to 
corporatism) that have tended to characterise regional decision-making processes 
(discussed in Chapters 3 and 4).  
   
In essence then, even though the importance of CSO consultation on trade 
negotiating agendas has been expressed by the RNM, this body’s conception of which 
CSOs are most important is biased in favour of EIGs. The following RNM Press release, 
which reports on Dr. Richard Bernal’s (Director General of the RNM) keynote address to 
a conference on commercial law in August 2004, shows the importance of a private 
sector emphasis (rather than a focus on varying CSO types): 
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…Ambassador Bernal highlighted that the involvement of the region’s 
private sector in external trade negotiations gives legitimacy to and 
ownership of negotiating positions, as regards these stakeholders.  
“Ultimately, it is firms that trade, not governments,” he said. (RNM 
2004c) 
The tendency towards viewing EIGs and specifically private sector interests as 
focal also has to do with institutional considerations. Non-EIGs tend not to have the same 
resource capacities as (private sector) EIGs. Resource deficits impact on the institutional 
capacity of non-EIGs (and some smaller EIG groups-to be discussed later in this chapter). 
By extension, non-EIGs tend to lack the wherewithal to mobilise effectively based on 
sustained advocacy and research. These CSOs are also less able to contribute well-
informed inputs (particularly technical inputs) when they are included in consultative 
settings, which further hinders them being perceived as legitimate or competent 
stakeholders. Chapters 2 and 3 hinted at the importance of these institutional factors, the 
importance of which becomes even more visible in the country case studies of Barbados, 
Trinidad and Tobago and St. Lucia to be discussed in the chapters to follow.  
 
So, even if some non-EIGs perceive themselves as having interests affected by 
trade negotiations or see themselves as having important contributions to make, these 
non-EIGs are not seen as primary interest groups/stakeholders on trade issues. Moreover, 
most non-EIGs do not have the institutional means to contribute research or expertise56 
and as a consequence gain only limited consultative space from officials. 
 
This latter point about institutional capacity conferring expertise is important. It 
illustrates a crucial idea relating to official incorporation of CSOs:  CSOs are important 
for operational or strategic reasons. If CSOs can contribute research or expertise that 
regional negotiators can use (even when they are not the key stakeholders) they can be 
included in trade discussions. As with the inputs from the region’s academic community 
(highlighted in Chapters 3 and 4), CSO inputs are valued for their potential to contribute 
technical, evidence-based inputs and causal ideas that can be drawn on in formulating 
                                                 
56  This point about limited non-EIG capacity will be brought out more clearly in the country studies to 
follow. 
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regional negotiating positions. One may, therefore, assume that there is not a deep 
ideationally based commitment by regional officials to CSO inclusion. However, this 
apparently instrumental or strategic commitment has an ideational basis. Officials within 
CARICOM and the RNM subscribe to the idea that CSOs have important inputs to add 
in regional politics (even if these CSOs are mostly private sector EIGs when it comes to 
trade issues). This type of belief grew to be of influence from the 1990s when the 
ideational-material trend towards focussing on good governance and emphasising the 
important roles that CSOs can play in governance and in development began to be 
endorsed in the region. Even if incorporating CSOs in order to draw on their expertise 
may not be conceived as exemplifying a commitment to CSO based on “principled 
beliefs” (i.e. CSO inclusion being seen as right or just) it does illustrate the importance of 
pertinent ideas of the time. Therefore, ideas about good governance and CSOs in the 
ideational-context of the 1980s and 1990s have impacted on the ways in which regional 
officials attempt to advance their goals.  
 
The idea that CSOs are important because of their potential to contribute expertise 
is a break with the pre-1990s ideas about CSOs. This change in ideas has begun to impact 
on the ways in which negotiating stances are arrived at in the region. For example, 
Ambassador Bernal’s plea to “private sector stakeholders” to be actively involved in 
submitting proposals is relatively new to the regional discourse.  
 
The consultations that the RNM conducts with a range of CSOs across the region 
and which form part of normalised practices of the institution, also illustrate a break with 
past trends. Even if for operational reasons versus some deeply felt moral commitment to 
broadening CSO consultation, and even if skewed towards a private sector EIG focus, the 
voiced commitment to CSO inclusion has opened avenues for CSO activism and 
insertion on trade matters and has altered processes of arriving at trade negotiating 
stances. Opening spaces for CSOs for whatever reason has the potential to further change 
processes, transform ideas and impact on outcomes.  
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Moreover, if one takes the words of the RNM seriously, it would appear that room 
for CSO inclusion and consultation is to some extent being expanded beyond an EIG 
focus and is indeed based on the institution’s subscription to the principled idea that 
such inclusion is “right”. A March 2006 Press release from the RNM on the topic of 
CSO consultations went to lengths to emphasise the various ways in which the RNM has 
attempted to and continues to attempt to consult with CSOs and to keep them up to date 
on trade issues. The following excerpt from the press release illustrates this point: 
 
Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM) Director General 
Ambassador Dr. Richard Bernal reaffirmed the RNM’s commitment to 
interfacing with civil society.  “We welcome regular interaction with 
non-state actors,” he said, emphasizing that “the RNM’s outreach 
activities are geared at engaging a broad cross-section of stakeholders, to 
the extent that resources allow.  We want to hear their concerns and views.  
We consider the involvement of civil society an integral part of the 
process.” (RNM 2006- emphasis added-)  
 
The same press release further emphasised the RNM’s commitment to CSO 
inclusion in stating: “The RNM’s outreach to non-state actors is considered a critically 
important aspect of its outreach activities as a whole” (RNM 2006). This press statement 
further stressed that the RNM interfaces with CSOs, including labour/trades unions, 
private sector actors, and a range of NGOs including environmental NGOs via:  
 
i) Collaboration: Convening joint Seminars/Workshops (in some cases 
partnering with the CPDC); ii) Briefings: The RNM Director General, 
Senior Director Mr. Henry Gill and RNM Technical Staff meet regularly 
with civil society representatives, to exchange views; iii) Dissemination of 
Information: The RNM regularly updates the NGO community on 
developments in trade negotiations germane to the Caribbean, sharing with 
several dozen NGO institutions its newsletter - RNM UPDATE; and, iv) 
Participating in NGO Forums: RNM staff participate in a variety of 
NGO-sponsored forums, often as feature speakers. (RNM 2006 -italics in 
original-) 
 
In order not to overemphasise the significance of a single press release, it should 
be noted that this press release expresses views about CSO consultation consistent with 
the RNM’s mandate as laid out in 1997 and in other RNM publications (notably their 
newsletters: RNM UPDATE). The commitment to CSO consultation and inclusion 
 146
expressed in the above mentioned press release is also consistent with the views 
expressed by Malcolm Spence of the RNM in an interview with the author (Malcolm 
Spence interview: 07-08-03). These public expressions of commitment along with actions 
that back them up are in line with the idea that CSOs are vital for promoting good 
governance.  
 
The deeds and words of the RNM (with respect to CSOs) show that, despite some 
private sector EIG bias, there is a genuine belief in the importance of broad-based CSO 
inclusion. Nevertheless, there is also no denying that CSOs are drawn on by the RNM for 
strategic reasons (they can contribute well-informed inputs) and this enhances their 
access to RNM officials. Still, the RNM’s information dissemination and other “outreach 
activities” illustrate the institution’s interest in engaging with and mobilising CSOs.  
 
TO SUM UP FOR REGIONAL MECHANISMS 
 
What we see when looking at the approach of regional officials to consulting CSOs 
are: 
? Efforts being made to overcome the institutional hurdles to effective regional 
insertion in a globalising world, which includes a neo-liberal oriented trade -
negotiating arena. These efforts included increasing the institutional capacity for 
regional officials to negotiate jointly and, in so doing, to consult with CSOs.  
 
? CARICOM official subscription to the idea that CSOs should be consulted (in line 
with a CSO oriented shift in thinking about governance). However, emphasis on 
private sector EIGs and on the strategic use of CSO expertise feature prominently 
in regional subscription to this idea.  
 
Yet, believing that CSOs can make useful contributions in crafting negotiating 
positions does not mean that CSOs will mobilise on trade issues. Similarly, creating 
region wide institutional mechanisms to consult with CSOs will not automatically 
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translate into CSOs activism on trade issues. We, therefore, need to look at the factors 
that motivate CSO activism on trade at the region level.  
 
The following section attempts to look at these motivating factors by focussing on EIGs 
and non-EIGs operating at the regional level. 
 
5.2 UMBRELLA CSO MOBILISATION AND INCLUSION 
 
 
At the regional level some CSOs (both EIGs and non-EIGs) have attempted to 
become active on trade by addressing institutional hindrances to effective political 
mobilisation. In the main, this has meant pooling resources to create institutional 
strength within CSOs in efforts to shape regional approaches to negotiations. 
Additionally, at the CARICOM level, officials have opened the door to consulting with 
the major regional umbrella CSOs. CSOs, therefore, have institutionalised access to 
government/regional officials specifically via CARICOM Heads of Government 
meetings, meetings of COTED, and consultations with the RNM.  
 
Particularly notable in the CARICOM context is the activism and inclusion (from 
the 1990s) of a non-EIG umbrella association called the CPDC. The inclusion of the 
CPDC is significant since the other major umbrella CSOs (the CCL and the CAIC) are 
EIGs that have had a history of contact with regional officials57, even though they did not 
have not institutionalised contact until 1991 (CARICOM 1991b: 2). A focus on labour 
and private sector EIGs, of course was consistent with the informal tripartite focus that 
dominated regional politics as suggested by a look into the region’s history (highlighted 
in Chapter 3).  
 
Where CSOs have gone beyond the territorial confines that limit capacity, they 
have gained input in recognition of their ability to make useful contributions. So some 
                                                 
57 See chapter 2 on the ICCC (later the CAIC) and the CLC (later CCL) on making proposals for the 
creation of CARIFTA and the British West Indies Federation respectively. 
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CSOs have pooled capacity at the regional level to create institutions able to focus on 
trade issues. The creation of such institutions has enabled CSOs to have better chances at 
participating in processes geared at shaping the trade agenda. Institutional capacity 
building, by means of regional peak associations, networking and partnering with other 
CSOs regionally and internationally, has notably allowed a variety of nationally based 
non-EIGs to build the technical capacity valued by governments and regional officials in 
order to have access to consultations.  
 
These efforts at activism and related attempts at institution building have been 
based on the idea that wide arrays of CSOs are stakeholders on trade issues. Specifically, 
from the mid-to late 1990s CSOs came to express that activism and consultation on trade 
issues was important for bringing a societal or people-centred approach to trade matters. 
In other words, from the 1990s, some CSOs (both non-EIGs and EIGs representing 
marginalised concerns) came to view themselves as having interests in shaping trade-
negotiating agendas where they did not see themselves as having these interests before. 
The ideational-material context of the post-Cold War in which good governance, 
globalisation and liberalisation have been important trends cannot be understated in 
attempting to understand this re-conceptualisation of important interests. 
 
However, no matter how CSOs view their interests, EIGs (especially private 
sector EIGs representing larger businesses) feature more prominently in consultations and 
in consultative mechanisms than even the most prominent non-EIGs. To examine non-
EIG and EIG mobilisation at the region-wide level, we will look here at some regional 
peak CSOs working in efforts to shape regional trade negotiating agendas.58  
 
NON-EIG MOBILISATION AND INCLUSION 
 
To begin with we will take a look at the most prominent and best recognised regional 
umbrella non-EIG (the CPDC) and then move on to look at some others of note. 
                                                 
58 It should be noted though that the CSOs highlighted are but an illustrative cross-section and therefore 
this is not an exhaustive examination of all active CSOs on such issues. 
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• THE CPDC: 
 
This CSO draws membership from a wide array of CSOs in the Caribbean and gains 
external funding from various Oxfam (an NGO with international scope) branches. As a 
result, the CPDC has overcome some of the institutional hurdles that face many non-EIGs 
in the region.  
 
This organisation has been able to conduct research, document its findings and 
actively disseminate these to CSOs and bureaucrats in the region and beyond. In addition, 
the CPDC has received requests for input and information from governments in the 
region (Anonymous interview: 06-08-03; Munro-Knight interview: 14-07-05; Malcolm 
Spence interview: 07-08-03; Roosevelt King: 11-08-03; Zakiya Uzoma Waddada 
interview: 14-04-05). The CPDC has created important expertise that regional and 
national officials value 
 
The CPDC, in cooperation with the Caribbean NGO Reference Group on External 
Relations (CRG) has conducted national consultations throughout the region. These two 
linked CSOs also facilitated the formation of National Working Committees on Trade 
(NWCTs) in Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. 
NWCTs are committees made up of a range of CSOs in different countries that attempt to 
advance CSO concerns on trade and generally encourage CSO activism on trade issues 
under negotiation in the WTO, EU-ACP EPAs and the FTAA. NWCTs also link national 
CSO activism and concerns more aptly to the region level activism of the CPDC (Munro-
Knight interview: 14-07-05).  
 
The CPDC’s capacity and networking strength have enabled this CSO to raise its 
profile. This networking and cooperative work regionally and internationally can be seen 
through links with and publications for the Commonwealth Foundation; work with the 
RNM; work with USAID; and collaboration with a number of regionally based CSOs. In 
consequence, at the CARICOM level the CPDC has gained the recognition that has 
allowed it to engage with the RNM, COTED and to sit on Prime Ministerial advisory 
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committees. This is in addition to addressing the annual Conference of Heads of 
Government meetings and taking part in meetings of COHSOD that focuses on social 
issues.  
 
Therefore, the institutional factor is important, as the CPDC’s ability to accumulate 
the needed resources to pay staff, conduct advocacy work and conduct research in order 
to contribute well-informed inputs at the CARICOM level and beyond shows.  Building 
this institutional capacity and, in particular, focussing on research has been important in 
allowing this non-EIG the legitimacy that officials view as important for serious 
consultation. In this regard space has been opened for the CPDC since it has come to be 
viewed as a useful partner for consultation.  
 
What is more, the idea (espoused by the RNM and within CARICOM) that CSOs 
have important roles to play in consultations cannot be forgotten. This gives credence to 
official inclusion of this non-EIG in consultations on trade issues and at the Heads of 
Government Conference. This point is worth emphasising because including this sort of 
CSO (a non-EIG) in consultative processes on economic affairs is a break with traditional 
consultative patterns. Even if the CPDC is included for instrumental reasons by regional 
officials, this has still opened space for this CSO and its constituent CSOs to advance the 
ideas that they see as important. Hence, the potential exists for this non-EIG and its 
member organisations to impact on outcomes where there was very little potential for 
such prior to the mid/late 1990s. 
 
That the CPDC represents largely non-EIGs with developmental, social, welfare and 
other non-economic foci (except for some smaller and more marginal EIGs) shows that, 
although their concerns may seem tangential to trade talks, these actors view issues 
surrounding trade agreements as relevant to their interests. The involvement of the CPDC 
in attempting to shape approaches to trade shows that the possession of instrumental 
economic interests is not the only important factor that motivates actors to become 
involved in trade issues.  
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For the CPDC the idea that it is important to have input from “sections of the 
Caribbean populations whose voices are less heard” (CPDC 2003), and that CSOs should 
participate and mobilise in a wide array of areas is paramount. In this regard the CPDC 
views CSO activism and mainstreaming CSO participation as important: 
 
Governments are the elected representatives of their countries and as such 
have a legitimate right to speak on behalf of and make decisions for their 
populations. However this does not eliminate the right of citizens to speak 
on their own behalf and to have a say in decision- making processes that 
will affect their lives. 
 
Given this, we believe that leaders must move to ensure that there are 
institutionalized entry points for civil society participation at the national, 
regional and global level. The process of trade liberalization is too far 
reaching and has so many implications for every sector. To exclude civil 
society is to exclude the very people who will bear the burnt of the impact. 
(CPDC 2002: 2- emphasis in original) 
 
So far then, it is apparent that the CPDC has attempted to mobilise and activate other 
CSOs on trade issues on the one hand, and on the other it has attempted to be included by 
governments and regional officials. This activism and attempted inclusion must be 
understood in light of ideational and material trends in the direction of good governance, 
globalisation and liberalisation. Additionally, this non-EIG needed to build the 
institutional wherewithal to conduct research, gather regional concerns in a structured 
way and to sustain activism. Hence, institutional factors are important to consider here in 
addition to ideational and material ones. 
 
• THE CRG: 
 
The work of the Caribbean NGO Reference Group on External Relations (CRG), 
which focuses solely on issues surrounding trade negotiations, is of note too. The CRG is 
coordinated by the CPDC as a region-wide CSO network comprising the following 
regional and national umbrella associations: the Caribbean Association for Feminist 
Research and Action (CAFRA); the Caribbean Congress of Labour (CCL); the Centro de 
Investigation Economica para el Caribe (CIECA); the Association of Caribbean 
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Economists (ACE); the Association of Development Agencies (ADA); the Haitian 
Platform for Alternative Development (PAPDA); and  the Windward Islands Farmers 
Association (WINFA). These constituent CSOs in turn comprise over 1, 000 national and 
community-level CSOs (CRG, 2001; Munro-Knight and Sinckler, 2002) 
The CRG, therefore, brings together a range of CSOs to make policy proposals from 
predominantly non-EIG perspectives (although WINFA and CCL are classed as EIGs 
here59). The CRG has conducted and published research papers and put forth advocacy 
positions on trade liberalisation with relation to the WTO, the FTAA, the previous Lomé 
IV and the EU-ACP EPAs (Anonymous interview: 06-08-03).  
The CRG’s research and advocacy has been issue-specific and specific to each of the 
negotiating platforms at hand. Such research and advocacy has been directed at the 
region’s governments and negotiators; at wider CS; and at the institutional mechanism in 
which negotiations take place in efforts to influence decision-making (i.e. submissions 
have been made to the FTAA, WTO and ACP-EU apparatuses).  
As in the case of the CPDC, the CRG pools capacity and resources across Caribbean 
non-EIGs in order to overcome the institutional barriers that tend to limit non-EIG 
activism on trade matters. Pooling capacity helps to build institutional strength and the 
ability to produce quality research, which is important because it opens doors to 
consultative frameworks with regional officials. External funding from the following 
facilitates the work of the CRG: Oxfam GB, NOVIB (Oxfam Netherlands) and Oxfam 
Canada (CRG, 2001; CPDC 2002: 4). This assistance (as in the CPDC case) is important 
in helping this CSO to deal with institutional problems that non-EIGs and more marginal 
EIGs tend to face in attempting to stay alive. 
To the institutional factors, vital for understanding the ability of the CRG to act on 
trade issues at the regional level, one can add ideational factors. The work of the CRG, 
like that of the coordinating CSO (the CPDC) is guided by the view that CS has vital 
roles to play in influencing the drive towards trade liberalisation. The following tenets 
                                                 
59 We will come back to this issue again in discussion EIG mobilization. 
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that the CRG views as fundamental are instructive in illustrating the presence of this idea 
in discourse: 
…[T] he first…affirms the right of every and all citizens to be consulted, 
informed and make recommendations about processes particularly global 
ones that will affect their lives. Secondly, we strongly believe that the 
purpose of the global system must be to put people at the centre of social, 
economic and political development. (CRG 2001) 
It follows then that CS writ large and CSOs of varying sorts need to engage 
governments, regional negotiators and other officials on trade issues. Once more we see 
that narrowly conceived material interests do not account for the mobilisation of non-
EIGs on trade matters. Certainly material concerns are important, and, undoubtedly, trade 
affects wide arrays of social groups. However, the perception that a group has interests in 
trade affairs that need to be acted on (either from a moral/principled or more instrumental 
perspective) is important also. Similarly, the way in which CSOs organise themselves 
and operate in efforts to gain the recognition and consultation they seek are important 
too. 
• THE CGTN 
Another non-EIG network of note is the Caribbean Gender and Trade Network 
(CGTN). This network was created in 1999 under the auspices of CAFRA, WINFA, 
Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era - Caribbean (DAWN Caribbean), 
and Grenada Community Development Agency (GRENCODA) (IGTN, 2005). The 
CGTN examines the impact of trade agreements and mobilises on trade issues up for 
negotiation in various arenas. Again we see networking efforts of non-EIGs to overcome 
the institutional hindrances to action based on the idea that trade affairs are of interest to 
them. This allows these CSOs to aptly conduct research, educational work and attempt to 
insert themselves in efforts to shape trade-negotiating positions put forth by the region, as 
is also the case for the CPDC and CRG: 
The Caribbean Gender and Trade Network (CGTN) was set up to 
strengthen the capacity of Caribbean women's organization for 
 154
understanding the impact of the trade liberalization on women's economic 
and social development.  (IGTN, 2005) 
For the CGTN, ideational and institutional factors are important in understanding 
this mobilization, particularly if one considers trade issues to be “gender neutral”, in the 
words of Robert Guiseppi (Guiseppi interview: 19-04-05) of the Trinidad and Tobago 
Manufacturers’ Association (see Chapter 7). 
Since the secretariat for the CGTN is CAFRA, and since the CGTN’s 
membership includes WINFA (both CAFRA and WINFA members/participants in the 
CPDC and CRG), this CSO cooperates with the CRG and the CPDC in some of its work. 
The NWCTs are a notable example of this collaboration (CGTN 2005: 14-15). 
Collaboration with like-minded CSOs speaks to efforts to share burdens in order to 
overcome institutional deficits amongst CSOs that operate at the regional level. In 
consequence, CAFRA and the CGTN have become more active in attempting to shape 
trade-negotiating stances at the CARICOM level. They have also moved beyond focusing 
on the region’s governments and officials alone. The CGTN has taken its concerns to the 
international level in attending all WTO ministerials from Singapore to Cancun as an 
accredited CSO. It has made submissions to the FTAA and has attended the FTAA CS 
summits. CAFRA and the CGTN also focus on trade issues within the EU-ACP context 
and at the regional level with respect to the CSME (CGTN 2005: 16).  
Since the CGTN forms part of a broader international network called the 
International Gender and Trade Network (IGTN), it is linked to a broader movement for 
gender focussed non-EIG involvement in shaping trade negotiating stances and by 
extension the broader ideational trend among CSOs (non-EIGs especially). Once more 
the view that non-EIGs have important roles to play in shaping multilateral trade agendas 
is evident as is the case in the linked CAFRA and the CPDC. These regional 
CSOs/networks have this idea in common and this is one factor that facilitates their 
cooperation in activities aimed at shaping trade-negotiating agendas pursued in the 
region. In addition, these CSOs are linked in that they gain support from and have links to 
Oxfam. 
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This link to Oxfam and the involvement of these groups/networks in international 
activism speaks to another point of note: that the activism of these CSOs is part of wider 
non-EIG activism on trade issues that shares the common belief that CSOs have 
important roles to play in shaping trade arrangements. This brings us back to the 
importance of international trends that became important particularly from the 1990s. 
None of these CSOs/networks in CARICOM were active on trade issues prior to the 
1990s. They only became so with ideational-material changes, which contributed to 
shifting the focus of some domestically oriented social or welfare oriented CSOs towards 
including political activism on economic issues. In fact, it is far from coincidental that 
these CSOs/networks only emerged from the 1990s (CAFRA in the 1980s). These CSOs 
were created in the context of: a growing focus on good governance and CSOs; a neo-
liberal thought and policy paradigm shift; increasing CSO visibility and activism in 
international affairs; and an array of processes, practices and prescriptions often termed 
“globalisation”. Therefore, the ideational-material atmosphere that existed in the 1990s 
facilitated: the emergence of these sorts of peak non-EIGs; non-EIG mobilisation on trade 
issues; and the appearance of official discourses/practices that illustrated the importance 
of CSO consultation on trade matters. 
The examples of the CPDC, CRG, CAFRA and the CGTN should by now make the 
point here clear, but to speak about one final non-EIG, one with weaker international 
links. Let us look at the activities of the Caribbean Conference of Churches (CCC) to 
support the claims here that CSOs outside of the EIG category view themselves as having 
roles to play when it comes to shaping the trade negotiating agenda.  
 
• THE CCC: 
 
In initiating discussion at the popular level on the FTAA, holding panel discussions, 
and establishing a desk for “International Relations and Cultural Affairs”, this 
organisation attempts to engage with the trade issues under negotiation. The CCC 
attempts too, to stay abreast of the occurrences pertaining to trade issues in the region; 
invites personnel from CARICOM and the RNM to its workshops/meetings; and attends 
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conferences/symposia on trade issues. However, the General Secretary of the CCC, 
Gerard Granado, stated that the organisation is “…perhaps not as aggressive as it should 
be on trade” (Gerard Granado interview: 19-04-05). This is understandable, since it 
appears that the CCC lacks some of the institutional capacity and networking vigour of 
the CPDC and the other networks/non-EIGs discussed previously (although none of these 
are wealthy).  
 
This observation aside, the attempts of the CCC to address issues relating to 
international trade negotiations (as well as with reference negotiations within the region 
on the CSME) and to raise awareness on trade negotiations are important to consider. 
This is so because, as an ecumenical CSO, the CCC may especially be viewed as having 
interests divorced from trade. The CCC’s activities exemplify the belief that CSOs have 
roles to play in shaping trade negotiations. As is the case with the other non-EIGs and 
networks of non-EIGs highlighted here (CPDC, CRG, CGTN and CAFRA), this 
organisation views its role as engaging wider CS in order to help people to understand 
trade issues. By extension, this awareness raising is thought to encourage wider CS/CSO 
participation in attempting to shape the regional trade agenda. The idea that CSO 
engagement with trade issues is important and that the involvement of broader CS is 
important, has come to inform non-EIG activism and educational work on trade issues 
since the late 1990s.  
 
It should also be stated that the CCC is a member of the CPDC, illustrating the 
interlinked nature of non-EIG activism at the regional level and implying that there is at 
least the shared view amongst these CSOs that non-EIGs should have input into regional 
trade negotiating agendas and regional trade policies. The same can be said for other 
regional umbrella non-EIGs that are members of the CPDC. Examples of these are the 
Caribbean Conservation Association, the Caribbean Human Rights Network, the 
Caribbean Organisation of Indigenous People, the Caribbean Federation of Youth, and 
the Caribbean Network for Integrated Rural Development (see http://www.cpdcngo.org). 
These associations, their members and their causes will not suffer or gain directly as a 
consequence of the varying tariff levels being considered in most of the issue areas being 
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negotiated in various trade forums. Yet, they see themselves as having interests to 
represent and roles to play in shaping trade negotiating agendas.  
 
Possessing some set of narrowly consigned economic/material interests is not the sole 
factor that leads groups to mobilise. Ideas and institutions are also important for 
understanding action. The perception that non-EIGs have interests in shaping trade affairs 
and the concomitant strengthening of non-EIGs through regional cooperation are critical 
to consider. However, these factors cannot be disconnected from wider temporally 
located trends in the direction of: (a) neo-liberal policy and ideas (of salience in domestic 
economic affairs and world trade matters); (b) an emphasis on “good governance” and 
CSO roles in governance (both domestically and internationally with the growing 
international CSO activism); and (c) the combined trends termed “globalisation”. 
 
• TO CLOSE ON NON-EIGS 
 
Umbrella CSOs/networks at the region level have the ears of the RNM officials and 
have contact with the CARICOM secretariat. Considering the assertions about official 
consultation in the region made in section 5.1 of this thesis, it would appear that the 
inclusion of these CSOs is attributable to their possession of the institutional capacity that 
allows them to provide knowledge on which regional officials can draw.  
 
In addition to CSO activism and institutional strength building for inclusion and 
consultation, institutions and attitudes are important to heed as well. On the institutional 
side, the creation of the RNM geared specifically towards trade negotiations with a CSO 
inclusive mandate must be considered as important. Although the CARICOM body as a 
whole has a Charter of Civil Society and has made overtures to CSO inclusion on an 
array of issues (e.g. in the Lilendaal Principles), its institutional make-up is has been 
primarily intergovernmental. This governmental focus is a legacy of the time period in 
which CARICOM was created (the 1970s), whereas the RNM’s composition more 
relevantly reflects the times in its openness to actors beyond states. 
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Discursively, amongst officials operating at the regional level there has been a shift 
towards including CSOs too. The idea that including a wide array of CSO concerns is 
important is made clear in the tenets of the Lilendaal Principles, the Charter of Civil 
Society, Conferences of Heads of Governments communiqués (since the 1990s) and in 
the RNM mandate. This discursive commitment on the side of regional officials may be 
based on instrumental motives but can only be understood in the post-Cold War context 
in which ideas emphasising good governance became important. Also, even if one were 
to assume that the discursive commitments of regional officials are either “just talk” or 
words aimed at disguising the strategic goals of regional officials, these words have 
created commitments that CSOs can draw on in order to insert themselves in consultative 
processes.  
 
All this said, at the domestic level, members of these peak CSOs/networks (that is 
non-EIGs) tend to have more constricted avenues for consultation or for influencing trade 
agendas.60 The idea that CSO inclusion in general is important runs alongside the 
perception that certain CSOs (EIGs) should be paramount on trade remains important, 
especially at the domestic levels of the case studies to follow will illustrate.  
 
When it comes down to institutionalised involvement of non-EIGs with regional 
officials on trade agendas, levels of contact vary widely with the CPDC having the best-
institutionalised contact amongst regional peak non-EIGs. This is true when one 
considers the access of the CPDC to the CARICOM Conference of Heads of Government 
at the annual meetings, access to Prime Ministerial Committees, access to COTED, and 
access to/the coordination of programmes/seminars/workshops with the RNM. The 
CPDC has access that others do not, but since the CPDC is very connected to other 
region-level non-EIGs/networks this allows the ideas and concerns that these non-EIGs 
hold in common to be expressed to some degree (Munro-Knight interview: 14-07-05). 
Moreover, some of these other umbrella non-EIGs are calling for more inclusion; notably 
CAFRA has been attempting to increase non-EIG involvement through its efforts to gain 
                                                 
60 That is, so long as the findings of the cases to be discussed in the chapters to follow are viewed as in any 
way illustrative of the situation in most of CARICOM. 
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recognition as a formal partner representing a gendered perspective in the CARICOM 
context (Margaret Gill interview: 30-05-05).  
 
We see then that non-EIGs have attempted to be consulted and have been included in 
consultations on trade issues at the CARICOM level. These efforts became visible in the 
mid/late 1990s and have continued into the opening years of the 21st century. 
 
EIG MOBILISATION AND INCLUSION 
 
EIGs have also been active in attempting to shape negotiating stances at the 
CARICOM level, as one might expect. Here we look at these broken into three 
categories: Labour EIGs, Private Sector EIGs and Agricultural/Farmer’s EIGs. 
 
• LABOUR EIG ACTIVISM: 
 
Representing workers is the Caribbean Congress of Labour (CCL) that like the CPDC 
addresses the annual CARICOM Heads of Government Conference and interacts with 
officials from the RNM. Although the CCL has a longer history (it was born out of the 
1930s Caribbean labour movement) than the CPDC and also has more experience in 
interacting with CARICOM officials at the Heads of Government Conferences than the 
CPDC, it does not have representation at COTED meetings. However, the CCL’s General 
Secretary, George Depeana, opined that the CCL attempts to ensure that labour views are 
at least known, and will continue to do so throughout the region in hopes that labour 
concerns will be acted on (George Depeana interview: 07-04-05). So, although it has a 
longer history as a “partner” in governance than the CPDC, the CCL has more limited 
contact with the CARICOM as seen in the lack of input at COTED meetings. What 
accounts for this somewhat limited consultation?  
 
Certainly an interest-based logic would imply that this kind of association would 
likely mobilise on trade issues. Mobilisation by this sort of EIG could especially be 
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expected in a region like CARICOM, comprising small open economies with high labour 
costs, since Caribbean countries face competition from countries with cheaper production 
costs, one of which is labour costs. In consequence, one would expect that the CCL 
would have economic interests in trade negotiations. Therefore, solely considering the 
material threats posed to labour interests by trade negotiations is not a sufficient way in 
which to think about the CCL’s regional level activism on trade.   
 
One factor to consider in thinking of the CCL is that this CSO may not be 
institutionally equipped to address trade issues, especially not in the technical or 
evidence-based manner that is esteemed by regional officials. One distinctly gets this 
impression on entering the CCL’s office in Barbados, which consists of workspace 
adequate for not more than the two staff present. The institutional deficits of the CCL are 
also expressed quite frankly by a representative of the St. Lucian National Workers’ 
Union (NWU) who asserted that the CCL lacks the financial resources and research 
prowess to mobilise on trade matters as aptly as it should (Joseph Goddard interview: 16-
09-04). Once again, material interests and material factors do not by themselves account 
for levels of CSO activism on trade issues in the CARICOM region. One important factor 
is institutional. 
 
Another institutional factor that is important to consider when looking at the CCL is 
the institutional legacy of this association. The CCL was created as an organisation aimed 
at addressing the industrial concerns and rights of workers (with a historically based 
political focus on regional integration). Unlike in the cases of the CRG, the CPDC and 
the CGTN that were created with built-in mechanisms to deal with trade, or the CAIC 
that was created with one of its focus points being trade issues, this association was not 
geared towards dealing with issues such as those up for negotiation in trade spheres. 
What is more, the institutional set-up of the CCL has not yet been “tweaked” to 
incorporate trade issues adequately into its work programme. Attempting to address and 
mobilise on trade issues would therefore require institutional change, a process that may 
be difficult, particularly in light of the limited institutional capacity of the CCL.  
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Munro-Knight of the CPDC brings another factor to the fore. She commented, to her 
chagrin, that labour activism on trade issues in the region appears to be limited because 
unions in the region view themselves as needing to focus on domestic issues rather than 
on international issues (Munro-Knight interview: 14-07-05). Munro-Knight’s observation 
also holds validity when one considers the limited union involvement in shaping trade 
agendas in the case studies of Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago and St. Lucia (to be 
outlined in the chapters to follow). Despite trade affairs having the potential to impact on 
workers, it seems that in the case of CARICOM, the workers’/labour EIGs conceive of 
their interests in trade issues in a constricted way. Some authors highlight that a 
shortcoming of the interest based approach is that interest groups may not act in their 
interests because they have difficulties identifying these (Woods 1995: 170; Bates and 
Krueger 1993: 456-457).61  At the regional level, the CCL seems to fit this mould: this 
EIG did not perceive of activism surrounding trade issues as advancing its interests. The 
institutional weaknesses of the CCL, further limit the ability of this CSO to mobilise 
effectively on trade topics. 
 
Despite not fully conceiving international trade issues as one of their main priorities, 
the CCL’s inclusion as a social partner in the CARICOM setting allows this non-EIG the 
opportunity to air the concerns of its constituent members with respect to trade 
negotiations at the annual meetings of the Conference of Heads of Governments. The 
CCL’s focus however, has mostly been on trade issues internal to CARICOM, notably 
those relating to the movement of labour under the CSME. Yet, the idea that unions need 
to mobilise more on trade and to prioritise international trade issues more seems to be 
growing within the CCL. The CCL’s secretariat has expressed that unions need seriously 
to consider the potential impacts of trade liberalising agreements on workers (George 
Depeana interview: 07-04-05). The CCL has also made other efforts to mobilise its 
member associations on trade issues, for instance, via the Trade in Labour forum held in 
2004. The forum: 
 
                                                 
61 This argument potentially also sheds light on late activism by non-EIGs since we could say that they 
have long had interests on such issues (making the name “non-EIG” a misnomer) but have been unable to 
identify such. 
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…[P]rovided an opportunity for representatives of workers’ organizations 
throughout the Caribbean to interface with the RNM and to exchange views on 
measures to ensure that the views of labour are appropriately accounted for, both 
in respect of general issues in trade negotiations and on matters of specific 
relevance to labour. (RNM 2004f) 
 
The CCL has also attempted to become active on trade matters through cooperation 
with other CSOs in the region, notably because of the lack of institutional wherewithal 
that would allow the CCL to mobilise independently.  Specifically, the CCL is a member 
of the CRG and, in this respect, is active on trade in association with other regional peak 
CSOs (George Depeana interview: 07-04-05). This shows that, despite the CCL’s limited 
institutional capacity to deal with trade and in spite of this CSO (its members most 
notably) not perceiving trade as a top priority, the CCL secretariat has been making some 
efforts to mobilise its members on trade issues. 
 
• PRIVATE SECTOR EIG ACTIVISM: CAIC 
 
The Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce (CAIC) has a long history of 
contact with regional organs, indeed the CAIC’s predecessor organisation played an 
important role in pushing for the creation of CARIFTA, which would later evolve to 
become CARICOM. Like the CCL, the CAIC has traditionally addressed the annual 
CARICOM Conference for Heads of Governments. The CAIC sits on working groups on 
trade as well as meetings with COTED in the CARICOM context.  
 
According to Gisele Mark from the CAIC, this umbrella association conducts 
research on trade and liaises with private sector interests in the region in efforts to make 
informed contributions with respect to trade negotiations. The CAIC also works 
intimately with the RNM and trade ministries in the region (Gisele Mark interview: 15 -
04-05). This EIG, therefore, conforms to the expectations of a material interest-based 
logic. It is also worth noting that the CAIC possesses the institutional capacity to conduct 
research and to engage with regional officials on trade issues. This capacity can be 
understood in light of this CSO being created in part to address trade matters and also in 
light of the association being comprised of both the region’s private sector representative 
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associations and large enterprises that exist in the region. The CAIC has, thereby, been 
well placed to contribute in consultations on trade. The activism of the CAIC, though, 
still rests on the group perceiving itself as having to become active on trade issues. Even 
if based on an instrumental logic, the CAIC came to believe it had to mobilise on trade 
negotiating issues from the 1990s with changes in the international policy temperature 
whereas prior to the 1990s, such activism was negligible. 
 
• PRIVATE SECTOR EIG ACTIVISM: CTO 
 
In terms of EIGs once more, there is the Caribbean Tourism Organisation (CTO). 
This organisation is not strictly a CSO however. Although it attempts to represent its 
tourism private sector members from across the Caribbean and is not staffed by 
government officials or civil servants, ministers for tourism comprise more than half of 
the Board of the CTO (32 out of the 54 board members). This places the CTO out of the 
CSO category in the strict sense, notwithstanding if viewed as a quasi – NGO 
(QUANGO), an association that lies in the area between state and society, it can be 
viewed as an EIG (recall figure 3 on page 24). 
 
The CTO has a short history of involvement in consultations or activism on trade 
negotiations. In August 2003 Karen Forde-Warner of the CTO noted that it was “only in 
the last year that we have made a concerted decision to make it [trade] a real priority and 
put it on the work programme” (Karen Forde-Warner interview: 12-07-03). Though late 
in initiating activism, the CTO has been engaging with the RNM and CARICOM on 
trade issues in efforts to impact on the region’s approach to service negotiations. The 
RNM, however, played a role in encouraging activism by the CTO. Most notably the 
RNM commissioned the CTO to conduct a study (completed in 2003) on issues 
surrounding tourism and trade negotiations. According to Forde-Warner, this study was 
the first formal CTO attempt to contribute a position to regional officials. Following the 
submission of this report the CTO took the initiative (in 2003) to seek inclusion at 
COTED meetings (Karen Forde-Warner interview: 12-07-03).  
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One would expect an association such as this one to have been active on trade 
issues much earlier, considering the implications of the GATS and issues up for 
negotiations in the GATS context. Also, one would have thought that the trade-related 
service components in other negotiating realms such as the FTAA would have mobilised 
the CTO based on material interests. It would appear then, that material interests alone 
cannot account for mobilisation. Speaking of the CTO’s late activism, Forde-Warner 
stated that tourism is one of the most liberalised areas in most Caribbean economies. The 
tourism sectors in the region boast open atmospheres with respect to foreign investment 
dating from the 1950s. Moreover, very few sub-sectors in the tourism market are 
protected from external trade competition. Yet Warner emphasised that even though the 
tourism sector in the region has long been “open”, it remains susceptible to changes in 
international trade arrangements (Karen Forde-Warner interview: 12-07-03).  
 
So, why did the CTO only attempt to mobilise on international trade topics from 
2003, as opposed to from the mid-1990s with the introduction of the GATS? The CTO’s 
Forde-Warner answered this question in the following manner: 
 
You have lots of priorities and lots of issues that appear to be very 
urgent…it is not that we ignored this area, but it was not in the formal 
work programme. (Karen Forde-Warner interview: 12-07-03).  
  
A statement of this sort illustrates the significance of group interest perception. 
Groups do not necessarily respond in what one would consider as their material interests 
whenever these are impacted on (or are potentially impacted on). Instead, they have to 
conceive of issues as priority interests before they mobilise on them. Indeed, Forde-
Warner indicated that this late acquisition of the idea that mobilising on trade matters was 
important and ill-affected the CTO’s members since, in not acting earlier the CTO was 
unable to address issues of particular salience to the Caribbean tourism industry. Some 
examples of such salient issues are keeping some small sub-sectors protected from 
external competition and mobilising for the creation of mechanisms or legislations to 
more easily allow tourism workers to sell their services abroad (Karen Forde-Warner 
interview: 12-07-03). 
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As part of their new activism on trade issues the CTO has been attempting to 
prioritise tourism matters in the CARICOM trade agenda in order to help Heads of 
Governments to craft negotiating positions (Karen Forde-Warner interview: 12 August 
2003). This activism is needed in the CTO’s view because, even as the major industry in 
the region, tourism has not been a regularised on the CARICOM agenda (Karen Forde-
Warner interview: 12-07-03).  
 
So, what does the CTO tell us about consultation and mobilisation on trade 
issues? It shows that having material interests that are affected by trade negotiations is 
not necessarily a sufficient condition to thrust groups into action. The actions of this 
organisation show that there has to be a perception that certain issues are vital in order to 
push them up the agenda. As with the CCL, the CTO had to accept the view that trade 
issues were important enough to necessitate activism, before activism on trade matters 
could begin. This view was accepted only at the start of the 21st century and was 
encouraged by the RNM, which attempted to draw on the institutional capabilities within 
the CTO (specifically the wealth of data and research on the tourism sector and market 
possessed by the CTO -see CTO website: http://www.onecaribbean.org-). The RNM’s 
mobilisation of the CTO, and the CTO’s continuing efforts to mobilise on trade, however, 
must also understood in the ideational-material context that impacted on the region from 
the mid-to late 1990s. 
 
 
 
 
• PRIVATE SECTOR EIG ACTIVISM: CASME 
 
One final private sector EIG that is worth noting is the Caribbean Association of 
Small and Medium Enterprises (CASMEs) that was created in September 2004. This EIG 
is one of the newer umbrella EIGs in the region attempting to pool resources and 
influence regional economic policy, including on international trade arrangements. Yet, 
 166
the member associations only began this endeavour in 2004. How can one account for the 
lack of a regional body representing these interests and the late mobilisation and 
advocacy of this group affected by trade negotiations?  
 
Once more we are left with the narrow focus of the member associations, 
concerned with the most immediate of member concerns despite being undoubtedly 
affected by market liberalisation. With decreasing tariff levels, small-scale manufacturers 
and small-scale service providers operating in domestic markets face competition from 
goods and services that can be produced or supplied more cheaply from external markets. 
So, the “possession” of interests being affected does not by itself help us to understand 
inaction by those represented by the CASME. Small business associations in the region 
had to believe they needed to prioritise international trade issues (rather than just to focus 
on domestic concerns) in order to organise and in order to propose mobilisation. 
Speaking of limited small business association activism in 2003 (before CASME was 
formed), Malcolm Spence of the RNM asserted the importance of institutional factors. He 
stated that institutional capacity has limited activism by these CSOs, since small 
businesses are less able to contribute financial and personnel expertise than are 
associations representing larger businesses (Malcolm Spence interview: 07-08-03). An 
interviewee from the Caribbean Export and Development Agency brought out a similar 
point by stating that some private sector associations, particularly the smaller ones, “do 
not have the capacity in terms of staff who are conversant on trade issues” (Anonymous 
Interview: 29-08-03).  
 
The RNM has made efforts to consult with and raise awareness of associations 
representing small and medium-sized enterprises across the region. An RNM 
Presentation to the Barbados Small Business Association in September 2004 entitled 
“SME Development in CARICOM: New Approaches, New Solutions” is an example of 
efforts to mobilise and include small business associations (RNM 2004d). However, the 
interests represented by small business associations have not been incorporated in 
consultations on trade negotiating issues at the regional level through activism because of 
lack of organisation and activism.  
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 Therefore, although the material interests can be important in understanding private 
sector EIG mobilisation on trade issues, so too are other factors. One is the perception of 
interests or beliefs about where interests lie and the other is institutional wherewithal. 
All private sector EIGs have not had the capacity or held to the perceptions that cause 
them to mobilise in areas that one might expect.  
 
The ideational-material factors highlighted previously (liberalisation, globalisation 
and good governance) are important to consider too. Before the 1990s EIGs hardly 
mobilised on trade matters of international importance but with the changes in the 
ideational-material context, space for mobilisation and consultation emerged. 
Additionally, efforts by the RNM to mobilise these CSOs from the late 1990s and into the 
early 21st century illustrate that the atmosphere in which trade agendas are set has 
changed in the direction of being more consultative. This more consultative emphasis on 
trade matters must be considered in light of the ideational-material backdrop outlined in 
the previous chapter.  
 
 
• AGRICULTURAL PRIVATE SECTOR/FARMERS’ EIG ACTIVISM: CABA and 
WINFA 
 
Agricultural trade issues have long been important in the CARICOM region. To 
be specific, agricultural trade issues were present in both the Lomé Accords and in the 
CBI. So, can changing material conditions and their impact on EIG material interests 
alone account for the mobilisation of agricultural EIGs on trade in the 1990s? Certainly 
not! Indeed, some consultation and mobilisation by agricultural groups occurred long 
before the 1990s. For instance, in 1965 there was consultation: 
 
Dealing with the future of the West Indies sugar industry, the Conference 
recorded its gratitude to the Prime Minister of Barbados for the steps he had taken 
to hold the recent meeting of representatives of the Governments of Barbados, 
British Guiana, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, the British West Indies Sugar 
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Association, the Caribbean Cane Farmers Association and the Caribbean 
Congress of Labour on the sale of sugar under the Commonwealth Agreement. 
The Conference endorsed the resolution passed by that Conference. (CARICOM 
1965: 2-emphasis added-) 
 
However, CSO consultations of this sort were anomalous and ad hoc before the 
1990s. In addition, CSOs noted here did not continually mobilise for inclusion. Such 
iterated mobilisation only commenced via EIGs such as WINFA and CABA from the 
1990s. The point here is that trade negotiations have always had bearing on agricultural 
producers, but this only translated into mobilization from the 1990s (Renwick Rose 
interview: 10-22-05). This is because of the ways in which groups perceived their 
interests and formed institutions to address these perceived interests.  
 
Group perceptions are temporally located, and perceptions of interests are linked to 
the ideational-material context of the time. Hence, by the late 1990s the trends of 
liberalisation, globalisation and CSO inclusion for good governance impacted on 
activism.  
 
In terms of EIGs representing the agricultural sector in the region the activism of the 
Caribbean Agri-Business Association (CABA), created in 1998, is worthy of note. CABA 
has mobilised on issues relating to the trade environment and the role of the region’s 
agricultural sector by looking at various occurrences within the WTO, FTAA and 
CARICOM settings and the implications for the agricultural sector as a whole and 
focussing specifically on different industries within the agricultural sector. The 
association has met with representatives in various industries and countries across the 
region to address these issues, take concerns to government officials in individual 
countries and to interface with regional officials (CABA 2002).  
 
An example of this interfacing was the involvement of an RNM official in the CABA 
Annual General Meeting of 2001 to give an update on the Doha round of WTO 
negotiations and to receive input from the association (CABA 2001).  Another example 
was a meeting on improving “the capacity of the agribusiness sector to articulate 
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positions on international trade negotiating issues” held in Jamaica in July 2003 by that 
country’s Ministry of Agriculture; the Inter-American Institute for Cooperation in 
Agriculture (IICA), the RNM, the Agribusiness Council of Jamaica, and CABA (RNM 
2003). CABA also presented a position paper relating to FTAA negotiations at a COTED 
meeting in 2002 (CABA 2002). These are but examples of mobilising and making input 
at the regional level, to which others can be added so that: 
 
The efforts of CABA and the commodity groups have not been in vain. 
CARICOM officials applaud and acknowledge their proactive attitude, 
involvement and contribution to the development process. (CABA 2002) 
 
This EIG was created in the 1990s following the creation of the WTO, with the 
start of FTAA talks and with the changing EU-ACP trade context. In other words, this 
EIG was created in part to deal with trade negotiating concerns and this can be linked to 
the intensification of liberalisation in the trade sphere that became marked particularly 
from the mid-1990s. So, when material changes occurred that potentially affected 
interests we see a response by affected interest groups.  
 
In terms of agricultural EIGs again, the work of WINFA is particularly worthy of 
note too, since it not only attempts to mobilise on trade issues for small farmers at the 
CARICOM level, but also at the sub-regional level of the OECS and at the national level 
of countries within the OECS. A banana desk was created within WINFA in 1992 to deal 
with marketing and trade issues relating to this important industry at a time in the face of 
changes to the European banana regime and in the face of threats to the non-reciprocal 
access to the European market of these fruits produced in the ACP countries (Renwick 
Rose interview: 10-22-05). WINFA further established a Fair Trade Desk in 1997 to 
address trade issues, specifically in light of potentially losing preferences on banana 
exports to the EU (ACP-EU Civil Society Information Network, 2003; Renwick Rose 
interview: 10-22-05).  
 
This organisation along with the Barbados Agricultural Society and the Guyana 
Rice Producers’ Association began to hold a series of talks to create a unified farmers’ 
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stance as it relates to agreements for trade liberalisation (WINFA 2003a). WINFA has 
continually met with RNM officials, specifically with respect to changes in the banana 
trade regime and also with respect to other trade issues (RNM 2004b; RNM 2005; 
Renwick Rose interview: 10-22-05).  Further, WINFA has become directly involved in 
engaging with the international trade arena outside of the CARICOM context as 
evidenced by the attendance of its president at the Cancun Ministerial of the WTO as part 
of the Via Campesina delegation of the international small farmers’ movement, through 
its involvement in the ACP-civil society forum and by attending ACP-EU trade meetings 
(WINFA 2003b; Renwick Rose interview: 10-22-05). 
 
Once more, there is a link between activism on trade issues and liberalisation in 
the trade sphere in response to interests being threatened, as material interest-based 
assumptions would posit. However, this cannot be separated from the idea that mobilising 
on trade is important. Material changes in trade rules for bananas were obviously 
important, but so too were ideas about how these changes should be addressed. Renwick 
Rose of WINFA for instance emphasised that the idea that WINFA members needed to 
become more active on trade issues and needed to build institutional mechanisms to do 
this before becoming active on trade. He further asserted that as “trade liberalisation” 
increased under the WTO and with “globalisation” WINFA members came to see 
activism on trade as in farmers’ interests (Renwick Rose interview: 10-22-05).  A similar 
point can be made for CABA: in addition to interests being affected, the idea that trade 
issues needed to be addressed had to be accepted for this association to be formed. This 
only occurred in the context of ideational-material trends that elevated liberalisation and 
globalisation as integral to economic progress. 
 
 
• TO CLOSE FOR EIGS: 
 
The EIGs one would expect to mobilise on trade issues have done so, but different 
EIGs have had differing degrees of contact with regional officials. The EIGs highlighted 
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here have overcome institutional constraints to action through working regionally, just as 
have the non-EIGs/networks discussed previously.  
 
Consultation with the CAIC and CCL has been relatively well entrenched when one 
considers the CARICOM mechanism. However, when it comes to trade, despite both 
being seen as a “partners” in the CARICOM context, the CCL does not have contact with 
COTED, whilst the CAIC does. Although other EIGs discussed here (CABA, WINFA, 
and CTO) do not have contact with the CARICOM mechanisms via the Heads of 
Government Conference; these EIGs engage regional officials, are consulted by RNM 
officials and (sporadically) have input in COTED.  
 
Most EIGs became active on trade issues from the 1990s, particularly following the 
creation of the WTO, with the start of FTAA talks, and with changes to EU-ACP trade 
relations. We can make the link here to material interests being affected in a changing 
trade environment and, therefore, we see that material interests being impacted by 
material changes are relevant in giving these EIGs impetus for action. Nonetheless, the 
limited action or late action by some of these EIGs in the post-WTO context (i.e. not 
mobilising until the start of the 21st century), and EIG inaction on pre-1990s trade matters 
(when their material interests were also at stake) both signal that a material interest based 
approach is insufficient for understanding activism on trade. Ideational factors, 
specifically the perception that groups had important interests being affected and that 
they needed to become involved, should be considered here. Also significant, is the 
institutional set-up of EIGs since this can assist in creating an environment in which trade 
issues come to be prioritised. EIG activism on trade, like that of non-EIGs, must also be 
considered against the backdrop of an enabling ideational-material context in which good 
governance, liberalisation and globalisation have featured prominently. 
 
Another point that must be brought out is that some EIGs are closely linked with non-
EIGs. As a member of the CRG, the CCL networks with non-EIGs attempting to impact 
on trade negotiating stances in the region. The linking of its activities to those of the non-
EIGs in the CRG illustrates that this EIG straddles the EIG/non-EIG boundary. Small 
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business and agricultural associations do this at times too, as their involvement in 
NWCTs in Trinidad and Tobago and St. Lucia illustrates. WINFA is another EIG to 
consider here because, like the CCL, it hops into the non-EIG realm of CSO activism 
through its networking and cooperation with regional non-EIGs. Moreover, WINFA may 
be viewed as more closely linked with non-EIGs through its links to Oxfam as an 
important source of funding and assistance, and because of its focus on social 
development and gender issues too.  
 
Associations such as these, though classified as EIGs, not only act out of instrumental 
economic interests of the groups they represent, but also because they share in the 
principled idea that CSOs with a developmental or social focus have important roles to 
play in consultations on trade issues so that social issues can be taken into consideration. 
They do not view themselves as having strictly instrumental goals, but also as being 
socially focussed.62 Preconceived instrumental interests do not drive action or link groups 
automatically. In addition to interests, ideas are important in understanding networking/ 
coalition formation for activism, as well as for understanding activism itself. 
 
So what does all this really mean? 
 
CONCLUSIONS FOR THE REGIONAL LEVEL 
 
 
At the regional level, states combine their capacity within CARICOM and via the 
linked RNM. At the level of CARICOM and the RNM there is an emphasis on CSO 
consultation in discourse and in practice.  The CCL, the CAIC and the CPDC have 
regularised contact with the Conference of the Heads of Governments within CARICOM 
in their roles as social partners. The CAIC, the CPDC and other CSOs make important 
                                                 
62 This straddling of the two CSO classifications (and the difficulty of placing the CTO either squarely 
inside or outside the CSO zone) is perhaps expected as classifying CSOs is a sometimes difficult task and 
further creating categories within the CSO sphere makes for somewhat artificial categorisations such as that 
implemented here for the purposes of clarity (see chapter 2). 
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inputs in the COTED, even though often on a sporadic basis. The RNM collaborates with 
the above-mentioned CSOs, other regional umbrella CSOs, domestic chambers of 
commerce, domestic sector/industry-specific associations, domestic labour unions and 
NWCTs. The RNM staff tours the region, attending meetings and putting on their own 
meetings and workshops in order to seek the views of CSOs and disseminate information. 
These CARICOM and RNM actions illustrate an emerging regularisation of consultation 
between regional officials and a diverse range of CSOs.  
 
This point aside, one must not overemphasise elevated levels of CSO inclusion or 
activism at the regional level. Even though some CSOs have pooled capacity in order to 
mobilise effectively and to impact on regional processes, only limited sets of CSOs have 
been incorporated in the region’s consultative processes on trade issues. Instead, EIGs, 
and in particular those representing more prominent commercial interests, tend to 
dominate consultative processes on trade. The CAIC’s regular contact with the RNM, 
repeated inclusion of in the RNM’s technical working groups, and the regular contact 
between the RNM and CAIC member associations (i.e. national Chambers of Commerce) 
point to this emphasis.  
 
One might assume that this inclusion stems from the more active mobilisation of 
the CAIC on trade issues. Active mobilisation of this association could be seen as 
stemming from the fact that the CAIC members possess material interests affected by 
trade, especially because it is the CAIC’s members who trade. However, other EIGs that 
one might expect to mobilise on the basis of their material interests mobilise less actively 
on trade matters at the regional level. The relatively limited activism by the CCL and by 
other less prominent EIGs (small business associations, for instance63) are examples of 
groups with interests that should propel them to mobilise, but that have not done so to the 
same extent as the CAIC. Furthermore, these EIGs have not been incorporated as 
integrally as the CAIC. Threats to material interests are not sufficient in helping one to 
                                                 
63 However, speaking of small businesses in particular Gisele Mark of this institution makes it clear that her 
association speaks to the interests of and includes businesses of all sizes, large, medium and small. 
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understand either regularised CSO mobilisation on trade matters or regularised CSO 
inclusion in trade consultations by regional officials. 
 
In addition to differences in terms of patterns of EIG mobilisation, it should also 
be noted that regular EIG activism on trade issues was absent prior to the mid/late 1990s. 
Despite the existence and evolution of trade agreements that could have impacted on EIG 
members’ material interests prior to the 1990s (e.g. the Lomé Conventions, the CBI and 
the CARIBCAN agreement), attempts at dedicated activism by EIGs on these issues did 
not exist until the 1990s. Hence, having material interests affected by trade cannot, on its 
own, be seen as the factor that propelled these CSOs towards more concentrated and 
regularised activism from the 1990s. 
 
This thesis suggests that perceptions about where interests lie are important, since 
interests do not exist somewhere out there simply to be discovered or acted on. Instead, 
interests have to be constructed and viewed as interests. From the mid/late 1990s, some 
EIGs came to view trade matters as priority interests that necessitated mobilisation. 
Additionally, having or creating the institutional ability to deal with trade issues is 
important for understanding patterns and levels of activism. Without the institutional 
wherewithal, activism on trade matters will likely be limited, sporadic and ineffective 
whether or not a group perceives trade matters as in its interests and worth mobilising on. 
 
Non-EIG activism by the CPDC, the related CRG, and other associations or 
networks is worth emphasising too. The activism of these CSOs is not based on them 
responding solely to material self-interests, it is also based on an ideational starting point 
that values the involvement of CS on issues that impact people’s lives. These ideas 
inform the way that these non-EIGs conceive of their interests in trade negotiations. 
However, perceptions of interests alone do not allow for activism. Again, institutional 
capacity has to be built to allow these actors to mobilise and to be seen as legitimate in 
consultative processes. These non-EIG umbrella associations and networks have 
attempted to create or enhance their institutions in order to allow them to make valuable 
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inputs on trade issues. Just as with EIGs though, this activism is only comprehensible 
when situated in the ideational-material context of the 1990s.  
 
Trends important in the ideational-material context of the 1990s have also 
informed the perceptions and approaches of regional officials to CSO consultation. 
Regional representatives have come to see CSO consultation as important in 
CARICOM’s efforts to cope with trade liberalisation, with globalisation and as needed in 
efforts to promote and conform to the norm of good governance. However, regional 
officials tend towards a focus on EIGs (particularly private sector EIGs) in consultations 
based on the idea that these EIGs are the most important stakeholders with respect to 
trade matters.  EIGs are seen as the primary stakeholders on trade issues because regional 
officials seem to start from material interest based assumptions about mobilisation. They, 
therefore, view CSOs representing traders or workers in the traded sectors as those that 
should be consulted primarily. Regional officials also tend to include CSOs that have the 
ability to give targeted and well-researched inputs on trade, since regional officials can 
draw on the expertise and information generated by these CSOs. Despite strategic and 
EIG focussed incorporation of CSOs by regional officials and mechanisms, it should also 
be noted that discourses and actions at the regional level have increasingly come to 
espouse the view that consultation of a variety of CSO types matters.  
 
All of this implies that factors beyond material or economic interests help one to 
understand CSO mobilisation and inclusion on trade negotiating agendas in the 
CARICOM context. Therefore, this chapter has shown that at the CARICOM level, both 
EIGs and non-EIGs that perceive themselves as having interests in trade matters; that 
have pooled capabilities; and that have developed the institutional ability to engage with 
trade issues have mobilised and have come to be included in trade discussions with 
regional officials. Additionally, patterns of CSO inclusion and activism must be viewed 
as influenced by the post-Cold War ideational-material context in which trade 
liberalisation and globalisation were placed high on country agendas and in which CSOs 
were brought into focus with an emphasis on good governance. 
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 CHAPTER 6 
CONSULTATIONS ON TRADE AGENDAS THROUGH 
SOCIAL PARTNERSHIP? THE CASE OF BARBADOS 
 
As with the broader regional level, material changes alone do not account for 
tendencies towards CSO mobilisation or towards government openness to consulting 
CSOs on trade matters in Barbados. Specifically, increased exposure to trade does not 
help one to understand CSO mobilisation on trade from the 1990s onwards nor does this 
help us to understand government consultation of CSOs from this time period. The graph 
in Figure 5 shows that Barbados’s exposure to trade from the 1990s onward was in fact 
markedly lower than it was in the 1970s and 1980s. Therefore, increased openness to 
trade can be disregarded immediately in efforts to understand CSO activism and 
consultation on trade matters from the 1990s. 
 
 So how can we make sense of CSO activism on trade and CSO consultation on 
trade matters from the 1990s? 
Figure 5: Barbados’s Trade Dependency64
Barbados's Trade Dependency
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
19
71
19
73
19
75
19
77
19
79
19
81
19
83
19
85
19
87
19
89
19
91
19
93
19
95
19
97
19
99
20
01
Year
Tr
ad
e 
as
 %
 o
f G
D
P
 
                                                 
64 Source: World Bank (2005), author’s calculations 
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 This chapter emphasises that an important factor that precipitated a movement 
towards CSO inclusion in policy consultations in Barbados was the economic crisis that 
began in 1991. To deal with the social fallout of this economic crisis Barbados 
institutionalised a tripartite consultative mechanism (the “Social Partnership” -SP-) and 
this consultative mechanism opened the door for greater CSO involvement in policy 
processes. Therefore, although trade openness did not drastically increase in Barbados, a 
material factor (economic crisis) fed into the emergence of consultative space for CSOs 
on a variety of matters.  This point aside, including CSOs and CSO activism should not 
be seen as driven only by this material factor. 
 
 As the previous regional level chapter highlighted, changes in the world 
ideational-material context, and ideas held by CSOs and government officials about these 
changes and about how to address these changes must be considered. This chapter will 
therefore highlight the connections between changes in the ideational-material context, 
changes in the policy atmosphere in Barbados, and changes in CSO mobilisation. 
Specifically, the chapter will look at changes in the ways that governments and CSOs 
came to perceive, and by extension, redefine their interests from the mid/late 1990s.  
 
One must also consider institutional factors in understanding patterns of CSO 
activism and inclusion or for understanding how CSOs attempted to realise their 
perceived interests and goals. First of all, the SP institutionalised consultation with EIGs 
representing labour and the private sector/employers. This institutional arrangement 
impacted on CSO inclusion in trade consultations. On the CSO side institutional factors 
must be considered too. Specifically, EIGs (those representing the private sector in 
particular) have become well coordinated and well versed on trade issues, allowing them 
to convey their concerns with relation to negotiating issues effectively. As in the regional 
case, this chapter shows that officials are more apt to include CSOs whose research and 
expertise they can draw on more readily than they are to incorporate less well-organised 
groups. This point aside, this chapter highlights that, as with the regional level, non-EIGs 
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have been trying to become better organised by means of pooling capacity in efforts to 
address trade issues and be included in consultations. 
 
This chapter presents these arguments in following manner: Section 6.1 examines 
the ways in which the creation and evolution of the SP opened avenues for CSO 
consultation. This section also illustrates that the crisis, which precipitated the creation of 
the SP, contributed to the advancement of neo-liberal policy and policy ideas. Section 
6.1 further highlights that the SP has evolved to become an institution used by the 
Barbados Government to comply with the trend towards good governance that became 
increasingly important in the 1990s. Section 6.2, follows by looking at the activism and 
inclusion of CSOs on trade negotiating issues and by linking CSO activism and inclusion 
to the trends of neo-liberalism, globalisation and good governance on the one hand and 
to institutional factors on the other hand.  
 
6.1 THE EARLY 1990S-RECESSION AND INSTITUTIONALISED TRIPARTISM 
 
 
The SP in Barbados was implemented on 24 August 1993 as the “Protocol on 
Prices and Incomes Policy”. This agreement was signed by the Prime Minister of 
Barbados (Erskine Sandiford) on behalf of the Barbados Government, (Sir) John Stanley 
Goddard of the Barbados Private Sector Agency (PSA) on behalf of employers/private 
sector, and (Sir) Leroy Trotman and Robert “Bobbi” Morris both of the Congress of 
Trade Unions and Staff Associations (CTUSAB) on behalf of employees/workers 
(Goddard 2003: 2; Sandiford 2003:1). Hence, a formalised neo-corporatist type 
arrangement for a consultative governance framework was initiated. This agreement was 
created on the back of a severe recession that occurred in the country between 1991 and 
1993.  
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ECONOMIC DOWNTURN AND DOMESTIC REACTIONS 
 
As a result of recessions in the USA, Canada and the UK between 1990 and 1992, 
economic activity in Barbados slowed, tourist arrivals dropped, industrial production 
decreased, and unemployment and inflation levels rose between 1989 and 1992. 65 
Barbados also saw negative rates of GDP growth, between 1989 and 1991, the fiscal 
deficit grew, and foreign reserves dwindled. As part of this economic crisis, Barbados 
also became hard-pressed to service debts with the balance of payments deficit growing 
to over BDS $100 million by 1991 (Fashoyin, 2001: 1). In reply the Government of 
Barbados entered into an SAP under the auspices of the IMF (Downes and Nurse 2003; 
Fashoyin 2001: 1-3).  
 
The agreed structural adjustments did not include currency devaluation (currency 
value remained BDS $2.00: US $1.00) as a result of the government in the country 
responding to public disdain for devaluation in negotiations with the IMF (Goddard 2003: 
2-3; Sandiford 2003:1, 4). However, other aspects of the austerity arrangements that the 
IMF proposed (civil servant pay cuts, massive lay-offs comprising nearly a third of the 
public sector) could not be negotiated away despite being heavily contested within CS 
(Fashoyin 2001: 2; Blackman 2003: 5). In response to the contested austerity measures 
implemented and the threat of others that were proposed, an at times confrontational 
atmosphere between CSOs and the government emerged.  
 
Labour and private sector EIGs in particular opposed the structural adjustment 
measures. Workers’ unions united to form the Coalition of Trade Unions and Staff 
Association in September 1991,66 and this coalition led demonstrations in October and 
November 1991. Labour unions and private sector/employers’ associations lobbied for 
the Prime Minister (Minister of Finance) to be ousted via a vote of no confidence.67 
                                                 
65 Unemployment rose from 15.3% in 1989 to 23% in 1992. Inflation rose from 3.1% in 1990 to 6% in both 
1991 and 1992 (Fashoyin, 2001: 1)  
66 This informal coalition of  the Barbados Workers Union (BWU) and the National Union of Public 
Workers (NUPW) was formalized and renamed the Congress of Trade Unions and Staff Associations of 
Barbados (CTUSAB) in August 1993 (Fashoyin: 11). 
67 This no confidence motion, however, failed to overthrow the country’s leadership. 
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Discussions between unions and private sector representatives also led to proposals for 
joint employer-employee protests under the auspices of the National Union of Public 
Workers (NUPW) and the Barbados Manufacturers’ Association (BMA).68  
Representatives from private sector/employers’ EIGs and labour unions met informally in 
attempts to come to agreements that would minimise lay-offs and labour militancy in 
order to “maintain industrial harmony”. Also, church representatives, members of 
community groups, other CSOs and some unemployed people joined protests in solidarity 
with union and private sector associations in 1991 (Trotman 2003: 12, 14; Goddard 2003: 
3-4; Fashoyin 2001: 2, 11, 20-21, 32).  
 
In other words, labour unions and private sector/employers’ representative 
organisations rallied public support, by holding meetings to engage CS and by means of 
public protests, in efforts to dissuade the Barbados Government and IMF representatives 
against insisting on some of the contentious austerity measures proposed. Speaking of 
this, Sir Leroy Trotman stated: 
 
In this initiative, we [CTUSAB] met with the Barbados Employers 
Confederation, the Barbados Chamber of Commerce, the Barbados 
Manufacturers Association; we met with leaders of the Church; we held 
‘town hall’ meetings before they were so glamorously designated and we 
held public open air meetings. (Trotman 2003: 6) 
 
In this tense atmosphere, the Government of Barbados initiated meetings that 
included these protesting actors in efforts to cool the heated political climate (Goddard 
2003: 4; Sandiford 2003: 3). In the words of Courtney Blackman, the government was 
“forced” to move towards inclusion of the “social partners”:  
 
The Administration, which had previously merely informed, rather than 
consulted with, the people, was forced to sit down with the other “Social 
Partners”, namely the Coalition of Trade Unions and Staff Associations of 
Barbados (CTUSAB) and the Barbados Private Sector Agency (BPSA), at 
talks mediated by Church leaders. (2003:5-emphasis added) 
 
                                                 
68 These joint protests never materialised as CTUSAB saw private sector – worker cooperation as clouding 
the agenda of workers. 
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This government action was a strategic response to CSO mobilisation. The 
government initiated consultative meetings because it wanted to avert further unrest 
rather than because the government believed that CSO consultation in government policy 
making was right or just. The consultations that ensued involved parties making trade- 
offs and were codified via the “Protocol for the Implementation of Prices and Income 
Policy”. This Protocol was in essence an agreement between the government, labour 
unions (represented by CTUSAB) and employers/the private sector representative 
associations (represented BPSA, created in 1993)69 on the terms for restructuring of the 
economy and on the need to subjugate conflicting group interests to national interests. 70  
 
Despite SAPs and the government-EIG consultative framework that resulted 
being responses to an economic crisis in Barbados (a material factor), SAPs, CSO 
mobilisation and the SP also must be understood with reference to the ideational-material 
backdrop of the time. By the early 1990s, dealing with balance of payments and other 
economic problems meant implementing neo-liberal policies in the form of SAPs. 
Implementing SAPs in Barbados was, therefore, a facet of the changing ideational-
material atmosphere and impacted on government-society relations. 
 
The policies introduced in Barbados entailed decreasing government involvement 
in the economy, decreasing public wage bills and focussing on private sector-led 
development (via export orientation). Specifically, government interventionism and 
provision of important functions (e.g. public sector employment and tariff protection) as 
laid out in consecutive development plans between 1960 and 1985 (Howard 1989: 26-30) 
came into question. Consequently, the populist-statist bargain in the country was 
threatened and this precipitated disquiet across CSOs in Barbados. Changes in a neo-
                                                 
69 The BPSA formalized consultative relations between the various private sector EIGs (Barbados 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry; Barbados Manufacturers’ Association; Barbados Employers’ 
Confederation; Barbados Agricultural Society; Barbados Farmers’ Union; Barbados Hotel and Tourism 
Association; Barbados Small Business Association) that commenced in 1991 (Fashoyin 2001: 12). 
70 The SP however has not been a substitute for voluntarism in industrial relations. Unions and employers 
(in the private and public sectors) continue to bargain on work related matters outside of this framework, 
whilst issues of national concern are the main focus of the SP.  
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liberal direction led to CSOs in Barbados seeing the need to mobilise in attempts to 
address these changing state-society relations.  
 
The Protocol, which resulted in efforts to calm CSO unrest, entailed CSOs 
agreeing to compromise on some of their concerns and to collaborate with the 
government so long as the government was willing to make compromises too. An 
institutionalised neo-corporatist agreement emerged in which labour and private sector 
representative associations cooperated with the government to prioritise a jointly agreed 
notion of national well-being. This meant, for the most part, accepting the neo-liberal 
policy direction being pursued in Barbados and agreeing to accept changing government-
society relations so long as consultation between EIGs and the government occurred. The 
parties to the Protocol eventually agreed that competitiveness needed to be restored and 
that productivity in the country needed to be improved via the austerity measures agreed 
with the IMF. After a range of meetings between the union representatives, 
employers/private sector organisation representatives and government ministers, an 
agreement on the necessary initiatives was struck.  
 
The parties agreed that adjustment would be achieved via a stabilisation 
programme to reduce the fiscal deficit, raise revenue, and slow demand through increased 
taxation. Raising government revenue was particularly important in light of projected 
decreased in earnings via imports, as tariffs levels were reduced in conformity to the 
CARICOM CET and under the advice of the IFIs. So, indirect taxation with a value 
added tax was introduced. The parties to the Protocol agreed that government expenditure 
needed to be cut, including an agreement to an 8% cut in public sector wages, and that 
wages should be frozen in both the public and private sectors until 1995 (extending the 
1991-1993 wage freeze established by the IMF). Other measures to keep inflation low 
and generally improve productivity (e.g. divestment in or privatisation of government 
owned enterprises and the creation of a National Productivity Council) were agreed as 
well (Goddard 2003; Sandiford 2003, Fashoyin 2001: 14, 22).  
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In the end, The Protocol for the Implementation of Prices and Income Policy 
began a formal neo-corporatist consultative process on economic issues to be 
implemented by means of quarterly meetings of the signatories. Later (under Protocol II), 
the creation of a Sub-Committee for discussing issues of concern in Barbados helped to 
ensure that consultation between the involved parties was regularised. This sort of 
institutionalised and codified CSO-government consultative forum was novel to 
Barbados and to the CARICOM region in which consultations with CSOs tended to occur 
on an ad hoc basis, if occurred. 
 
So far, this summation of the early days of the SP shows that material interest 
based approaches to understanding mobilisation hold validity. Workers’ unions 
mobilised and consolidated, forming the umbrella organisation CTUSAB, and the private 
sector organisations (business/ industry specific associations) did the same, forming the 
PSA. Both groups lobbied when their material interests were threatened. Workers faced 
job insecurity and wage cuts, and businesses had to deal with losses in protection (with 
cuts in import taxes) and labour militancy that hurt their earnings (due to policies 
advising private sector wage freezes and restructuring to increase efficiency). Action by 
these EIGs is what one would expect using material interest based conceptions. However, 
even these supposedly rational-materialist responses to pending changes were based on 
ideas about where interests lay within the policy context of the time.  
 
Labour EIGs could have reacted far more radically than they did in 1991. The 
labour revolts of 1937 illustrate that radical labour action in order to get the government 
to heed workers’ demands was possible. Workers did not have to sit down with 
governments to agree a compromise; nor did they have to cooperate with private 
sector/employers’ representative associations. However, at a time when neo-liberal 
adjustments seemed inevitable - because of their implementation in the region and the 
developing world via SAPs and because neo-liberal policy ideas came to be accepted as 
the best way to cure economic ailments - the course of action pursued by labour EIGs 
was to seek compromises that would be feasible within this context. Workers’ EIGs did 
not call for job security at all costs; nor did they threaten to disrupt the economy if they 
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were not heard (as was the case with the 1937 revolts). Instead, they expressed their 
interests in a manner that was conditioned by the ideational-material context of the time.  
 
EIGs agreed to reconstitute their interests to fit into those of the country in the 
face of the ideational-material shift in a neo-liberal direction. Based on the belief that 
neo-liberal policy changes were inevitable, these EIGs acquiesced to most of the market-
oriented policy demands of IMF SAPs on the condition that they could have a role in 
reforming the policies pursued so that the impacts would not be overly drastic. EIG 
interests, therefore, evolved in line with changing ideas about the policies necessary for 
dealing with balance of payments problems. Groups agreed to refashion the way that they 
conceived of their interests by subjugating these to wider concerns about national welfare 
versus narrow group self-interests alone. The actions of the PSA and the CTUSAB in 
agreeing to conceive of their interests differently illustrates that, through interaction, 
group interests came to be reconstituted based on ideas about how things should be done 
(causal ideas) and ideas about right/wrong (principled beliefs). 
 
The Barbados Government of the time sought to placate labour and private sector 
EIG concerns through consultation. This action was instrumental because it served 
government interests to decrease militancy and to maintain domestic stability. Creating a 
framework for consultation that was in line with a focus on good governance by IFIs and 
within development and political policy thought was self-seeking too. However, placing 
emphasis on consultation cannot be separated from the ideational-material shift towards 
“good governance”. Additionally, the continuation of the SP beyond the crisis period 
illustrates that this mechanism has evolved away from an instrument for calming unrest. 
In Barbados, the parties to the SP have come to believe that this consultative framework 
is important for advancing national goals and is vital for advancing good governance (this 
will be highlighted in the following sub-section).  
 
So, although the actions of EIGs and the government were instrumental/self-
serving and based on material factors, these actions and expressions of self-interests only 
had meaning in the context of the time period in which they were situated. Actors held 
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specific ideas about how to act and about the policy atmosphere in which they were 
located. In other words, the ideational-material context of the time and the ideas held by 
CSOs and governments about how to respond to ideational-material changes impacted on 
group interest specification and on group actions. 
 
Nevertheless, EIGs mobilised on economic issues and in broad terms this fits the 
material interest-based mould. However, the role of churches and other CSOs in protests, 
and of church representatives (in particular) who acted as intermediaries between 
conflicting concerns and who helped broker the SP (Fashoyin 2001: 21, 32, 60) is 
difficult to explain using a material interest based approach. Here one must acknowledge 
that these actions were based on principled ideas about social responsibility and justice. 
Church leaders, for instance, perceived themselves as having an interest in facilitating 
social stability and cohesion. Although this activism would likely not be defined as 
rational in a rationalist view, it did occur and was based on principled beliefs defining 
group interests. 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE SP 
 
The SP has been renewed three times since it was created and continues to focus 
on maintaining peaceful industrial relations and a consultative, cooperative framework 
for the country’s “stakeholders”. The first two Protocols focussed on policies relating to 
prices and incomes that were paramount in the climate of economic stabilisation. Such 
focal points remain along with emphasis on productivity, increasing competitiveness of 
local industries and products and maintaining prices in line with incomes (Downes and 
Nurse 2003; Blackman 2003: 7; Protocol IV, 2001). The SP was, therefore, not a 
mechanism specifically for dealing with the international trade agenda. Nonetheless, the 
SP is linked to such at the national level. Specifically, Protocol Four of the Social 
Partnership: 2001-2004 states that the social partners agree to guarantee, among other 
things: 
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2.2 (b) participation in regional, hemispheric and global trade 
agreements on such terms and conditions as do no violence to the nation’s 
long term economic and social development; (Protocol IV, 2001:7-
emphasis added-) 
 
This Protocol also speaks of the links between productivity, competitiveness, social well-
being and trade liberalisation and globalisation in stating: 
 
3.1 The Social Partners are aware that the onset of globalisation and 
trade liberalisation demands an intensified co-operative effort to 
accelerate economic growth, increase employment and improve the living 
standards of all Barbadians. (Protocol IV, 2001: 8 -emphasis added) 
 
These statements hint at the expanding remit of the SP, which began with the 
third Protocol which very notably institutionalised the SP via a “Social Compact” and, 
thus, its expansion to include responses to globalisation and trade liberalisation 
(Protocol III, 1998; Protocol IV 2001; Blackman 2003: 7-8, Downes and Nurse: 2003).71 
Therefore, at least two of the ideational-material trends that this thesis emphasises as 
important in understanding CSO activism and inclusion from the 1990s emerge as vital 
for understanding the extension of the SP beyond the crisis period. As such, the 
consultative device that was developed to deal with a specific economic crisis in 
Barbados has become an important institution for consultation on important social and 
economic issues at the national level, including international trade matters.  
 
The SP is collaborative and consensus building in nature as a mechanism for 
including CSOs in governance. The idea behind the SP is that CSOs (particularly labour 
and private-sector EIGs) agree not to act in adversarial or confrontational settings with 
each other or with government, but to reconstitute their interests in order to make 
cooperation and compromise on important socio-economic policy issues possible in 
pursuit of “good governance”.  
 
                                                 
71 Other newer issues in the SP are public sector reform, poverty alleviation, HIV/AIDS, Human Resource 
Development and Crime. 
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The evolution of the SP, and its importance for governance reasons and in the context 
of trade liberalisation, is reflected too in the 2003 Manifesto of the Barbados Labour 
Party that won the 2003 national elections (in power from 1994).72 Here the BLP states: 
The re-elected BLP Government will: 
• Entrench the Social Partnership in the Constitution.  
• Extend the scope of its remit so that the Social Partnership becomes a vital 
instrument for the expansion of participatory democracy, and enhanced 
standards of civil governance, and resolution of industrial conflict.  
• Refine the protocols under which the Partnership functions.  
• Broaden the role of the Partnership to involve it fully in the negotiations with 
the CSME, the FTAA, the WTO, and all other major international economic 
and trade talks.  (BLP 2003: 61) 
Of importance here is the commitment to broaden the scope of the SP for governance 
purposes and to include international trade negotiating issues within the SP. Like the 
prior statement taken from the 2003 manifesto, the following - once more from the BLP 
government- reiterates the commitment to consultation and links this commitment to the 
norm of “good governance” that came to be important by the 1990s: 
It is no secret that this Government since coming into office in 1994, has 
gone beyond the rhetoric to establish systems of accountability and 
transparency that are so vital to good governance and to a fair and just 
society.  
 
There is undoubtedly a direct link between a government that consults 
with the stakeholders of society on important matters before it, and the 
preservation of a healthy democracy through the expressed confidence of 
an enlightened and informed public. (Nation Newspaper, 16-04-04- 
emphasis added-) 
 
 
In line with intentions for the SP to evolve in a fashion similar to trends in the 
direction of “good governance”, the SP has grown to encompass CSOs beyond the 
original EIGs. However, the main CSOs involved remain those representing workers and 
                                                 
72 This although the SP was created under the prior Democratic Labour Party (DLP) government of Lloyd 
Erskine Sandiford (1991-1994) 
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the private sector/employers (Downes and Nurse 2003; Protocol III; Protocol IV). The 
identical wordings of Protocol IV and Protocol V make this EIG focus clear:  
 
The Social Partners therefore undertake to use such opportunities as may 
present themselves to effect the deepening and widening of the social 
partnership including, where appropriate, the formal involvement of 
accredited73 non-governmental organisations in its dialogue. (Protocol 
IV, 2001: 31; Protocol V, 2005: 42-emphasis added-). 
 
Despite the still limited inclusion of CSOs beyond EIGs in the SP, the institution 
embodies the belief that CSOs have important roles to play in governance. Specifically, 
the idea that CS and CSOs have integral roles to play in cooperating with government has 
been significant in maintaining and expanding the remit of the SP for over a decade. 
Commitment to the SP could be viewed as tactical and self-serving on the part of all 
parties: all parties can potentially gain important concessions through institutionalised 
consultation and cooperation. However, if this were little more than a tactic how can one 
explain the fact that where similar arrangements were created in other countries in the 
region, these consultative frameworks have not survived? The case study of Trinidad and 
Tobago to follow, for instance, indicates that where belief in the importance of continual 
consultation (for good governance purposes) was weak, such a mechanism was unable to 
survive, group interests notwithstanding.  
Even if the SP was originally created for instrumental reasons by private 
sector/employer groups, labour groups and the government to address various 
instrumental concerns, the cooperation that ensued was based on specific conceptions of 
how to deal with problems in collaborative settings. These ideas have grown and have 
become more entrenched, with the involved CSOs agreeing on the need to reconstitute 
their interests in consideration of national concerns and the government agreeing to the 
necessity of consultative arrangements. 
                                                 
73 This term is ambiguous but in Barbados CSOs have legal character as either registered charities 
(Charities Act) or Non-Profit Companies (Companies Act). 
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The Government and the Social Partners are bonded not just by a Protocol 
that is a collection of words, but by a spirit to do what is in the best 
interests of the country. (Arthur 2005: 12-13) 
 
 
INVOLVEMENT OF CSOs PRIOR TO THE SP 
 
The assertion throughout this thesis that CSOs were not consulted until the 1990s 
in the CARICOM region should be qualified with respect to Barbados. Fashoyin (2001), 
for instance, makes it clear that some consultations existed based on tripartism with 
respect to economic and labour matters from the 1970s, stating:  
 
Consultation at this level was carried out under institutions that were 
variously referred to as the National Economic Consultative Council or 
Committee (NECC), which met on an ad hoc basis depending on the 
Government and prevailing economic conditions. Several fora such as this 
were set up from time to time, to address specific issues of national 
importance. For example, in 1986, the Minister for Labour set up an ad 
hoc broad-based committee to address the unemployment problem at the 
time. On the other hand, tripartite consultation could be based on the 
exchange of correspondence or information and need not involve the 
signing of any memorandum of agreement. (19- emphasis added) 
 
Yet, as the emphasised segments of the above quotation show, consultation was 
by no means a matter of course. It was with the 1990s crisis and the emergence of the 
ideational-material trend of “good governance” that systematic and institutionalised 
inclusion of CSOs (EIGs specifically) by the government began. As already stated, this 
has continued and has expanded over the years to include more issues and more actors. 
Moreover, as Blackman (2003) makes clear, previous governments “informed” rather 
than “consulted” groups within CS prior to the SP (5). The SP changed this so that the 
sporadic nature of consultation in crisis times has been replaced by a culture of continual 
cooperation, a process that CSOs mobilised for and government responded to, a process 
through which actors interests have been reconstituted through interaction and changing 
ideas.  
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As for consultations on the trade negotiating agenda pursued by the country, these 
too were sporadic and ad hoc up until the mid/late 1990s. However, following the 
creation of the SP, consultations on trade issues were opened in parallel with ideational-
material changes in the international sphere favouring liberalisation, emphasising 
globalisation and seeing the importance of “good governance”. Mobilisation by CSOs in 
efforts to direct the course that government representatives would take on trade matters 
was also negligible before the 1990s. In contrast, with the ideational-material changes of 
the 1990s and as part of a broader international CSO movement towards activism on 
international trade and economic issues, both EIGs and non-EIGs in Barbados came to 
perceive of their interests as necessitating a focus on issues up for negotiation in trade 
arrangements.  
 
Official inclusion of CSOs on trade matters and CSO activism on trade matters 
will now be discussed in section 6.2. 
 
6.2 THE SP AND CSO CONSULTATION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
ISSUES 
 
 
The tripartite mechanism for consultation in Barbados has been streamed into the 
workings of all government ministries in the country. Hence, the SP has bearing on 
consultations on international trade arrangements at the ministry level where trade 
agendas are formulated.  
 
One senior official at the Barbados Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade 
stated that comments and suggestions from the “Social Partners” are “considered” in 
compiling briefs to guide delegations and to inform the national positions.74 This view 
was further supported by James Paul, CEO of the Barbados Agricultural Society (BAS) 
who stated that at annual national consultations the government seeks the opinions and 
                                                 
74 Senior Official at the Foreign Trade Division, Barbados Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade. 
Correspondence, 19-07-04 (referenced as (MFA1) throughout text).  
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views of stakeholders and as a result has a good feel for the views of agricultural 
producers on trade arrangements up for negotiation. Moreover, Mr. Paul emphasised that 
the continual nature of consultations with the Barbados Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Foreign Trade  has been important for ensuring that the concerns of agricultural 
producers are understood by officials (James Paul interview: 09-06-03).75 A 
representative from the Barbados Workers’ Union (BWU) supported this view in stating 
that as part of CTUSAB, labour unions have been able to make suggestions and have 
their concerns and views expressed about the direction of Barbados’s trade negotiating 
agenda in annual national consultations and through continued participation in the SP on 
all issues of national significance.76  
 
THE INVOLVEMENT OF EIGS 
 
Private sector EIGs are of particular importance in consultation with the ministry 
responsible for trade issues. Members from private sector EIGs sit on various committees 
such as the Technical Committee on External Trade Negotiations, the Technical Trade 
Committee, and The National Committee on External Trade Negotiations. Hence, 
officials have consulted with private sector EIGs. 
 
Additionally, the concerns and suggestions of private sector EIGs (and individual 
firms that) have been consolidated with the creation of the Private Sector Trade Team 
(PSTT) that attempts to mobilise on trade matters. The PSTT conducts research, gathers 
information on trade talks, disseminates this information to “private sector interests”, and 
seeks out the views and positions of various realms of the domestic private sector. Views 
gathered from the private sector are transmitted to the Foreign Trade Division of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade in the form of proposals or through the 
PSTT’s participation in Technical Committees (MFA1). 
 
                                                 
75 This assertion was made as a comparison to the understanding held by the RNM of the interests 
represented by the BAS, which is James Paul asserts is not as thorough as that held by the government. 
76 Anonymous interviewee from the Barbados Workers’ Union; interviewed July 2003, to be referenced 
throughout text as (BWU-1).  
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In addition to private sector EIGs being included in consultations via committees, 
there are working groups on specific issue areas, such as agriculture and intellectual 
property rights, which are chaired by the government ministries to which the various 
issue areas pertain. These working groups attempt to evaluate proposals and papers 
relating to international trade that have been disseminated in different negotiating arenas 
in order to continually rethink the country’s negotiating positions with the input of 
ministerial and EIG “stakeholders”. The work of these working groups is fed into the 
Technical Trade Committee and then passed on to the Cabinet Sub-Committee on Trade, 
comprising the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, the Minister of 
Agriculture, the Minister of Commerce, Consumer Affairs and Business Development 
and the Minister of Industry and International Business. The Cabinet Sub-Committee on 
Trade must then either endorse or reject negotiating stances before they are submitted to 
Cabinet. In addition to these processes, non-trade ministries conduct consultations with 
their EIG stakeholders before transmitting individual ministerial trade positions and 
concerns to the division responsible for external trade (MFA1). 
 
Thus, the official commitment to including private sector EIGs in collaborative 
process on trade exists. This commitment is borne out by Ruall Harris of the Barbados 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI) who states:  
 
The BCCI is a member of a number of committees established by the 
Barbados government, particularly those committees that were established 
when the government began to negotiate within the WTO setting, the Free 
Trade Area of the Americas, and the ACP-EU trade agreement. (Raull 
Harris interview: 15-06-03) 
 
It is evident that there are systematised processes for consultation between 
officials and CSOs on trade matters in line with the government’s commitment to the SP. 
However, consultation remains dominated by CSOs representing private sector interests. 
Specifically, the PSTT, the BAS, the BCCI, the Barbados Manufacturers’ Association 
(BMA), and the CTUSAB were named as the prime CSOs/stakeholders consulted in 
these processes. Across the spectrum of EIGs however, private sector EIGs were the ones 
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that were most emphasised with respect to consultation on trade issues. Labour EIGs, on 
the other hand, appear to be emphasised less. 
 
Notably, the private sector CSOs seem to be incorporated in consultative 
processes from a relatively early stage through their inclusion in Technical Committees, 
which conduct much of the work pertaining to the formulation of negotiating agendas in 
various issue areas, and for various negotiating realms. Taking this inclusion of EIGs 
representing the private sector a further step is the fact that since its creation in 2003, the 
PSTT has gone as part of the Barbados delegation to international trade negotiations in an 
advisory capacity. For instance, the PSTT has attended talks on the FTAA, CSME and in 
the WTO (Lawson Nurse interview: 06-08-04; MFA1).  
 
This better inclusion of private sector EIGs is in part due to institutional factors. 
Notably, the PSTT has acted to pool capacity across domestic private sector EIGs in 
order to speak to a variety of issues up for negotiation and to mobilise continually on 
trade matters. The PSTT represents a wide array of private sector interests and has the 
staffing capacity to conduct research that allows for formation of specific negotiating 
proposals and specific information that can be drawn on by government officials in the 
areas of tourism, manufacturing, agriculture, services and investment (Lawson Nurse 
interview: 06-08-04). This assertion was made public by an article about the PSTT and 
trade issues in the press: 
The focus of the Private Sector Trade Team, (PSTT) is identifying, 
researching and documenting the special interests of the Barbados private 
sector with respect to the on-going international trade negotiations.  
These are then communicated to the negotiators through negotiating briefs 
and discussion. (PSTT, 2003) 
 
With respect to the workers’ union component of the EIG category in 
consultations on trade issues in Barbados, as previously stated unions are consulted via 
CTUSAB as part of their involvement in the SP and in national consultations. 
Additionally, CTUSAB is invited to meetings held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
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Foreign Trade on trade negotiating proposals being considered by Barbados. At such 
meetings CTUSAB is able to offer input from the labour perspective and is kept abreast 
of negotiating positions being put forward by the country. This is the view from the 
unions as gathered from a union representative (BWU-1) and is confirmed by information 
gained through correspondence with government representatives: 
 
There are a number of Committees of which the Foreign Trade Division is 
the host or standing member. On these [committees] there are either 
representatives from the local trade unions in their individual capacity or 
their collective capacity under CTUSAB. These Committees make, refine 
or endorse proposals for Barbados Trade Policy as negotiations by 
extension impact upon labour.  (MFA1) 
 
Although consultation with union representatives exists, this appears to be less of 
a priority than consultation with EIGs from the private sector. It appears that private 
sector EIGs, and the PSTT in particular, have been included in earlier phases of 
consultation than those from labour.  The repetition of disdain at labour representatives 
only being invited to meetings on the FTAA from the eighth such meeting, whilst 
business representatives were invited from the start, bares some witness to this (BWU-1).  
 
Even though labour EIGs are not as integrated in consultation as are EIGs 
representing private sector concerns, they have attempted to be heard on trade issues. 
Labour EIGs have not mobilised in a manner that has been very well coordinated or 
based on targeted trade research, as has the PSTT. However, they have been included on 
an ongoing basis in government efforts to consult CSOs even if this has been down the 
chain in the consultative process. 
 
That labour EIGs have not conducted targeted research and activism on trade as 
has the PSTT is important to note here. Since the ministry with responsibility for trade 
values the research and information that they can gain from “stakeholders” (MFA1; 
MFA2), this can explain the limited emphasis on labour EIGs as opposed to private 
sector EIGs.  
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The focus on private sector EIGs can also be connected to the ambiguous term 
“stakeholder” used in the parlance of government officials. This term is in no way 
defined but seems to suggest that certain groups should be consulted on certain issues as 
the pertinent interest groups or stakeholders. This view is based on a material interest 
based conception that sees some groups as having interests on trade issues and others as 
being less likely to mobilise. Stakeholders in this conception are not limited to CSOs but 
can include individual firms (private or parastatal) and industries (MFA1). However, in 
terms of CSOs, a focus on private sector EIGs  appears to dominate the conception of 
stakeholder on trade issues.  
 
Ruall Harris from the BCCI aptly expressed the view that private sector EIGs are 
the prime stakeholders on trade in stating: 
 
Governments negotiate trade agreements but governments do not trade, 
[they] do not do business; it is the private sector that does business. So, 
whether we are talking about market access, whether we are talking about 
subsidies and anti-dumping legislation, whether we are talking about even 
government procurement – where government buys goods and services 
from the private sector – all these issues are of the immediate concern of 
the private sector because it is the private sector that trades. (Raull Harris 
interview: 15-06-03) 
 
THE INVOLVEMENT OF NON-EIGS 
 
When attempting to discover the role of CSOs, representatives from the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade indicated that non-EIGs were not very involved. 
Instead, private sector and labour associations (thus EIGs) were the organisations 
primarily included in consultations (MFA1, MFA277). This fact was reiterated by 
Roosevelt King of BANGO who stated that there were no close links between the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade and BANGO members78 and that BANGO 
does not sit on any committees on trade with the Ministry as the local NGO umbrella 
                                                 
77 Another Senior Officer in the Foreign Trade Division in the Barbados Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
Foreign Trade; interviewed 9 August 2004 (referenced as (MFA2) throughout text).  
78 The BAS and the Barbados Small Business Association- two BANGO members falling into the EIG 
category-however have been consulted. 
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organisation (Roosevelt King interview: 05-04-05). This speaks partly to the fact that 
non-EIGs tend not to be viewed as stakeholders when it comes to trade issues, or put 
differently that they are not perceived to have interests affected, so need not be 
considered. 
 
Nonetheless, one source from the Foreign Trade Division in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs shed light on the ways that these non-EIGs have been included, with 
respect to international trade negotiating matters. Non-EIGs, with more awareness of and 
concerned about the goings on in international trade negotiations have been invited to and 
have attended “half-day” and “two hour” sessions with trade ministers. Additionally, 
public consultations, town hall meetings and education for students have been conducted 
to inform broader CS and to note their concerns (MFA2). This sort of involvement by 
non-EIGs though is not of the same quality as consultation with other CSOs. EIGs, have 
been given information, attended meetings to obtain information and so on, just as have 
non-EIGs, however, this is not the same as being involved in committees (particularly 
technical committees) and having institutionalised, or at least systematised channels for 
making suggestions that could potentially influence the national trade negotiating stances.  
 
In other words, non-EIGs have been excluded from more in-depth consultations 
on formulating agendas for trade negotiations. They are instead informed and educated 
rather than consulted or invited to participate in consultative frameworks. The approach 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, as evidenced by the statements of 
two sources there (MFA1; MFA2), has been to deliver information to non-EIGs about the 
various ways that they can transmit their views within the multilateral or regional 
negotiating forums. For instance this ministry sent information and letters to various 
Barbadian NGOs about the “Open Invitation to Civil Society” within the FTAA, and also 
about other initiatives such as side meetings in the FTAA context in which labour 
organisations and NGOs can discuss pertinent issues and submit their views. 
Consequently, institutionalised consultation with CSOs has been the privilege of EIGs, 
especially those representing private sector interests. 
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That the SP was created as a tripartite mechanism based on the more traditionally 
important CSO interests in Barbados contributes to the marginalisation of non-EIGs. 
Hence, the primacy of EIGs in consultation on trade (and other economic matters) in 
formal consultative processes is unsurprising. Yet, materialist assumptions about the 
groups that constitute stakeholders and traditional patterns of group influence fail to show 
the full picture here.  
 
First off, private sector EIGs are better equipped with the technical capacity, in 
the form of knowledgeable staff and facilities, and are funded by contributions from 
members. This institutional wherewithal has allowed private sector EIGs in Barbados to 
produce and to commission research. The PSTT for instance has been able to commission 
research on private sector preparedness for liberalisation of certain economic sectors and 
on private sector views on trade agreements that the government has been able to draw 
on. Such research has enhanced the PSTT’s legitimacy and “usefulness” as a consultative 
partner on trade matters (Lawson Nurse interview: 06-08-04). This factor cannot be 
forgotten in understanding the better inclusion of private sector EIGs over other CSOs 
(both EIGs and non-EIGs). This capacity is a resource that is drawn on by officials in 
government seeking to arrive at the best negotiating positions for the country, particularly 
considering the capacity constraints of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade 
in Barbados. Labour unions and non-EIGs in Barbados, in contrast, tend to have less 
expert inputs to add in the realm of trade, at least from a technical perspective (MFA1; 
MFA2). Hence, institutional factors play into understanding how private sector EIGs 
have come to be better included in consultative processes than other CSOs.  
 
Although the activism of EIGs appears to fit with material interest based notions 
of rational action, these occurrences cannot be separated from ideas. As highlighted 
previously, EIG interests are framed around ideas and perceptions about where interests 
lie. Until the 1990s EIGs in Barbados did not attempt to mobilise on trade issues. It was 
only from the mid/late -1990s with ideational-material changes in the form of neo-
liberalisation, globalisation and good governance that private sector EIGs for instance 
came to prioritise trade issues and it was only in 2003 that they rationalised their 
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mobilisation efforts on this front in the PSTT. Even though pre-1990s trade agreements 
impacted on these EIGs’ materially, they did not mobilise until the 1990s; that is until 
there was a significant shift in the ideational-material context.  
 
Even the SP (a response to neo-liberalisation that evolved to speak of 
globalisation and governance) was a response to a significant shift in the ideational-
material context. Certainly it was a direct response to an economic crisis and social fall 
out, but the way the crisis was dealt with and the social tensions that resulted are 
intimately linked to changes in the ideational material context (specifically neo-liberal 
ones).  It was only with the introduction of the SP that EIGs came to be systematically 
consulted on an array of issues, thus, making their inclusion on trade negotiating issues a 
matter of course and to some extent a matter of duty.  
 
Even though non-EIGs have not been consulted as intimately as EIGs, some non-
EIGs attempt to mobilise on trade issues both domestically and through regional 
cooperation. Although non-EIGs in Barbados may not be considered to have material 
self-interests that would propel them into activism on trade talks (by and large their 
members do not trade) and even though they tend not to be not included in formal 
consultations on trade; they have at least voiced some public concerns about trade talks in 
which Barbados is involved. Some non-EIGs have attempted to raise public awareness 
about trade negotiations through writing articles published in local newspapers, for 
instance. In so doing these groups have illustrated that they conceive trade issues as 
forming part of their priorities or interests. Just as with EIGs, this mobilisation is a break 
with past patterns of activism and ways of conceiving of interests that must be linked to 
the ideational-material contexts in which action and inaction have been located.  
 
For instance, the Clement Payne Movement, with the assistance of a US based 
advocacy NGO (Global Trade Watch), initiated the creation of a “National Committee on 
the Free Trade Area of the Americas”. This committee seeks to include NGOs in 
discussing issues related to the FTAA, educating broader CS about the FTAA and 
pressing government “to deal with the FTAA negotiations in a manner that does justice to 
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the legitimate interests of Barbados.” (Commisiong, 2004). The Clement Payne 
Movement, as a forerunner event to the proposed creation of this committee, held a 
public lecture by the director of Global Trade Watch – Lori Wallach- entitled:  “The 
Hidden Agenda Behind The Free Trade Area Of The Americas” and publicised the 
importance of CS engagement with trade matters in the print media (Commisiong, 2004).  
 
The activities of the Barbados Association of Non-Governmental Organisations 
(BANGO), established in 1997, further illustrate the attempts of CSOs to consolidate in 
the 1990s in order to mobilise and become involved in consultation with the government 
on many issue areas including trade negotiations. BANGO, through its website makes 
this claim in stating: 
  
Through the efforts of BANGO, nearly every Government Department, 
Statutory Corporation and Committee of Government relates to CSOs in 
some way or other, either by partnering with, consulting with or having 
CSO representation on their Boards and Committees.  
 
BANGO's reputation is such that it is regularly consulted by all three 
social partners as they seek to engage wide Civil Society participation in 
their plans and activities. It is a public service for all CSOs in Barbados.  
(BANGO, 2005)  
 
Roosevelt King of BANGO stated that this CSO participates at the CARICOM 
level of ministers meetings and becomes involved in RNM consultations and seminars 
among other activities in order to make contributions on trade matters. He further made it 
clear that this organisation attempts to keep up to date with the trade negotiations 
schedule in efforts to actively engage with occurrences relating to the FTAA, WTO, 
ACP-EU talks and, at the regional level, the CSME. BANGO has held workshops on 
trade issues to increase the levels of awareness of local CSOs as it related to trade issues 
too. King also emphasised that BANGO has sent representatives to attend trade related 
workshops held by governments and private sector EIGs in order to stay abreast of trade 
issues and in order to ably inform its members and the public of occurrences on the trade 
front. He further noted that BANGO interacts with private sector associations to make the 
views of NGOs on trade matters known to these EIGs that are more intimately involved 
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in shaping the trade agenda in Barbados (Roosevelt King interviews: 11-08-03; 05-04-
05).  
 
The above mentioned attempts to make informed contributions on national and 
regional approaches to trade arrangements commenced from the late 1990s against a 
backdrop of ideational-material trends in the direction of neo-liberal reforms to trade 
regimes, globalisation and international efforts by CSOs to mobilise on trade matters. 
BANGO’s mobilisation on trade has also been helped by the fact that BANGO has been 
allowed in the door of the national consultations of the Social Partners as what Roosevelt 
King considers to be the “developmental arm of civil society” (Roosevelt King 
interviews: 11-08-03). The opening of space for CSOs beyond the traditional labour and 
private sector/employers’ representative associations is therefore important to note and 
must be linked to attempts by the Government of Barbados to comply with and to 
advance the ideational-material trend of “good governance” via the SP. However, this has 
as yet not been translated into non-EIGs being included in consultations on trade matters. 
The idea that these sorts of CSOs should be included as integrally as EIGs has yet to fully 
permeate government ministries. 
 
So, non-EIGs have attempted to become better included and to have their voices 
heard through joint activism, self-education, and awareness raising. Non-EIGs have also 
found some space for inclusion via the SP and through the limited forums made available 
to them by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade.  Yet, as already stated the 
involvement of non-EIGs in this process should not be overemphasised, especially since 
both non-EIGs and government officials recognise that these associations have not 
mobilised very well and have not been well incorporated in consultative processes.   
 
Attempts by the Clement Payne Movement to engage non-EIGs on international 
trade issues and to build capacity amongst non-EIGs in order to remedy their scant 
involvement speak to the persistence of limited non-EIG activism. Roosevelt King of 
BANGO also speaks to the limited non-EIG mobilisation on trade matters in stating: 
“Development NGOs are not taking trade as seriously as they should” (interview: 11-08-
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03). King’s assertion that NGOs are unable to effectively focus on issues beyond their 
primary concerns with social and developmental matters and, therefore, tend only to 
mobilise on trade issues when the implications of trade matters “hit home”, is also 
poignant here (interview: 05-04-2005).  
 
The sporadic approach to activism in attempts to shape the trade agenda is also 
borne out by Nalita Gajahdar, immediate past-president of the National Organisation of 
Women (NOW). For instance, Gajahdar stated that in the year 2000, NOW campaigned 
as part of the activities of the World March of Women on issues surrounding poverty and 
trade but highlighted that the organisation has not mobilised on a consistent basis since 
then (Nalita Gajahdar interview: 26-04-05).  Officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Foreign Trade have also emphasised that most non-EIGs are not sufficiently 
knowledgeable on the trade issues and are not institutionally capable enough to be 
included in consultative processes. One of these officials elucidated that evidence of 
limited non-EIG competence is illustrated by the fact that when the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and Foreign Trade has supplied these groups with information on trade 
negotiating agendas, these non-EIGs have not attempted to make use of avenues available 
to them for activism. For instance, non-EIGs have not put forth submissions within the 
FTAA context even after being informed on the progress of these talks and the issues up 
for negotiation (MFA2). 79  
 
As the previous points should make clear, non-EIGs are not conversant on trade 
issues and are unable to mobilise effectively on trade issues in part due to institutional 
problems. Non-EIGs are characteristically voluntary organisations with limited paid staff 
and scant financial resources. Non-EIGs, thus, need to source funding to engage with a 
wide array of issues, such as those relating to trade arrangements. Both Nalita Gajahdar 
of NOW and Roosevelt King of BANGO emphasise this point in asserting that financial 
constraints plague NGOs in Barbados and mean they are staffed mostly by volunteers on 
                                                 
79 This assertion about Barbadian CSOs not taking up the Open Invitation to CS within the FTAA should 
be tempered however by a recognition that BANGO, representing many NGOS in the country, and other 
CSOs, form membership of the CPDC, that has indeed made submissions within the FTAA framework, as 
well as to the WTO, and has been actively involved in dialogue and the submission of research within the 
ACP-EU setting. 
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a part-time basis. As a result, these CSOs have been unable to mobilise and interface with 
government officials on trade as consistently as they would like (Nalita Gajahdar 
interview: 26-04-05; Roosevelt King interviews: 11-08-03; 05-04-05).  
 
BANGO attempts to help with these institutional capacity problems by pooling 
capacity and providing what can be compared to “a secretariat for NGOs” so that they 
can become more involved in various consultative processes (Roosevelt King interview: 
05-04-05 ). The proposed initiative of the Clement Payne Movement, further seeks to 
enhance the capacity of NGOs - though with reference to the FTAA negotiations-. 
However, the efforts of these organisations to mobilise consistently are yet to be 
translated into the sort of effective and sustained activism that would convince 
government officials to include them more integrally in consultations on trade issues in 
line with government commitments to widen participatory space for CSOs.  
 
At the regional level, though, the situation is different. As the previous chapter 
highlighted, at the regional level the CPDC has created sufficient capacity to speak to 
trade issues and this has led this non-EIG to be viewed by officials as a useful CSO to 
consult in discussion on trade issues (as discussed further in Chapter 5). BANGO’s 
membership in the CPDC and its involvement in the policy oriented activities of this 
regional coordinating non-EIG are notable as means for non-EIGs in Barbados to 
mobilise and be included in consultations on trade negotiating agendas. This is 
particularly so as it relates to activism geared towards the regional and multilateral levels 
since the CPDC makes submissions in the FTAA context, participates at WTO NGO 
meetings and puts research documents and policy advocacy forth for the ACP-EU 
negotiations.  Regional cooperation between national non-EIGs with limited institutional 
wherewithal can therefore allow these domestic associations to mobilise and be consulted 
on trade discussions. However, in Barbados, regional capacity pooling has not translated 
into domestic non-EIGs being able to activate with enough regularity or competence to 
be integrally included in government organised consultative forums (Roosevelt King 
interview: 11-08-03; Nalita Gajahdar interview: 26-04-05; MFA2). 
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This sub-section has highlighted that non-EIGs face more difficulties in 
mobilising and in gaining access to officials than EIGs (especially private sector EIGs). 
The better institutional capacity of EIGs and the fact that EIGs are seen as the focal 
“stakeholders” on trade amongst CSOs are points that have been highlighted too. 
However, why would non-EIGs want to mobilise on trade issues or participate in shaping 
the national or regional trade negotiating agenda?  
 
Here the importance of ideas comes into this analysis. The idea that it is important 
for CSOs to at least try to become active in shaping such areas is crucial. Nalita 
Gajahdar’s assertion that a focus on trade began in the late 1990s with NOW widening its 
advocacy role, combined with the NOW campaign on trade issues during the World 
March of Women in 2000 illustrates this point. Gajahdar further stated that this activism 
grew out of the “demonstrations in Seattle”, in response to “globalisation” and in 
response to “trade liberalisation” (Nalita Gajahdar interview: 26-04-05).  
 
The idea that it is important for non-EIGs to broadened focus in order to look at 
trade issues in the face of trade liberalisation and globalisation can be seen as part of a 
broader international or “global” CSO movement towards such. Global and cross-
national CSO networks began to gain visibility for focussing on trade issues from the mid 
to late 1990s and the formation of BANGO in Barbados and the CPDC at the regional 
level in 1990s can be considered in this light. Further, the involvement of CSOs in the 
talks and protests surrounding the economic problems of the early 1990s, must be 
acknowledged as an important factor that brought the importance of mobilisation with 
respect trade liberalisation to the fore in the CARICOM region. 
 
That non-EIGs in Barbados have found some space for inclusion in official 
information sharing exercises on trade and other matters can also be linked to the idea 
that CSO inclusion by governments is important for good governance purposes. As 
previously mentioned, this idea has led to the tripartite framework of the SP being 
expanded to open space for more CSOs than the traditional EIGs. Additionally, the 
Government of Barbados stated in 2005 that it will continue its efforts to expand space 
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for CSO consultation in governance, according to strategies it put forward in the Draft 
National Strategic Plan of Barbados 2005-2025 that aimed to: 
 
1.1 Make governance more transparent and accountable in the public 
sector, civil society and the business community. 
 
1.2 Promote the role of the private sector, trade unions, non-governmental 
organisations and civic based organisations in transparent and accountable 
governance. 
 
1.3 Enhance the independent role of the media and ensure greater access 
to information. 
 
1.4 Facilitate the integration of civil society into all spheres of activity in 
Barbados, as well as in the country’s interactions at the regional and 
international level. 
 
1.5 Equip civil society with the tools necessary to contribute in a 
substantive way to national decision making and the implementation of 
national initiatives. 
 
1.6 Assist in the development and empowerment of a civil society that is 
self-reliant and non-partisan. (Government of Barbados 2005: 98-99) 
 
This discourse potentially opens more space for non-EIGs in consultative 
processes in many areas. Yet, up to the year 2005 non-EIG inclusion with respect to trade 
policy has been minimal. At the regional level however, the use of umbrella organisations 
that are able to do research, pool capacity and transmit well researched and succinct 
inputs, have allowed Barbadian non-EIGs to have some input in regional efforts at 
shaping trade negotiating agendas.  
 
 
CONCLUSION:  WHAT THIS CASE IMPLIES 
 
 
The economic crisis that began the early 1990s in Barbados created an 
atmosphere in which the traditional unwritten social contract was threatened, so that 
state-societal relations came to be mediated in a formal (though non-binding) contract.  
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Yet, only from the mid/late 1990s was there some movement towards CSO mobilisation 
on trade issues and towards greater inclusion of CSOs in decision-making in the country. 
The SP created the institutional framework that can partly be attributed to this. However, 
one must understand the international ideational-material context to fully grasp the space 
opened for CSO consultation. If the institutional setting alone explained regularised CSO 
consultation, one would expect that CSO inclusion would not exist where an 
institutionalised framework is non-existent. Yet, when one considers the case study of 
Trinidad and Tobago to follow, it will become evident that consultation on trade can exist 
without an overarching domestic framework. Although institutions are important for 
facilitating CSO activism and consultation, institutional factors alone cannot help one to 
understand activism and consultation. 
 
To reiterate, one must remember the international trend towards calling for “good 
governance”, which in part helped to sustain the SP beyond the crisis phase and further 
encouraged consultation and a discourse of consultation on a wide range of areas 
(including on trade). Critically too, one must remember that it was only with the creation 
of the WTO in 1994, proposals for a reciprocal FTAA around the same time, the threat to 
Lomé preferences in the second half of the 1990s and the picking up of momentum on the 
creation of the CSME in the late 1990s that these trade negotiating issues grew in 
salience in CARICOM. The combination of these factors (the trend of good governance, 
ideas about domestic policy liberalisation, trade liberalisation and globalisation) allow for 
an understanding of government attempts to involve CSOs in consultations on trade 
negotiating agendas. 
 
On the CSO side, at the start of the 21st century we see the consolidation of 
private-sector EIGs with the creation of the PSTT. We also see the emergence of 
BANGO in the late 1990s, as an effort by non-EIGs to consolidate action, to improve 
capacity and facilitate more effective participation in governance. The actions of these 
groups can be considered in the context of the changing international economic climate 
following the Uruguay Round, in the face of the end of the Lomé, and in light of a variety 
of trade talks to be simultaneously negotiated and ideas about what these changes meant 
 206
for society. They can also be considered in light of the growing trend toward CSOs 
calling for inclusion in decision-making in international trade talks at the international 
level. 
 
Ideas about the “threats” posed by trade and economic liberalisation or about the 
ways in which / the extent to which economic spheres should be liberalised coloured 
perceptions of interests and are important in understanding CSO mobilisation in 
Barbados, and the region. Such ideas were internally (domestically and regionally) 
generated as well as transmitted through international channels. Moreover, government 
acceptance of the idea that it is important to include actors beyond the state on a 
consultative basis at a time when such began to be encouraged by various international 
organisations and donors cannot be forgotten either. This can be viewed as a response to 
material dictates, or trends, but should also be conceived as subscription to a course of 
action based on ideational grounds. 
 
The continuation of the SP in Barbados past the crisis years illustrates that both 
the included CSOs and the Government of Barbados have come to internalise the idea 
that CSO consultation on areas of importance is vital. The institutionalisation of 
consultation has allowed for improved transparency, greater participation of EIGs, the 
expansion of the SP to include a wider range of CSOs, and the ability for these various 
“partners” to participate in a range of policy areas. Despite these factors, though, levels of 
activism by and inclusion of different types of CSOs on the trade matters have varied.  
 
EIGs are included more and have mobilised more effectively on trade issues than 
non-EIGs, as material interest-based assumptions would suggest. EIGs have been the 
main groups consulted, and little space has been opened for non-EIGs. Non-EIG activism 
has been more limited than that of EIGs in part because of differences in institutional 
capacity. However, the ministry responsible for international trade has at least come to 
see the importance of giving some information to CSOs on trade issues up for 
negotiation, and non-EIGs have made efforts to increase their potential for inclusion. 
Space is also being opened for non-EIGs to be included in consultative processes more. 
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So, the reasons behind CSO activism and consultation, and patterns of activism and 
consultation in Barbados should be understood by looking at the ideational-material 
context of the time, ideas about this context, institutional factors and occurrences specific 
to the country, rather than in terms of material interests alone.  
 
It is now left to tease out how the activism and inclusion of CSOs on trade matters 
compares for other countries in the region by taking a look at Trinidad and Tobago and 
St. Lucia.  
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 CHAPTER 7 
TRADE CONSULTATIONS IN THE REPUBLIC OF 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO 
 
The twin island Republic of Trinidad and Tobago stands out somewhat from all 
other Eastern Caribbean countries within CARICOM. Firstly, its economy is based on 
exports in petroleum and manufactured goods rather than agriculture and services.80 
Secondly, racial/ethnic and regional rifts have complicated party politics, social and 
economic relations (Boodhoo and Royer, 2000: 96).81 These specific national factors may 
(or may not) impact on CSO activism or inclusion on trade matters; so, this chapter will 
look at these factors. In addition, as in the previous case study, this chapter will look at 
the impact of the ideational-material context of the time and of a combination of material, 
ideational and institutional factors that have coloured patterns of CSO mobilisation and 
inclusion on trade negotiating issues in Trinidad and Tobago. In other words, this chapter 
intends to look at CSO activism and inclusion on trade matters from the 1990s to see why 
and how this occurred.  
 
The following graph illustrates that Trinidad and Tobago faced similar high levels 
of trade openness in the 1970s as the country did from the 1990s. Therefore, the economy 
of the country has long been open. This openness implies that CSOs could have 
mobilised on trade from the 1970s based on the material impacts of trade dependency on 
various groups within the society.  
 
 
                                                 
80 This however reflects the economy of Trinidad rather than Tobago, the smaller island in this twin island 
state .Tobago is more akin to most of the Eastern Caribbean both economically and in terms of racial/ethnic 
composition. These divergences between Trinidad and Tobago are discussed in chapter one in the 
introduction to the case studies. 
81 Such tensions are discussed in chapter one and can be seen in more racially diverse Guyana, Suriname 
and Belize too, each to varying extents. 
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Figure 6: Trinidad and Tobago’s Trade Dependence82
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In looking at why activism and inclusion have occurred, this chapter asserts that a 
confluence of international ideational-material factors have shaped CSO perceptions of 
their interests and impacted on CSO desires to mobilise on trade issues. Government 
incorporation of CSOs in consultations on negotiating issues has also been impacted on 
by the ideational-material context of the time. In this regard, this chapter illustrates that 
despite Trinidad and Tobago’s differences in the social, political and economic 
landscapes, as in Barbados, the 1990s marked the decade in which CSOs began to 
become more active and to be considered formal participants in consultative processes 
with an ideational shift towards neo-liberalism (e.g. as embodied in SAPs and the 
Uruguay Round of the GATT,) with the rise of a globalisation discourse, and the 
ascendance of a focus on good governance.  
 
In examining how CSO activism and inclusion has panned out, this chapter 
focuses on institutional arrangements put in place by CSOs to realise their goals and the 
impacts of these institutional arrangements on their inclusion by government officials. 
This chapter also looks at mechanisms that have been officially sanctioned for including 
CSOs on trade issues and the impact of these mechanisms on patterns of CSO inclusion 
                                                 
82 Source: World Bank (2005), author’s calculations 
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in trade consultations. To do this, this chapter will examine and compare CSO institutions 
and government institutions in Trinidad and Tobago with those in Barbados by looking at 
the EIG and non-EIG activism and inclusion on trade matters.  
 
The first section of this chapter (7.1) looks at the setting in which consultations on 
trade issues are located and discovers that in contrast to the case of Barbados, inclusion of 
CSOs on trade cannot be linked to the evolution of institutionalised national 
consultations. However, as in Barbados, consulting CSOs (specifically EIGs) on trade 
issues can be linked to broader ideational-material changes, ideas about these changes 
and ideas about actor interests. The second section of the chapter (7.2) looks at CSO 
activism on trade issues specifically. This section shows that CSOs have mobilised based 
on ideas as well as interests in the ideational-material context of the 1990s. Section 7.2 
also shows that differences between EIG and non-EIG activism and mobilisation exist 
and, as in the case of Barbados, these differences are partly due to differences in 
institutional capacity between different types of CSOs.  
 
7.1 ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND CONSULTATIVE FRAMEWORKS 
 
 
In Trinidad and Tobago, government interventionism into the economy intensified 
in the 1970s, facilitated by windfall earnings during oil booms of 1973/74 and 1978/79. 
This government involvement in the economy also followed “Black Power Movement” 
and labour union protests (from the late 1960s) that called for government 
nationalisations in the sugar, petroleum and banking sectors (Harrison 2002: 68-6; 
Walker 2002: 21-22; Mac Donald 1986: 150, 162-155). Along with intensified 
government interventionism also came centralised decision-making structures. 
 
Whereas in the 1960s private sector representative associations were consulted on 
medium term development planning, this ended in the 1970s. Hence, in the 1970s 
decision-making power became heavily concentrated in the hands of politicians, and a 
select cadre of technocrats and civil servants. As a consequence, little consultation with 
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CSOs occurred (Walker 2002: 126). Mac Donald’s discussion of interlocking directorates 
in which decision-making was concentrated in the hands of a select group of technocrats 
loyal to the Prime Minister Williams during an unstable time reinforces this point (Mac 
Donald 1986: 177-79). Therefore, it is clear that by the 1970s, private sector associations, 
labour unions and other CSOs were excluded from consultations and decision-making 
arenas.  
 
CSO consultation on national issues in Trinidad and Tobago was also hindered by 
radicalism on some fronts (efforts to limit protests such as those by the Black Power 
Movement), divisions within society and by fragmentation and in fighting amongst 
CSOs. Judith-Ann Walker (2002), for example, illustrates that amongst private sector 
representative associations in the 1970s there were divisions along racial and sectoral 
lines. The Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Commerce (Northern) represented the 
interests of white ex-planters involved in import trading and import substituting business; 
the Southern Chamber represented largely East Indians and was formed as a splinter from 
the Trinidad and Tobago Chamber to focus on Southern interests in petroleum; and the 
TTMA represented mostly the interests of East Indian businessmen in Northern Trinidad 
(Walker 2002: 121-122). All of these associations represented “big businesses” (Walker 
2002: 122; Harrison 2002: 102) and are the associations that began to be consulted on 
trade negotiating issues with the government from the 1990s. Other associations 
established in the 1970s (e.g. Hardware Owners Association) were usually East Indian 
dominated and hostile to white traditional capital. Also, no small business associations 
existed until 1979 when the Trinidad and Tobago Small Business Association was 
formed as an outgrowth of the state sponsored Small Business Consultation in 1978. This 
association though was characterised by fragmentation and dissolved in 1982 (Walker, 
2002: 122-123).   
 
Divisions amongst private sector EIGs have also been highlighted by the former 
Prime Minister Williams. Speaking in 1961 he said: 
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What we have today is a large segment of the community-union of this or 
the other, Chamber of Commerce North and South, Manufacturers’ 
Association, Businessmen’s Association, Agricultural Society of the 
island or of parts, each pulling this way or that way, each seeking to 
establish itself and promote its own interests, even at the expense of 
others, not caring about others, each seeing an individual tree in the whole 
forest. This gets us nowhere, and the community, subjected to a barrage of 
propaganda from all sides, itself cannot see the wood from the trees 
(Quoted in Walker 2002: 121; Ryan 1972: 260) 
 
There was fragmentation along ethnic, class, regional and sectoral lines that 
undercut consensus building and cooperation in governance. Creating a stability bargain 
in the country was, therefore, a difficult task. CSOs and social movements that mobilised 
for economic change from the close of the 1960s, with differing degrees of radicalism, 
also complicated the sustenance of a social bargain.  The National Joint Action 
Committee (NJAC), the New Beginning Movement, the Oilfield Workers Trade Union 
(OWTU); the Transport and Industrial Workers Trade Union; the All-Trinidad Sugar 
Estate and Factory Workers Union; the Tapia House Movement are such examples 
(Walker 2002: 120, Mac Donald 1986: 150, 163). Their concerns and methods were often 
in conflict with those of the major private sector representative associations. There were 
also divisions between some of these CSOs. Notable amongst these divisions were those 
between unions, such as the divides that existed between the OWTU, whose members 
tended to be of African descent, and the unions representing sugar industry workers who 
tended to be of East Indian descent. At times the unions have been able to unite to deal 
with important socio-economic concerns as in 1965 under the national Trade Union 
Congress (TUC) and under the United Labour Front (ULF)83 in 1975, but such 
partnerships were precarious (Mac Donald 1986: 151, 180) 
 
Divisions and diversity of interests amongst these vocal CSOs and a tendency 
towards centralised decision-making in government characterised the CSO-government 
landscape in Trinidad and Tobago during the 1970s. Yet, when economic crisis 
intensified in the 1980s and the neo-liberal tenets of privatisation in the economy and 
decentralisation in decision-making began to take hold, consultative processes on 
                                                 
83 Functioning as the main opposition political party to the PNM then in power. 
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economic issues surfaced in Trinidad and Tobago. Attempts to create stability via 
consensus building were initiated at a time when the way the economy functioned was in 
the process of transformation and when the authoritarian approach to governance was 
becoming less and less tenable.  
 
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS FROM THE 1980S ONWARDS 
 
Petroleum prices fell in the 1980s with world prices decreasing by 14% in 1983. 
As a result Trinidad and Tobago’s earnings plummeted (Walker 2002: 22). In addition, 
high levels of government expenditure and large consumer import bills ate up Trinidad 
and Tobago’s gains from oil in the 1970s. Oil production levels in the country also 
declined and, to make matters worse, there was a recession in the industrialised countries 
by the start of the 1980s. So, 1982-1987 saw consistent negative growth in the country; 
government earnings were halved; petroleum revenues fell by 40%; unemployment more 
than doubled; and no governmental attempts at economic realignment were able to stem 
economic sclerosis. Consequently, the country sought assistance from the IMF in 1986 
with the implementation of a SAP in 1988 (Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of Finance, 
1988: 1; Boodhoo and Royer, 2000:97; Ramsaran 1993: 144-146).  
 
With structural adjustment this country moved towards a more market oriented 
approach internally and externally. Most non-agricultural trade restrictions were 
scrapped, currency controls were removed (circa 1992), and a floating exchange rate 
regime was adopted (circa 1993) (Boodhoo and Royer, 2000:97-98). Debt relief from the 
IMF and the SAPs that followed came with some social burdens though. Specifically, 
discourses indicate that state expenditure on health, education and social services was 
curbed; state subsidies on electricity, water, transportation increased costs for much of the 
population; and unemployment and poverty levels were heightened and only began to 
recover towards the mid-1990s84 (Boodhoo and Royer, 2000:109; Kwamina 1988:102). 
 
                                                 
84 Here the thesis relies on discourses that speak to declines in social spending since there is a gap in 
government statistics on expenditure during the crisis years. As is the case with other CARICOM countries, 
accessing time series data can often be problematic. 
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As state involvement in the provision of social services and in community 
development was scaled back, developmental and welfare oriented CSOs were brought 
into the development initiatives in Trinidad and Tobago as evinced in the statement of 
former Prime Minister A.N.R Robinson: 
 
Traditionally, the area of social development has been largely considered to be the 
responsibility of the Government. By contrast future policy will be designed to 
affect a shift in emphasis and non-governmental organisations will be accorded 
an important role in designing and implementing programmes which will serve to 
enhance individual, family and community well-being… (Robinson 1989: 55-
emphasis added-) 
 
“Decentralisation” and “self-help” or “self-reliance” in development were the 
important starting points here and brought community/village councils and other private 
voluntary organisations into “cooperative or participatory” relationships with the state in 
parallel with decreasing reliance on the state (Robinson 1989: 48-50).  Kwamina (1988), 
commenting on the 1988 budget of the Robinson’s NAR government, referred to the 
promotion of  “self-help” as a privatisation strategy of “deregulation via voluntary 
associations” that put the onus for the provision of social welfare and services on society 
(102). Whether viewed positively or negatively, leaving social service provision to 
voluntary associations 85 meant that developmental or community oriented CSOs became 
involved in decision-making processes, at least those in the field of welfare and social 
development. In the economic sphere though, these non-EIGs tended not to be included 
in decision-making consultations and were not emphasised as important actors.  
 
The liberalising trend in economic affairs in Trinidad and Tobago translated into 
private sector led development using an export-oriented development strategy (versus 
ISI). The government was no longer tasked with managing economic activities as 
intimately as it had in the past, just as it was no longer slated to take on as involved a role 
in the provision of welfare services as it had previously. The government was to be a 
facilitator, or referee in economic affairs that were to be conducted in a neo-liberal vein. 
                                                 
85 Such welfare oriented CSOs did not register on the scale of those that actively mobilized for social 
changes in the 1960s and 1970s, but as in most of the region performed important social and economic 
functions. 
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Hence, both non-EIGs and EIGs came to be better incorporated in the development 
processes in Trinidad and Tobago. However, EIGs were more involved in economic 
aspects of development and non-EIGs were more involved in social areas. 
 
As in Barbados, neo-liberal trends in economic thinking fed into policy ideas and 
these ideas were implemented, on the recommendation of the IFIs, in efforts to deal with 
economic crisis. This ideational-material trend brought CSOs (and the members they 
represented) into policy processes by the 1990s more fully than was the case in the 1970s. 
 
NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE FRAMEWORKS FROM THE 1980s 
 
In remodelling the economic structure and the path to “development” “national 
consultation” was undertaken by the start of the 1990s (Robinson 1989: 47). The shifting 
tide internationally towards “good governance” with the emphasis on transparency and 
inclusion of CS was important in this regard. That the former Prime Minister A. N. R. 
Robinson spoke to:  “…the government’s principle of national consultation and 
communication with the population on important issues” (Robinson 1988), illustrates 
this point. Under his administration a National Planning Commission (NPC) that 
consulted with CSOs and other stakeholders was created to discuss restructuring the 
economy. This shift towards consulting with CSOs and implementing neo-liberal policies 
belies a shift in thinking and policy also present within the CARICOM context as evident 
in the Grande Anse Declaration of 1989 (noted in chapter 4, page125). 
  
The NPC, established in 1988, was chaired by the Prime Minister (also Minister 
of Finance) and included government ministers from various ministries; the governor of 
the central bank; other government representatives (a representative from Tobago and a 
local government representative); representatives of business and industry EIGs; labour 
EIGs; and other “Representatives of the Public” (National Planning Commission 1988: 
24-26). A “Joint Consultative Council” that included government, labour and 
employers/the private sector representatives also came to form part of consultative 
processes for decision making on national matters (Robinson 1989: 47-48). These were 
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efforts to bring “stakeholders” beyond select politicians, civil servants and technocrats 
into decision-making at a time when the country was attempting to find its way out of 
economic problems.86  As with Barbados, a consultative framework was created in an 
economic crisis environment. However, the consultative culture between CSOs and the 
government on issues of domestic salience in Trinidad and Tobago has not been 
sustained. 
 
The national consultations of the late 1980s neither out-lived the economic crisis 
nor matured to become regularised as in Barbados. Unlike Barbados, the commitment to 
subjugating individual group interests to national concerns and cooperating in 
consultative settings did not emerge. The idea that national consultation and consensus 
building are important was not accepted in this more differentiated society. Nevertheless, 
attempts to institutionalise a national consultative mechanism began in Trinidad and 
Tobago from the late 1990s producing “Compact 2000 and Beyond” in the year 2000. 
This was basically a tripartite mechanism similar to the SP in Barbados that was 
promoted by the ILO (an organisation with its long history of tripartism) and based on the 
Barbados model (Momm 2000). The novelty of this national framework in Trinidad and 
Tobago was expressed at the signing of this “compact”. For instance, Robert Guiseppi 
(2000) of the National Trade Union Centre stated: 
 
Never before has the trade union movement had the possibility of being so 
closely involved in the key economic affairs of our nation…The Social 
Compact gives us the potential of being decision-makers and not just the 
takers of decisions made by someone else. (-Emphasis added-) 
 
This sentiment was reiterated by Gerald E. Pinard (2000) of the Employers’ Consultative 
Association: 
 
For the first time in our country’s history we have managed to achieve 
consensus on a compact between the social partners of Government, 
                                                 
86 However, such consultation was not altogether novel as the previous discussion of consultations 
surrounding development planning in the 1960s illustrates. 
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Labour and Business which covers several areas of common interest to us 
all in the sphere of economic and social issues. (-Emphasis added-) 
 
This Social Compact though was limited to “the usual suspects”, that is 
traditionally important EIGs in the CARICOM region. Compact 2000 did not go beyond 
formalising the previously informal corporatist or populist-statist bargain between the 
government, labour and the private sector/employers; it did not seek to engage a broad 
spectrum of CSOs as “social partners”. The model for participation at the national level 
was based on a thin conception of stakeholders on economic matters. EIGs have been 
conceived as the main stakeholders on economic issues and, therefore, have been the 
target groups in consultations rather than viewing other CSOs (non-EIGs) as “social 
partners” or “stakeholders” with material interests in economic affairs. Therefore, a type 
of formalised democratic corporatism emerged, linked to a focus on industrial relations 
and private-sector led development in the neo-liberal vein. One must consider this 
conception of “stakeholders” on economic issues when thinking about the focus by 
national officials on EIGs when it comes to trade consultations. 
Despite the establishment of a “Social Compact” though, the process seems to 
have been legless in Trinidad and Tobago. None of the “social partners” in the Trinidad 
and Tobago interviewed or corresponded with during the course of this research 
mentioned this mechanism. In contrast, in Barbados all CSO representatives, even CSOs 
outside of the tripartite framework, mentioned the SP and its concomitant national 
consultations as an avenue for actual or potential CSO input on domestic and external 
issues. It appears that in the case of Trinidad and Tobago then, national consultative 
frameworks are not very important for understanding CSOs consultations on trade issues. 
Tony Fraser, commenting on the Social Compact, in a Trinidadian newspaper (the 
Trinidad Guardian) illustrated his point aptly in stating: 
[L]abour and business and the new PNM Government have left the 
compact in idle storage, the two former perhaps awaiting an initiative from 
the Government, the latter presumably not wanting to acknowledge that 
the previous government was able to construct a useful and workable 
partnership agreement. (Fraser, 18-03-04) 
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The apparent dormancy of the Social Compact notwithstanding, in 2004 the 
Government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, once more made clear its 
commitment to consultation of CSOs in decision-making in its plans to transform the 
twin island state into a developed country by the year 2020, in a processes called “Vision 
2020”. Vision 2020 attempts to use national consultations in the process of planning in 
order to create a strategic development plan (Vision 2020 [a]). The Vision 2020 plan 
attempts to be “participatory, interactive and integrative” using a “multisectoral” and 
“multidimensional” procedure (Vision 2020 [b]) 
In elaborating on the processes of “widespread consultation and participation” 
(Vision 2020 [c]) to be used to achieve this goal the Government stated: 
These phases will continue to have the participation of a wide cross-
section of interests and deepen the partnerships between the state, the 
private sector and civil society. (Vision 2020 [d]-emphasis added-) 
This approach is significant as it is inclusive of actors from the public, private and 
civil “sectors”. People concerned with varied issues (economic, social or cultural) are 
brought into preparatory meetings and decision-making processes. Within this framework 
there is a multi-sectoral group comprising prominent persons from various sectors with 
these CS representatives forming parts of various sub-committees on important areas of 
national concern including “international relations, regional cooperation and trade”. Each 
sub-committee comprises “key stakeholders and interest groups at the public, private and 
community level” and is obligated to “organize and conduct stakeholder consultations to 
ensure widest possible participation in the process.” (Vision 2020 [a]).  
Hence, at the national level, there is once more a framework for the inclusion of 
CS input in consultative processes, including those relating to trade matters. Moreover, 
this has advanced a discourse that includes a wide variety of CSOs and has created 
interactive processes that can potentially alter perceptions about CSO-government 
consultation in decision-making/policy discussions and groups’ perceptions of their 
interests. The door has, thereby, been opened for a variety of CSOs to participate in 
consultative processes on trade (and other areas). However, it is left to be seen whether or 
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not this mechanism will survive and whether the idea that CSO-government consultations 
are important will be accepted and will become engrained.  
Neo-liberal policies implemented in  Trinidad and Tobago brought CSOs into 
development processes and impacted on the creation of national consultative mechanisms 
(to deal with social fall out brought on by economic crisis). In the years 1988, 2000 and 
2004 efforts were made to regularise these in line with a focus on good governance that 
emerged as important by the early 1990s. This point aside, none of these consultative 
mechanisms have impacted on CSO consultations on trade issues. However, CSO 
consultation and CSO activism on trade issues have occurred. These instances of activism 
and consultation have been impacted by the ideational-material trends of neo-
liberalisation, globalisation and a focus on good governance, and groups’ perceptions of 
their interests in light of these trends.  
 
7.2 CSO PARTICIPATION ON TRADE ISSUES 
 
 
Mechanisms for the incorporation of CSOs in consultations on trade negotiating 
issues in Trinidad and Tobago exist. Firstly, a Technical Coordinating Committee (TCC) 
was established in the 1997 by the government of the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago. 
The TCC, chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Trade, invites the 
participation of private sector association representatives, trade union representatives, 
public sector representatives and NGO representatives in its meetings that are held every 
six weeks (WTO 1999: 17; Guiseppi interview: 19-05-05; Placide interview: 14-04-05; 
Placide, 2004). Issue specific sub-committees on agriculture, government procurement, 
market access, investment and services (chaired by the relevant Ministers) also function 
alongside the TCC. The decisions by such sub-committees must be approved by the TCC 
before they are transformed into negotiation positions and policy (WTO 1999: 17-18; 
Placide interview: 14-04-05; Placide 2004).  
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Secondly, a government appointed Standing Committee on Trade, chaired by the 
Trinidad and Tobago Manufacturing Association (TTMA), exists too (WTO 1999: 18; 
Guiseppi interview: 19-04-05; Placide interview: 14-04-05; MTI)87. This committee 
meets once monthly, inviting representatives from private sector associations, labour 
unions and academics from the University of the West Indies (WTO 1999: 18; Guiseppi 
interview: 19-04-05; Placide interview: 14-04-05).  
 
In both of these consultative initiatives relating to negotiating agendas, private 
sector representative EIGs are the main participants.  
 
THE INVOLVEMENT OF EIGS 
 
The two above-mentioned consultative mechanisms on trade were initiated in 
1997 when the country was negotiating a free trade arrangement with the Dominican 
Republic (DR) that followed trade agreements negotiated with Colombia and Venezuela 
(Placide interview: 14-04-05). Lawrence Placide, of the International Trade Negotiations 
Unit (ITNU) in Trinidad and Tobago, stated that this consultative mechanism was seen as 
important by private sector representative associations because in their opinions the 
government did not aptly speak to the views or concerns of the country’s private sector 
(Placide interview: 14-04-05). The view that the government was not fully aware of the 
concerns of private sector  interests was further borne out by Anthony Guiseppi of the 
TTMA and again by a senior staff member from the Trade Division at the Ministry of 
Trade and Industry (MTI; Guiseppi interview: 19-04-05).  
 
In light of this problem, private sector associations mobilised for inclusion in 
trade talks during the preparatory phases for negotiating the trade agreement with the DR 
and they began to be better included from this approximate time. Also, during the 
Uruguay Round of the GATT the Government of Trinidad and Tobago consulted with 
private sector representative associations by seeking their views on trade related position 
                                                 
87 Information also gained from a senior staff member at the Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of Trade and 
Industry. Correspondence: 25 April 2005. Will be referred to as (MTI) throughout.   
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papers and on trade issues in general. However, consultation was sporadic and was not as 
well coordinated as that which came to exist from the time of negotiations with the DR 
(Placide interview: 14-04-05). 
 
As in Barbados, mobilisation on trade and institutionalised channels for CSO 
consultation on issues up for trade negotiations at the ministerial level began in the 
1990s, particularly following the Uruguay round. As in Barbados too, EIGs representing 
private sector concerns emerged as the principle participants. Unlike in Barbados 
though, inclusion of EIGs was not an outgrowth of a commitment to consultation of 
“stakeholders” or “social partners”. Consultation on international trade issues in 
Trinidad and Tobago instead emerged from private sector EIGs, as a response to disdain 
(especially by EIGs representing “big business”) at the way in which bilateral trade 
agreements and the Uruguay round were negotiated “for them” but without them. 
Negotiations for bilateral agreements between CARICOM and: Colombia, Venezuela and 
the DR, were especially important for Trinidad and Tobago, as one of the countries 
within CARICOM with most to gain and to lose in terms of trade in manufactures. 
Certainly, amongst the Eastern Caribbean economies, Trinidad and Tobago had the most 
to gain from these trade agreements as the principal manufacturing power in this area of 
the Caribbean. 
 
Despite the slightly different rationale for including EIGs in consultation on trade 
than in Barbados, one must acknowledge the growing tendency towards decentralisation 
in governance and export orientation based on the private sector that came with SAPs, 
which opened the door for the private sector to be the prime drivers of economic 
development. The emphasis within this neo-liberal influenced conception placed 
private-sector EIGs at the centre of consultations on economic affairs following the logic 
that these actors had direct material interests in trade issues. This is akin to the case of 
Barbados where the growing importance of neo-liberal ideas brought specific liberalising 
policies via SAPs. These liberalising policies also intensified following the Uruguay 
Round. These factors must be considered in understanding the reconstituted interests of 
EIGs that did not mobilise to attempt to shape trade agendas prior to the 1990s.  
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 So, private sector associations, notably led by those representing major business 
interests (e.g. Chambers of Commerce and the TTMA), have been the prime CSOs that 
have mobilised, that have been consulted and that are most deeply integrated in 
formulation of trade proposals in the TCC and the Standing Committee on Trade. This 
consultation resulted from their mobilisation on trade issues as a response to their 
material interests, as a response to interest perceptions in the ideational-material setting 
of the time and was facilitated by their institutional wherewithal. Let us look a bit at the 
material basis of private sector EIG activism to begin with. 
 
The TTMA has been the focal point for discussions on trade in general and with 
respect to trade in goods specifically. This is an outcome one would expect from a 
material interest based perspective, particularly considering the importance of the 
manufacturing export sector to the country in economic terms. With its creation in 2002, 
on the initiative of various private sector interests in the financial services and domestic 
chambers of commerce, the International Trade Negotiations Unit (ITNU) has also 
become an important EIG included and active in mobilisation on trade issues but 
focusing specifically on trade in services. The ITNU was also significant in initiating the 
creation of the Private Sector Committee on Trade in Services. This EIG’s activism and 
involvement on trade issues can be understood in light of the perceived need to promote 
the service sector in the country by private sector interests.  
 
Trade agreements that impacted on the “interests” of these private sector groups 
represented by the ITNU and the TTMA were negotiated prior to the 1990s though. Yet, 
it was only from the mid/late 1990s that these EIGs came to conceive of themselves as 
having to prioritise activism on trade fronts and as needing to create institutions that 
would allow them to do so aptly. In response to ideational-material shifts that became 
important in the region by the 1990s, these EIGs came to perceive themselves as having 
interests in actively mobilising on trade issues. They came to hold somewhat different 
ideas about where their priority areas for mobilisation lay. Hence, their mobilisation 
initiatives were not simply automatic responses to changing material circumstances but 
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were based on changing perceptions of interests against the background of ideational-
material shifts. Neither in Trinidad and Tobago nor in Barbados were the interests 
represented by these EIGs threatened with the loss of preferences or guaranteed markets. 
Unlike the case of St. Lucia (to be discussed on the chapter to follow), the EIGs that 
mobilise have done so mostly based on their projected beliefs about the impacts of trade 
negotiations or because of their perceptions of how liberalisation and globalisation may 
impact on them. To reiterate, mobilisation by these EIGs can be understood partly by 
looking at the material impacts that trade arrangements could have on them but also 
partly by their interest perceptions or ideas about the courses of action deemed to be 
necessary in light of emerging ideational-material trends. 
 
Looking at the institutional capacity of these EIGs in Trinidad and Tobago also 
allows one to understand how these EIGs were able to mobilise effectively and to be 
included in official consultations. The wherewithal of private sector EIGs has allowed 
them to be aptly informed on the general trade issues and also the issue specific technical 
issues in order to make well informed inputs. These EIGs have the ability to draw on 
funding from their private sector members in order to dedicate staffing to the task of 
undertaking the necessary research on trade issues. Moreover, the ITNU and the TTMA 
have been awarded grant funding by the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA) to carry out their mobilisation on trade. Specifically, grant funding has been 
geared towards informing private sector players on occurrences in the trade sphere and 
towards facilitating their participation in shaping domestic trade negotiating stances. 
Funding has also been made available by the government of Trinidad and Tobago that 
allows for representatives of private sector EIGs to take on advisory roles in various trade 
negotiating settings (Guiseppi interview: 19-04-05; Placide interview: 14-04-05; MTI).  
 
Since these private sector EIGs have been able to build institutional capacity to 
produce research, officials can draw on them as sources of expertise and knowledge, 
making them useful consultation “partners”. The ability of these EIGs to undertake 
research and focus on various areas of trade (that are in the material interests of their 
members) has allowed their representatives to move beyond consultation to be 
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incorporated in the field of trade negotiations as advisory members on government 
delegations that go to various trade negotiations (MTI; Abdullah interview: 05-05; 
Placide interview: 14-04-05).  
 
So far, the tendency for private sector EIGs to be the CSOs that are intimately 
involved in shaping trade negotiating approaches has been underlined. However, in 
Trinidad and Tobago there is little mention of EIGs representing the agricultural side of 
the private sector when it comes to trade matters. This is unlike in Barbados where there 
is participation of the Barbados Agricultural Society (BAS) and unlike in the case of St. 
Lucia (to follow) where these are of great significance.  
 
Although traditionally important, agricultural products (mainly sugar, cocoa and 
coffee) have diminished to near invisibility as exports the agricultural sector is important 
from an employment perspective. The agricultural concerns of farmers/producers in 
Trinidad and Tobago are certainly at issue in trade talks, particularly considering that this 
is the one economic sector that is most “protected” from open trade (WTO 1999: 68). 
However, the Standing Committee on Trade does not include agricultural associations in 
its advisory capacity.  Nevertheless, farmers’ associations do have institutionalised 
contact with the Ministry of Agriculture, Land and Marine Resources (MALMR) via the 
County Agricultural Consultative Committee. Meetings of this committee comprise 
representatives from farmer’s associations and are attended by MALMR officials. The 
committee is able to provide inputs on important policy areas under discussion, one of 
which happens to be trade (discussed by one of the sub-committees of the TCC). In 
accounting for agricultural associations’ involvement though, one must consider that in 
the agricultural sector public enterprises dominate (WTO 1999: 70), implying that the 
concerns agricultural interests are known to the government to whom such are 
accountable. So the input of MALMR into consultations on trade issues represents 
concerns of agricultural producers as these are dominated by state run enterprises.  
 
As for workers’ unions, the situation is different. According to the classification 
used in this thesis, trade unions fall into the category of EIGs and like private sector 
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representative associations these began to be concerned with trade matters from the 
1990s. Once more, changing ideational-material trends impacted on their interest 
perceptions so that workers’ EIGs came to prioritise issues up for negotiation in trade 
spheres. Yet, this group of EIGs seems to play only a limited role in trade consultations 
particularly when compared to their private sector EIG counterparts.  
 
Although representatives from prominent private sector EIGs indicated that 
workers’ union representatives rarely attend consultative meetings on trade issues, the 
view from within trade unions is different. For instance, Vincent Cabrera noted that the 
trade union movement has been “alienated” from trade talks unlike the situation in 
Barbados and the Bahamas. He further opined that in Trinidad and Tobago unions tend to 
be “advised” rather than “consulted” and that trade negotiations have been monopolised 
by the government and, the private sector representative associations (Vincent Cabrera 
interview: 14-04-05). The situation painted here is one of exclusion. It is not that unions 
do not want to be included in talks on trade negotiations or that they do not see trade 
issues as within their range of interests, but that they are not viewed as the most pertinent 
stakeholders in this area. Cabrera made this clear by stating that although he has written 
to the trade  Minister about the requirement of continual labour inclusion as specified 
within the ACP-EU context, his union not been “taken on”, as trade issues are not 
“perceived as within the purview of  unions” (Cabrera interview: 14-05-05-emphasis 
added-).  
 
The opinion of another labour union representative is slightly different but, all the 
same, illustrates that union concerns are not heard on trade negotiating issues to the 
extent of opinions from private sector EIGs. Specifically, David Abdullah of the 
Federation of Independent Trade Unions noted that he was the only representative from 
labour who has taken part in the Standing Committee on Trade and that there is no labour 
movement representative who takes part in the TCC (Abdullah interview: 05-05). This 
limited participation though is due, in his view, to institutional problems faced by unions: 
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“We don’t have the resources to have people participate. We don’t have 
the trained people who have knowledge of the detailed negotiating 
positions…nor have we done the detailed research.” (Abdullah interview: 
05-05-emphasis added-) 
 
Vincent Cabrera stated that the Trade Ministry has drawn on the “expertise” of 
private sector associations and Abdullah speaks of the research capacity of private sector 
associations and the lack thereof on the part of unions. Both workers’ representatives, 
thereby, imply that institutional capacity creates expertise, facilitates effective activism 
and assists in legitimising CSO consultation. Private sector representative associations, 
especially those representing “big business”, have garnered the institutional capabilities 
to mobilise well and to be seen as important in government consultations. Since research 
allows valued insider input in consultative settings, it allows private sector EIGs that have 
the wherewithal to conduct research or commission research to be more thoroughly 
incorporated on trade issues than other EIGs (e.g. labour unions, small business 
associations and agricultural associations). It is not that other CSOs are altogether 
excluded or that they do not see themselves as having interests in trade matters but that 
despite these things, they face institutional constraints that make it difficult for them to 
continually and effectively be involved in consultations on trade issues in meaningful 
ways. Hence, infrequent union attendance of meetings on trade issues must be linked to 
capacity problems.  
 
To compound the capacity problem there is no national umbrella association for 
unions in Trinidad and Tobago, unlike in Barbados where such exists and seeks to unite 
unions in order to better interact with the government (and employers) with respect to 
major issues. This lack of coordination and engagement on trade (as well as other issues) 
is a factor that hinders labour association inclusion and activism on trade negotiating 
issues.88
 
We see then the importance of another institutional factor that comes out by 
comparison between cases. In Barbados where union capacity is pooled this has allowed 
                                                 
88 Yet, in the context of Trinidad and Tobago where fragmentation based on ethnic and regional lines has 
been significant, this must be kept in mind in understanding this lack of cooperation to some extent. 
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one umbrella body to be able to participate in consultations. This has facilitated unions’ 
attendance of meetings on trade and their iterated engagement on trade issues. The same 
can be said at the regional level where it appears that both EIGs and non-EIGs that have 
pooled capacity via umbrella organisation and regional networks have been able to 
mobilise and be included on trade matters. Important to note on the institutional side in 
addition, is that in Barbados the SP has included unions and private sector EIGs for over 
a decade. This mechanism may, therefore, be seen to contribute to a more ingrained 
culture of participation by EIGs on a range of issues than has been the case in Trinidad 
and Tobago (discussed in section 7.1).  
 
These points notwithstanding, the general picture is the same for both countries: 
private sector EIGs are the major participants in consultative processes based on officials 
and some CSOs holding to the idea that private sector EIGs are the prime stakeholders 
on trade (they are the traders so they have material interests in trade matters). 
Additionally, because private sector EIGs (especially dominant private sector EIGs) have 
the institutional capacity to produce the valued resource of research, they have further 
come to be valued and consulted by officials. 
 
THE INVOLVEMENT OF NON-EIGS 
 
As the previous section implies, CSOs that are not in the EIG category are left out 
of the consultative process, as is (for the most part) also the case in Barbados.  
 
According to Hazel Brown from the Network of NGOs of Trinidad and Tobago 
for the Advancement of Women89 “there are not many opportunities for NGOs to 
participate in decision-making on trade negotiating issues” (Brown interview: 18 April 
2005). Brown further notes that although NGOs have been invited to seminars and 
workshops, channels of interaction with government officials have not been 
regularised; instead, only private sector associations (she states “Chambers of 
Commerce”) have been the institutionalised participants (Brown interview: 18-04-05). 
                                                 
89 Note this is a network of NGOs as opposed to an umbrella organization or a unified CSO. 
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This point was also reiterated by Zakiya Uzoma-Waddada from the Caribbean Network 
for Integrated Rural Development (CNIRD) and Nelcia Robinson of CAFRA (both 
located in Trinidad and Tobago). These persons made it clear that in Trinidad and 
Tobago non-EIGs are consulted or included differently and less regularly than EIGs. To 
be specific, non-EIG inclusion by officials has mostly been in seminar form and has been 
intermittent rather than regularised (Uzoma-Waddada interview: 14-04-05; Robinson 
correspondence: 09-10-05). 
 
If one considers a material interest based view of stakeholders, that non-EIGs 
(tending to focus on social welfare and developmental issues vs. being traders) are not 
included regularly in consultative processes is on the basis that these groups do not have 
interests in trade. Anthony Guiseppi of the TTMA makes this view startlingly clear when 
asked whether CSOs such as those representing women’s interests or social concerns 
were invited to consultative meetings or trade forums. In response, Guiseppi retorted that 
there was no need to include these groups since trade issues are “gender neutral” 
(Guiseppi interview: 19-04-05). This comment belies the view that EIGs are the prime 
CSO stakeholders on trade matters and therefore are the prime groups that should be 
consulted. This view may be seen, at least to some extent, as informing government 
approaches to consulting with CSOs. Hence, although non-EIGs have played important 
roles in service-provision from the 1980s in the areas of social welfare, this has not been 
translated into non-EIGs being viewed as stakeholders with interests much beyond the 
remit of social welfare issues.  
 
Yet, at least some non-EIGs want to be involved in these consultative processes, 
even if they lack the technical expertise. Brown stated that NGOs would like to see more 
information sharing on issues relating to trade negotiations in order to know what is being 
negotiated. Additionally, non-EIGs are keen to have input on trade matters, especially 
regarding employment related effects of trade. The network that Brown represents is also 
particularly interested in the gendered impacts that issues up for negotiation may have 
and therefore would like to be better informed of the consultative meetings on trade that 
exist in the country (Brown interview: 18-04-05). Hence, despite materialist conceptions 
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of interests, non-EIGs such as those comprising this network appear to see the value of 
being involved in decision-making processes on trade issues.  
 
Brown, Robinson, and Uzoma-Waddada made it clear that from the 1990s in 
Trinidad and Tobago, non-EIGs came to see themselves as needing to look at trade 
issues. This focus emerged based on the idea that the social concerns that they speak to 
will be impacted on by trade agreements and should be considered in trade consultations 
(Uzoma-Waddada interview: 14-04-05; Robinson correspondence: 09- 10-05). Therefore, 
some non-EIGs came to perceive of their interests as including trade matters. This 
occurred in the context of ideational-material trends of importance from the 1990s. 
However, non-EIG activism on trade matters has been more limited than that of EIGs. 
How can one account then for the gap between seeing activism as important and actually 
mobilising? 
 
To start with, it appears that the institutional robustness that would help to enable 
such activism is lacking. The point here is that resource constraints faced by non-EIGs 
have made it difficult for these groups to prioritise social welfare issues and concerns in 
tandem with other linked issues. As a result, non-EIG activism has been infrequent and 
for the most part ineffective, both of which have limited the consultative avenues made 
available to them by government officials (Uzoma-Waddada interview: 14-04-05; 
Anonymous interview: 07-03). Institutional inabilities to address trade issues continually 
and as effectively as EIGs are import factors that may deny non-EIGs inclusion in 
consultative processes and that restrict their potential to have impact on trade agenda 
through interactive processes. However, when non-EIGs have been facilitated and 
attempt to correct their capacity deficits, they have begun to conduct research, to do 
educational work and to discuss trade issues up for negotiation in structured and focussed 
ways.  
 
A National Working Committee on Trade (NWCT) was established in Trinidad 
and Tobago under the auspices of the CPDC as a forum that facilitates repeated CSO 
engagement with trade matters. This structure provides evidence that when non-EIGs 
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pool capacity, they can become better able to mobilise and assert their interests on trade 
matters. The NWCT framework has brought together non-EIGs from diverse areas such 
as youth, women, the disabled as well as some EIGs (Munro-Knight interview: 11-07-05; 
Anonymous interview: July 2003; Uzoma-Waddada interview: 14-04-05). However, 
Munro-Knight of the CPDC noted that although private sector EIGs are not the principal 
participants of the NWCTs, EIGs that speak for small and medium sized enterprises (i.e. 
less prominent private sector EIGs) have mobilised as part of the NWCT. One example 
of such a small business representative association is the Downtown Owners and 
Merchants Association (DOMA) (Munro-Knight interview: 11-07-05). 
 
The CSO participants in the NWCT come together to debate and discuss their 
concerns on trade issues. Thereafter, the NWCT attempts to transmit the views and 
concerns expressed in their internal discussions to domestic officials in order to link the 
regional work of the CPDC and the CRG to local concerns (Munro-Knight 
correspondence: 14-06-05; Munro-Knight interview:11-07-05;  Anonymous interview: 
07-03). The cooperative work of these associations via the NWCT has helped non-EIGs 
to jointly overcome some of the institutional deficits that have constrained their activism.  
 
A lack of material interests is not the obstacle to action here, indeed, even though 
non-EIGs may not be “traders” or “producers” the socio-economic impacts of trade 
agreements can impact on the concerns that these CSOs represent. This has long been the 
case in Trinidad and Tobago and across the region but it was only from the mid/late 
1990s that some non-EIGs came to see themselves as having a right to be heard on these 
issues that affect their lives, and the lives of those whom they represent or work with. 
Non-EIGs perceived themselves as needing to be consulted and as having interests in 
shaping trade negotiating agendas in the ideational-material context of the 1990s in which 
neo-liberal ideas and practices, a globalisation discourse and a focus on good 
governance characterised the landscape. This intangible factor of perception is important 
in understanding why non-EIGs have come together in cooperation with the CPDC to 
form an NWCT. In understanding how they attempt to turn these desires for mobilisation 
into action though, one needs to look at institutional factors. 
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 The involvement of representatives from EIGs in the NWCT in Trinidad and 
Tobago, particularly those EIGs from the less dominant private sector associations and 
unions is worth emphasising once more. These associations are classed as EIGs 
throughout this thesis. However, these EIGs possess less institutional strength (in terms 
of human and financial resources) and have less access to government channels of 
consultation on trade negotiating issues than more prominent private sector EIGs (e.g. the 
TTMA and Chambers of Commerce). As such, these more constrained EIGs have come 
together with non-EIGs to discuss trade issues and to pool capacity in efforts to consult 
with the relevant trade officials. 
 
Here EIGs and non-EIGs have joined together to promote their shared social 
concerns as well as their material interests. To drive home this point is, the following 
statement from David Abdullah of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions:  
 
The business associations may have a different interest or philosophical 
position to labour and the NGO movement in these trade negotiating 
processes (Abdullah interview: 05-05) 
 
It is clear then some EIGs slide into the non-EIG category by means of acting out 
of similar principled beliefs or moving beyond their so-called material self-interests. 
Some EIGs, such as unions and small private sector associations, share with non-EIGs a 
similar ideational view about why they should mobilise on trade issues. This, of course, is 
in addition to the more instrumental goals of both the EIG and non-EIG participants in 
the NWCT in building institutional strength through resource pooling. As stated in Part A 
of this thesis, the observation illustrates that the EIG/non-EIG classification does not 
strictly hold in reality, even if it may be useful for simplification or analytical purposes. 
 
So, has this mobilisation and this strategic pooling of resources by these CSOs 
been translated into consultation?  
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The answer is that there have been some instances of consultation with these 
CSOs. For instance, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions and Trinidad and 
Tobago’s CAFRA branch attended the 2003 Miami ministerial of the FTAA as a 
component of the country’s trade delegation. This was the first time that these two CSOs 
were included on trade matters at such a high level, since such inclusion has tended to be 
the exlcusive remit of private sector representative associations. According to Abdullah, 
this inclusion came on the initiative of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions and 
CAFRA, but he goes on to note that such inclusion has not continued in any other trade 
negotiating forum since (Abdullah interview: 05-05). Although CSOs have come to be 
included in areas in which they were not included prior to the mid/late 1990s, 
consultation and participation has been rather sporadic when it comes to non-EIGs.  
 
Despite believing that they have important inputs to contribute, non-EIGs (and 
more marginalised EIGs) have yet to insert themselves in trade consultations with the 
national government of Trinidad and Tobago in any systematised way. As already stated, 
institutional constraints have something to do with this and these constraints are what the 
NWCT has been making efforts to correct. However, the belief that CSOs besides the 
usual EIGs should be brought into consultative processes at the domestic level does not 
seem to register fully with all representatives from private sector associations, or with the 
representatives from government ministries, contacted for the purposes of this research 
(e.g. a source from the Ministry of Trade and Industry, Anthony Guisseppi of the TTMA 
and Lawrence Placide of the ITNU). The material interest based conceptions about which 
groups constitute stakeholders on trade appear to dominate their views. Put differently, 
these persons hold to the idea that dominant EIGs are the legitimate stakeholders on trade 
matters and this view impacts on the more limited inclusion of non-EIGs in consultations 
than of EIGs.  
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CONCLUSION: PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER 
 
 
This chapter has highlighted that the ideational-material context of the 1990s and 
CSO material interests, perceptions and institutional capacity have impacted on CSO 
mobilisation and consultation in Trinidad and Tobago, even if this has been to a limited 
extent. 
In terms of making a comparison with the Barbados case, a consultative culture 
did not grow out of the severe economic crisis that occurred in Trinidad and Tobago. The 
consultative process linked to discussions of trade negotiating issues between government 
officials and EIGs came in the context, more specifically, of liberalising changes in the 
world trading atmosphere, especially following the Uruguay Round. Trade liberalisation 
is important in the case of Barbados too, but in Barbados consultative processes can be 
linked to the SP framework as well. Moreover, in both cases the neo-liberal shift in ideas 
about trade and about the importance of the private sector as the main stakeholders on 
economic issues at the domestic level were important. Hence, the broader neo-liberal 
trend in ideas and accompanying material changes in the trade realm were important in 
impacting on private sector EIG constitution of their interests and by extension their 
activism and inclusion where little such occurred in the area of trade previously. It was 
only from the mid /late 1990s that EIGs came to conceive of themselves as needing to 
actively mobilise on trade issues in light of a shift in mainstream ideas about economic 
management and interactions and linked material occurrences in the international and 
domestic spheres. 
Considering the excerpts of Trinidad and Tobago’s economic history highlighted 
here illustrates that the inclusion of CSOs in consultative processes of decision-making at 
the national level is rather complicated due to the divisions that have characterised 
political, social and economic relations, unlike in Barbados where the social atmosphere 
is less charged with divisions and the ability to create consensus building mechanisms 
(e.g. the SP) has been easier. The consultative culture that has been engendered in 
Barbados through the SP is lacking in the consultative arrangements on trade in Trinidad 
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and Tobago. Yet, on issues surrounding trade negotiations CSOs have been included in 
consultations with government officials from the 1990s and in much the same manner as 
in Barbados.  
The CSOs that dominate the process are EIGs, particularly those from private 
sector associations representing predominantly well-established businesses. Other EIGs 
have been included too, such as unions, but not as integrally. This asymmetry in 
consultation is in part due to constraints that EIGs apart from the better established 
private sector associations face. So, it appears that the situation is similar to that in 
Barbados; this in spite of the ethnic, racial, sectoral and regional divisions that have 
characterised divisions between CSOs in Trinidad and Tobago. It seems then that these 
factors are in some ways unimportant when it comes to understanding CSOs participation 
or inclusion in consultations on trade issues.90 Instead factors of salience in Barbados are 
pertinent to Trinidad and Tobago: 
• On the one hand, beliefs held about who should be consulted are important. Trade 
negotiating issues are seen not just as “gender neutral”, but primarily as an EIG 
concern by EIGs and government officials.  
 
• On the other hand, the idea that non-EIGs and EIGs besides the usual suspects 
have interests in trade matters and have roles to play is notable, as it informs their 
interest construction and their attempts at activism, capacity building and their 
educational work on trade negotiations. This analysis has tried to illustrate that 
interests by themselves cannot be taken as the driving force in understanding 
group activism since groups do not just possess interests they generate them based 
on their perceptions. 
 
• The institutional capacity of CSOs to mobilise aptly and to be included is also 
critical for understanding how CSOs have been consulted and patterns of CSO 
                                                 
90 Ethnic or racial issues may still have underlying importance within and between EIGs, and also within 
and between various non-EIGs, but in understanding the involvement of various sorts of CSOs such issues 
appear less significant at the surface. 
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mobilisation. Notably, the better capacity of the well-coordinated private sector 
EIGs facilitates their inclusion in consultation, in contrast to the limited means of 
other EIGs and non-EIGs.  
 
• Another important institutional consideration is the manner in which governments 
structure channels for consultation so as to facilitate EIG participation rather than 
that of non-EIGs. This is evident both in Trinidad and Tobago where consultative 
arrangements on trade are independent of national consultative frameworks and in 
Barbados where the national consultative framework has been mainstreamed but 
remains skewed towards EIG consultation. 
 
In addition to these factors the ideational-material trend in the form of a growing 
emphasis on “good governance” in the wake of the Cold War should be noted. In 
discussing attempts in Trinidad and Tobago to create mechanisms for national 
consultation, governance concerns have been highlighted. The ideational-material context 
in which good governance has become focal therefore may be seen as impacting on 
general efforts at consultation and even on government approaches to trade matters. 
However, with respect to trade matters, a commitment to consultation with actors from 
within CS in line with a focus on good governance appears skewed towards emphasising 
specific EIGs representing the dominant private sector interests. 
 
So, as in Barbados, there is a bias towards including certain CSOs, whilst excluding 
or allowing for different methods of inclusion of others when it comes to matters up for 
external trade negotiation. This skew exists even in spite of the stated commitment to 
“consultation”, “good governance”, espoused by both the Republic of Trinidad and 
Tobago and Barbados governments. This is not to say that there is not a commitment to 
consultation, but rather that this commitment is rather selective. All the same, the 
discursive space has been opened to accommodate a variety of CSOs in consultative 
settings at the domestic level, including non-EIGs, which have begun work together 
domestically via the NWCTs and regionally (via the CPDC and CAFRA) to create more 
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space for non-EIGs inclusion on trade topics. These actions by non-EIGs have begun to 
reduce the EIG bias in consultations, although this bias is still predominant. 
 
Next this thesis moves on to compare the situations in Trinidad and Tobago and 
Barbados with that in St. Lucia. 
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 CHAPTER 8 
CONSULTATIONS ON THE TRADE AGENDA IN AN LDC 
WITHOUT A NATIONAL CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM: 
THE ST. LUCIAN EXPERIENCE 
 
The last two chapters started by showing that levels of exposure to trade cannot 
account for CSO activism on trade, since exposure to trade in the 1970s was either 
equally high or higher than it was from the 1990s. On the same note, increases in trade 
exposure cannot account for government openness to consulting CSOs on trade issues 
either. The following graph shows that the situation in St. Lucia is much the same as 
those in the previous cases. To be specific, St. Lucia became much less dependent on 
trade from the 1990s than it was in the late 1970s and late 1980s.  
 
Figure 7: St. Lucia’s Trade Dependence91
                                                
St. Lucia's Trade Dependence: 1977-2002
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91 Source: World Bank (2005), author’s calculations 
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Therefore, one needs to look at other factors to understand CSO activism on trade 
and government openness to consulting CSOs from the 1990s. As in the cases of Trinidad 
and Tobago and Barbados (despite the social, political and economic differences) CSO 
interest perceptions in the face of ideational-material changes that became important in 
the 1980s and 1990s are important to consider.  
 
The previous case studies also illustrated that CSO activism and inclusion on 
trade have been impacted on by institutional considerations. Specifically, in actualising 
their perceived interests, EIGs have been the CSOs best able to mobilise because of their 
institutional robustness and have also been the prime CSOs consulted because their 
institutional wherewithal grants them the capacity to conduct research and mobilise 
effectively. On the other hand non-EIGs have lacked the institutional ability to move their 
perceived interests into effective mobilisation. Non-EIGs have also had less success in 
having governments include them in trade consultations, despite the existence of some 
inclusion and despite national consultative spaces being opened. 
 
However, this chapter, will show that in St. Lucia EIGs and non-EIGs have faced 
significant institutional hurdles to mobilising continually and effectively on trade. As a 
result of these institutional capacity problems, activism by both EIGs and non-EIGs on 
trade issues has been limited. Also, institutional hindrances have circumscribed the 
government’s ability to consult with CSOs (both consultation of EIGs and non-EIGs) 
more markedly than in the cases of Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago. Even though the 
ideational-material context of the time has led the St. Lucian government to advocate and 
initiate CSO consultation on trade matters, the government of St. Lucia has not had the 
capacity to create regularised consultative settings on trade. The St. Lucian case shows 
then, that institutional factors help one to understand why some CSOs have been able to 
mobilise better than others and also why governments have included CSOs in trade 
consultations in certain ways.  
 
As in the cases of Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, ideational factors, 
specifically ideas about which groups constitute stakeholders on trade topics, have 
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impacted on how CSOs have mobilised and on how officials have included CSOs in trade 
consultations. Conceptions about which groups constitute the prime stakeholders on trade 
have impacted on government inclusion of some CSOs (especially private sector EIGs) 
over others. Yet, despite these conceptions being important in St. Lucia, it should be 
reiterated that government-CSO consultation has on the whole been more limited than in 
the previous two case studies in light of institutional considerations. 
 
In spite of the differences with relation to consultation between this case and the 
former cases, this chapter will illustrate that institutional factors have impacted on how 
CSOs have mobilised and how they have been included in consultations with officials on 
trade issues. Additionally, it will highlight that interest perceptions, framed in the 
ideational-material context of the time, help one to understand why CSOs mobilised and 
came to be included. 
 
To bring out these points this chapter proceeds in the following way: Section 8.1 
looks at government-CSO consultations in St. Lucia and at some trade related aspects of 
the economic history of St. Lucia. This section pays special attention to the role of 
bananas in the economy. Section 8.2 follows by examining CSO activism and inclusion 
on trade issues and highlighting the differences between this case and the previously 
discussed cases but, all the same, shows that the ideational-material context is important 
in understanding activism, as are perceptions of interests and institutional factors. 
 
8.1 ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
CONSULTATIONS WITH THE BANANA AFFAIR 
  
The St. Lucian case differs from the previous two cases with relation to trade in 
some important respects. As in the previous studies, CSOs could have mobilised on trade 
in the 1970s and 1980s because of exposure. CSOs however only began to mobilise in the 
1990s, but in the case of St. Lucia a very real material threat thrust CSOs into mobilising 
on trade issues. St. Lucia (along with fellow ACP banana exporting countries) faced 
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losses in preferential access of their bananas to the European market because of changes 
to the EU banana regime and also due to a WTO challenge to banana preferences granted 
to ACP producers. These occurrences led to the country attempting to restructure its 
economy from the mid-1990s whereas in Barbados or Trinidad and Tobago such 
restructuring came under SAPs (due to balance of payments problems). In light of these 
shocks a material interest based conception would lead us to think that CSO mobilisation 
should been more pronounced than in the other two countries. However, as has been 
alluded to already, CSO mobilisation in St. Lucia has been limited (though it exists) 
because of institutional factors.  
 
In fact, although St. Lucia faced some slowing in economic performance between 
the late 1970s and 1982 from the mid 1980s right into the early1990s St. Lucia fared 
relatively well economically due to favourable external market conditions for its banana 
exports. Notably, St. Lucia saw average GDP growth rates of 7% per annum between 
1983 and 1992 (CCA 1991: 64; WTO 2002: 2). With changes to the EU’s banana regime 
and a challenge from the WTO (both emerging post-1992) GDP growth rates began to 
peter off in St. Lucia, plunging into the negative range by the start of the new 
millennium. The following graph illustrates this decline: 
 
Figure 8: St. Lucia’s GDP Growth92
St. Lucia's GDP Growth: 1991-2002
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92 Source: World Bank (2005). 
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Hence, balance of payments problems did not open the door for the ideational-
material shift in a neo-liberal direction does as occurred in the previous two cases. In 
Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados, SAPs brought internal economic liberalisation and 
external liberalisation (in trade). SAPs also introduced a focus on private sector led 
development and decentralised service provision (in Trinidad and Tobago rather than in 
Barbados) that inserted actors from beyond the state apparatus into development and 
decision-making processes. St. Lucia, however, did not undergo the same move towards 
internal and external liberalisation, private sector led development or CSO focussed 
social service provision that some other countries in the region did. Balance of payments 
problems that afflicted other CARICOM countries and concomitant SAPs were staved off 
in St. Lucia and in the other OECS countries in part because of the stabilising role of the 
Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB) that controlled these countries’ shared currency 
(Eastern Caribbean Dollar). To be specific, the ECCB was pivotal in containing 
expenditure and external borrowing of its members which helped them to avoid some of 
the problems faced by other CARICOM states d (Wint 2003: 36, ECLAC 2001: 11).93  
 
Nevertheless, in the 1980s and early 1990s there was cognisance of the 
importance of structural adjustment (as espoused in the 1984 Nassau Understanding) 
throughout the region. Additionally, CARICOM members acknowledged the “necessity” 
of liberalising trade in conformity with international trends (as espoused in the Grand 
Anse Declaration in 1989)94.  Therefore, even without SAPs, the ideas and policies that 
formed part of the neo-liberal ideational-material shift of the 1980s (into the 1990s), 
impacted on St. Lucia. Yet, it was only in the 1990s when these ideas and policies came 
to impact on St. Lucia more directly via changes to the structure of multilateral trade 
rules. Hence, when preferential access for the country’s bananas came to be restricted 
with changes to the EU banana regime (via the Single European Act) and with 
                                                 
93 However, into the 21st century the ECCB has been less successful in containing expenditure and 
borrowing. This has meant that some ECCB members now have very high debt to GDP ratios, some 
teetering on the verge of HIPC status. 
94 See chapter 4 
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preferential access to the EU market being challenged in the WTO the country was 
propelled towards restructuring the economy95: 
 
Saint Lucia’s main economic policy objective for the period 1994-2000 
was structural reform by means of a progressive liberalization of 
international trade, the promotion of tourism and financial activities, and 
the restructuring of the banana industry. (WTO 2002: 4-emphasis added-) 
 
The neo-liberal trend in ideas and policies (which the government signed up to in the 
trade sphere via the WTO), therefore, impacted on St. Lucia and the other Windward 
Island banana exporting economies. It has been estimated, for instance, that average 
exports of bananas from the Windward Islands decreased by 50% from an average of 
110.2 million Euros between 1989 and 1992 to an average of 55.2 million Euros between 
1999 and 2002 (DFID 2004: 42). The declining exports have had significant impacts on 
farmers with data suggesting that registered banana farmers in the Windward Islands 
plunged from 24, 100 in 1993 to 7, 300 in 2001. In St. Lucia the number of registered 
farmers declined from 9, 700 in 1993 to 2, 000 in 2003. In addition, losses in employment 
between 1993 and 2001 are estimated to be as high as 18% of the entire working 
population in the region or approximately 67, 000 job losses (DFID 2004: 43-44). 
 
Since this trade shock attacked St. Lucia’s main export sector directly, neo-liberal 
policy thought inherent in these arrangements directly impacted on St. Lucia’s economy 
and on CS. The same, however, cannot be said for Trinidad and Tobago or Barbados. 
Although Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago reduced their protective tariffs in line with 
WTO arrangements and in line with the CARICOM CET during the 1990s, neither was 
reliant on an export sector that came directly under threat, as was the case in St. Lucia.  
 
In response to the neo-liberal ideational-material shift that had specific impacts on 
the banana industry in St. Lucia, activism on this trade issue grew amongst CSOs, 
particularly the EIGs from within the agricultural sector. This agricultural EIG activism 
on trade came via a regional effort directed by the Windward Islands Farmers’ 
                                                 
95 A similar situation holds for other Windward Island economies 
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Association (WINFA) rather than by country specific agricultural EIGs (Renwick Rose 
interview: 10-22-05; Representative of the St. Lucia Ministry of External Affairs, 
International Trade and Civil Aviation –MEA)96. A focus on strengthening the private 
sector emerged in St. Lucia too. As occurred in Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados, with 
the shift in a neo-liberal direction, the private sector became focal in attempts to propel 
development. As a consequence, plans were made by the government to include these 
important actors in consultations on trade matters (MEA; Brian Louisy interview: 17-09-
04). Consultation in the trade area between the government and stakeholders, moreover, 
has been encouraged in the context of the EPAs under negotiation with the EU and more 
generally too in the context of the contemporary focus on good governance.  
 
CSO activism and government overtures to consultation on trade issues from the 
1990s in St. Lucia were novel. Neither prior to nor during the Uruguay Round of the 
GATT were there consultations with actors outside of the government on issues up for 
negotiation in the trade realm. Kerde Severin from the St. Lucia Agriculturalists 
Association makes this point clear in saying: “In the Uruguay Round agricultural 
stakeholders were not consulted…” (Kerde Severin interview: 16 -09-04). This view was 
reiterated by Brian Louisy of the St. Lucia Chamber of Commerce, Industry and 
Agriculture (Brian Louisy interview: 17-09-04) and further by a representative of the St. 
Lucia Ministry of External Affairs, International Trade and Civil Aviation (MEA). This 
official from the Ministry of External Affairs noted that prior to the late 1980s there was 
no need to include CS representatives with respect to trade negotiating matters and went 
on to elucidate that only with the creation of the WTO did the government begin to 
“realise” that actors from outside of the government needed to be involved in 
consultations on negotiating proposals (MEA).  
 
In spite of this realisation, greater involvement by actors from CS only began with 
farmers’ representatives mobilising in response to the banana dispute that emerged in the 
WTO the mid-1990s (MEA). As stated earlier, St. Lucian banana farmers mobilised in 
                                                 
96 A senior official from the St. Lucia Ministry of External Affairs; interviewed 14-09-04; to be referenced 
as (MEA) throughout the text. 
 244
alliance with other such producers in the region under the aegis of WINFA to lobby 
within and outside of the CARICOM region for the interests of banana producers. 
Governments in the Windward Islands responded in support of the activism of WINFA 
and its constituent members, particularly considering the importance of bananas in these 
economies. As a result, governments in the Windward Islands in association with private 
traders created an export enterprise called the Windward Island Banana Development and 
Exporting Company (WIBDECO). WIBDECO (established in 1994) was an outgrowth of 
an umbrella banana growers association for the Windward Islands called the Windward 
Island Banana Growers Association (WIBAN). 97 In its evolution from WINBAN, 
WIBDECO became a joint government- private sector corporation to market and export 
bananas in the changing trade atmosphere (Grossman 1998: 69-70; St. Lucia Ministry of 
Agriculture 2005).  
 
That farmers’ CSOs were listened to within this context in St. Lucia illustrates 
again that with trends in a neo-liberal direction intensifying in the 1990s, came 
consultation between CSOs and governments in the region on trade issues.  To 
understand the role of WINFA (representing banana producers in St. Lucia) and of 
banana producers in St. Lucia in mobilising to shape trade-negotiating agendas, and 
indeed to preface an understanding of wider CSO activism on trade issues, it is important 
to explore the role of the banana industry in the context of St. Lucia’s history. 
 
THE GROWTH OF THE BANANA INDUSTRY 
 
To understand the development of the banana industry in St. Lucia one must look 
to external and internal factors within the colonial context.  
 
                                                 
97 WINBAN ceased to be a CSO as member associations became statutory bodies rather than private 
associations (e.g. the St. Lucia Banana Growers’ Association was converted to a statutory body in 1990 
only to be privatized and transformed into a corporation in 1998 - St. Lucia Banana Corporation-). When 
WINBAN was transformed into WIBDECO in 1994 shares were divided between governments and 
growers associations/corporations in the Windward Islands, thus removing it further from the CSO 
category (Ministry of Agriculture 2005). 
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On the external side, the British administration was concerned about the 
penetration of an American company called the United Fruit Company that owned an 
extensive range of banana plantations in Central America by the early 20th century. In 
efforts to compete with this American company, the British established plantations for 
the production of bananas in Jamaica and also St. Lucia by 1925 (Grossman 1998: 35; St. 
Lucia Ministry of Agriculture 2005). Other attempts to undermine this American 
dominance in banana production included encouraging British shipping companies to 
participate in the banana trade with Jamaica and other Caribbean islands (especially in 
the islands of St. Lucia and Grenada); experimenting with Windward Island banana trade 
directed at the Canadian market; and the imposition of preferential policies towards 
bananas imported from the British Empire (Grossman 1998: 35- 36). 
 
On the internal side, there were British concerns about economic and social 
problems that affected St. Lucia. With the declining profitability of sugar production in 
the islands at the end of the 19th century, plantations of the Windward Islands faced 
economic and social instability  (Thomson 1987: 3; Ferguson 1998). This was particularly 
notable in St. Lucia where plantation based sugar production was not as well established 
as in other parts of the region since this method of production was only introduced when 
the British took over possession of the island in 1814 (Barrow 1992: 11, 15; O’Loughlin 
1968: 43). Also, by the 1930s (as in much of the region) dire poverty accompanied by 
labour unrest came to afflict St. Lucia and the Windwards.   
 
Banana cultivation emerged to fill the void left by plantation production of sugar 
and helped to deal with unrest linked to poverty in the 1930s.  Banana cultivation was 
compatible with large plantations and also on smallholdings of unfertile and steep land 
that characterised this country and tended to be occupied by the less well-off in the 
country. Therefore, banana farming provided opportunities for both the planter class and 
the descendents of slaves who only had access to small plots of land (Thompson 1987: 3-
4). The focus on banana cultivation was also less controversial than British proposals for 
land reallocation and dealt with problems of seasonal unemployment of plantation 
workers that was usually associated with a sugar production. In sum, the introduction of 
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banana cultivation was a viable means of curbing socio-economic unease since the 
planter classes were allowed to keep their valuable lands and peasant agriculture by the 
“lower” classes was supported (Thomson 1987: 4-5; Barrow 1992: 25, 30). 
 
The banana trade to Britain was suspended during World War II, but 
recommenced in 1945 with the British Ministry of Food acting as the sole importer under 
a managed the market. Since after the war Jamaican producers were no longer able to 
supply sufficient bananas to the UK, a door was opened for Windward Island bananas, 
such as those from St. Lucia. This was helped along by the involvement of a Canadian 
company (Antilles Products) that began shipping bananas from the Windwards to the UK 
(Grossman 1998: 38-39; St. Lucia Ministry of Agriculture 2005). In addition, British 
Empire bananas could enter the UK freely whilst those from Central and South America 
could only be imported with licences. The reasons for this discrimination were many, 
ranging from favouring sterling area bananas (as foreign exchange reserves were low 
following World War II) to assisting colonial economies, facing plummeting sugar prices 
in the 1950s.98 The Windward banana industry gained another boost in 1952 when a fast-
growing British based company, Geest Industries Limited, bought the over-stretched 
Antilles Products and signed contracts with banana growers’ associations on each of the 
Windward Islands, guaranteeing these growers a buyer for their fruits (Grossman 1998: 
39, 42; Thomson 1987: 28-31; St. Lucia Ministry of Agriculture 2005).  
 
As a result of these occurrences, by 1957 dependence on sugar decreased 
dramatically in St. Lucia, and in 1963 the decision was made by the domestic government 
to abandon sugar production on the island in favour of banana cultivation. Sugar was 
officially abandoned by 1964, and St. Lucia saw increasing prosperity as “blacks” saw 
better standards of living based on small-scale banana production for export (Barrow 
1993: 22, 30; O’ Loughlin 1968: 45). Indeed, small farming in the banana industry 
allowed for “blacks” to pay to educate their children, which facilitated the entry of these 
“banana children” into more affluent jobs in both the private and public sectors in St. 
                                                 
98 These and other reasons for preferential treatment are notable in helping to understand the development 
of the banana industry and its importance in St. Lucia and the Windward Islands, but need not be developed 
at length for the purposes of this study. 
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Lucia. Bananas and the upward mobility they provided facilitated growing participation 
of “blacks” in politics, with this group comprising the political elite from the 1950s as 
well as the commercial elite. Notably, the election of the St. Lucia Labour Party in 1951 
ended the political domination of the island by the “white” elite linked to large mercantile 
or sugar interests. In consequence, only small pockets of “whites” remained on the island 
following the decline of sugar and those that did tended to move towards commercial 
activities linked to North American or European business interests (De Albuquerque and 
Mc Elroy 1999; Barrow 1992: 26-27).  
 
Bananas grew to be of paramount importance because of their export role and also 
because of their role as a vehicle for social and economic change within St. Lucian 
society.  
 
BANANAS AND EIGS 
 
EIGs that were formed to support the interests of growers in this important sphere 
were able to negotiate with the government to improve conditions and also acted with 
other such associations in the Windward Islands. Banana Growers’ Associations are 
important to take note of here.  
 
In St. Lucia one such association was formed by the government in the 1930s but 
in 1948 was privatised to become a CSO. In 1953 the Banana Growers’ Association, 
which was made up of growers operating on large, medium and small scales (though 
initially dominated by larger producers), evolved to become the St. Lucia Banana 
Growers’ Association (SLBGA). This association was based on equality between farmers 
of varying sizes and acted to politicise rural farmers. The SLBGA so politicised farmers 
that the United Workers Party (UWP) formed as a breakaway wing of this association 
and came into political power in 1964. The SLBGA was important in St. Lucia because it 
negotiated on the behalf of members for infrastructural and other improvements 
necessary to support this increasingly vital industry from the 1950s (St. Lucia Ministry of 
Agriculture 2005; Barrow 1992: 27). Therefore, the SLBGA emerged as a significant 
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EIG that interfaced with the domestic government. With the growth of the banana 
industry in the other Windward Islands, growers associations from across the region 
created the Windward Island Banana Growers’ Association (WINBAN) in 1958 (St. 
Lucia Ministry of Agriculture 2005).  
 
Hence, these EIGs were important in mobilising on issues in member interests 
from the 1950s and would remain important into the 1990s on trade issues. The SLBGA, 
however ceased to be a CSO when it was once more was converted to a statutory body in 
1967 and remained as such until 1998 when it was dissolved becoming a private 
company owned by all banana growers- renamed the St. Lucia Banana Corporation 
(SLBC)-(Government of St. Lucia 1999: 11). The involvement of Banana Associations as 
statutory bodies (as members of WINBAN) and the creation of WIBDECO as a 
corporation owned by governments and growers’ bodies (some private and some 
statutory) takes them out of the CSO category. However, other small farmers associations 
and farmers associations existed within CS in the Windward Islands and by 1982 these 
came together to form the Windward Island Farmers Association (WINFA) informally 
and then formally in 1987 (ACP-EU Civil Society Information Network, 2003).  
 
In short, bananas have been an integral part of the economies in the Windward 
Islands, and more importantly for the purpose of this study, to St. Lucia. When this vital 
industry came under threat from the mid-1990s with changes to the EU’s banana regime 
and following the creation of the WTO, banana producers in St. Lucia and in the region 
saw their ability to export and eek out a living come under threat. As such they mobilised 
on international trade matters, domestically, regionally and internationally through 
WINFA, along with other organisations in the Windwards that were not CSOs (e.g. 
WINBAN and later WIBDECO)99. This mobilisation however was not aimed at shaping 
trade negotiating agendas; it occurred after the Uruguay Round negotiations, and after 
the governments of St. Lucia and other banana dependent states in the CARICOM region 
had agreed to the rules of the WTO.  
                                                 
99 Remember WINBAN was transformed into a strictly corporate entity comprising government and 
corporate collaboration and as such is not a CSO according to the classification used here. 
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  OTHER EIGS  
 
It is important to emphasise that the story of EIGs in St. Lucia is not all about 
bananas or agriculture. As noted previously, from the 1960s (as in much of the British 
Caribbean) St. Lucia attempted economic diversification. Specifically, attempts were 
made to develop tourism, industrial production (such as light manufacturing) and import 
substituting agricultural production -i.e. geared towards the domestic market (Caribbean 
Conservation Association 1991: 64; Barrow 1992: 11). However, the level of economic 
diversification was slow into the mid-1980s, likely because the economy was buoyed by 
good fortunes in the banana market, which made concentration on bananas very lucrative.  
 
Even so, attempted diversification brought other EIGs into existence to speak to 
the needs of these private sector interests. The most significant of these EIGs in St. Lucia 
is perhaps the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, in existence since 1884 
as the St. Lucia Agricultural and Commercial Society and with origins in the planter and 
commercial elites. Other EIGs include the St. Lucia Hotel and Tourism Association 
(SLHTA -est. 1968) and the St. Lucia Industrial and Small Business Association 
(SLISBA -est. 1989). Moreover, the labour movement and unions with roots in the 1930s 
are important EIGs, although unions lost much of their political clout with the rising 
importance of self-employment based on small farming in bananas from the 1960s 
(Barrow 1992: 27; O’ Loughlin 1968: 45). 
 
These are the EIGs, besides those representing banana growers’ interests, which 
one would expect to become engaged on trade negotiating matters. Yet, what of other 
CSOs, the non-EIGs that surely have played important parts in development in St. Lucia? 
What role do these CSOs, representing groups of people who are not traders, play in 
shaping the approach to trade issues and how does this compare with the role that EIGs of 
various sorts play? Further, what mechanisms exist for CSO consultation on the trade 
negotiating agenda? These are the issues to be addressed more fully in Section 8.2. 
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 8.2 CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS ON TRADE AND CSO ACTIVISM 
 
EXISTING CONSULTATIVE MECHANISMS 
 
Despite the activism by WINFA and member organisations with respect to the 
banana dispute in the WTO, neither this occurrence nor the government “realisation” that 
CSOs needed to be consulted on trade issues has been translated into regularised 
mechanisms for consultation on trade issues. There is, however, an Inter-Ministerial 
Committee. This committee includes representatives from various government ministries 
such as External Affairs, Agriculture and Finance and consults with private sector 
representative associations on trade matters prior to important trade meetings. Following 
ministerial approval, proposals from meetings of the Inter-Ministerial Committee, which 
have become parts of St. Lucia’s trade positions, are fed into the OECS and then the 
CARICOM forums or bodies (MEA). This relatively limited avenue for consultation is 
the only one that exists and a formalised framework for national consultations on issues 
of domestic significance neither exists nor has been mooted.  
 
Nonetheless, there is ministry level contact with stakeholders, such as between the 
SLHTA and the tourism ministry or between agricultural associations and the agriculture 
ministry (Andrena Simon interview: 16-09-04; Kerde Severin interview: 16-09-04). Such 
contact should allow for inputs from various CSOs to feed into decision-making on trade 
negotiating agendas as well as other issue areas, this though is not necessarily the case. 
100
 
ENVISIONED MECHANISMS 
 
Following the banana dispute in the WTO, the St. Lucian government made 
gestures to creating mechanisms for CSO consultation on trade issues prior to national 
                                                 
100 The problem of limited coordination between ministries on trade issues will be discussed later when 
speaking of institutional constraints faced by the St. Lucia government. 
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trade positions being passed onto the OECS level or the CARICOM level. Brian Louisy, 
of the St. Lucia Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, spoke of the existence 
of these stated intentions on the side of the government but went on to express that these 
intimations never became reality. In making this point he articulated that the absence of 
consultative structures has hindered interaction between CSOs and the government on 
trade negotiating issues and has weakened the government’s ability to craft well informed 
positions. This is particularly so since the government’s proposed External Trade Council 
was not yet functioning, even though the government launched this twice as a vehicle to 
encourage involvement by CS actors (Brian Louisy interview: 17-09-04). 
 
Speaking of attempts to create formalised mechanisms for consultation, a 
representative from the Ministry of External Affairs also noted the government’s 
intention to form the External Trade Council. This council would include CSO 
participation from private sector representative associations, the labour unions, church 
and other associations in consultation with government officials. This mechanism has 
been envisioned to inform decision-makers so they can come up with more “coherent 
trade policy” and at the same time “engage stakeholders” (MEA). However, as already 
noted, this framework has not yet become a reality. 
 
Since the crisis in the banana industry ushered in a heightened focus on the 
service sector as a pivotal earner of foreign exchange and driver of the St. Lucian 
economy (as well as others in the region), a Coalition of Service Industries (CSI) was 
established in St. Lucia in March 2005 (RNM 2005).101 This organisation is a 
government organised NGO, sometimes called a GONGO or a QUANGO (quasi-NGO). 
This CSI is supposed to allow for a more informed approach to service negotiations in its 
function of coordinating views domestically, passing these views onto government 
representatives and then discussing the negotiating stances proposed for St. Lucia.  
 
An interviewee from the Ministry of External Affairs spoke of the importance of 
organising this coalition, since the involvement of service providers in helping to shape 
                                                 
101 Such are to be implemented across CARICOM as stated prior; the first was created in Barbados in 2002.  
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negotiating positions has been limited. In this source’s view the limited activism from 
this sector has been a result of limited institutional capacity within the service sector to 
deal with trade issues (MEA). Andrena Simon spoke about the lack of capacity of the 
SLHTA when she opined that although the SLHTA meets with trade and tourism 
ministers, the Chamber of Commerce takes on most responsibility for discussions on 
trade issues because the SLHTA is not able to do so effectively (Andrena Simon 
interview: 16-09-04). The St. Lucian CSI is supposed to correct some of these 
institutional deficits in order to bring service stakeholders into consultations. However, as 
stated earlier, this GONGO is as yet not fully operational, as it has only recently been 
formed. Hence, the inclusion of EIGs from this important realm of the private sector has 
so far been very limited.  
 
With respect to the intention of governments to include CSOs and the lack of 
formalised mechanisms for such, a representative (Joseph Goddard) from the National 
Worker’s Union emphasised that the involvement of unions has been limited even more 
than that of private sector associations. Goddard states that there “has been talk” about 
involving unions at the national level about issues such as the CSME and suggestions that 
unions play an increased role in the context of the EPAs under negotiation with the EU. 
However, Goddard went on to state that the focus has been on the private sector 
representative associations since these are viewed as representing the main trade interest 
groups. Trade unions, on the other hand, have not been accepted to the same extent 
because they are seen as less linked to trade (Joseph Goddard interview: 16-09-04). 
Goddard’s view confirms one of the assertions made throughout the case studies in this 
thesis: that a material interest based conception of which CSOs comprise the important 
stakeholders has informed official approaches to CSO consultations whether these have 
been regularised or remain sporadic. This point aside though, unions in the country have 
expressed interest in and have tried to get involved on their own initiative (Joseph 
Goddard interview: 16-08-04; MEA).  
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INCLUSION OF EIGS AND ACTIVISM BY EIGS  
 
So far, this look into frameworks for the formalised inclusion of CSO in decision-
making pertaining to trade negotiations has shown that frameworks or mechanisms for 
facilitating CSO inclusion are lacking in St. Lucia. Yet, where there is consultation 
between government representatives and CSOs, this has been focussed on primarily on 
EIGs, specifically private sector representative EIGs. This EIG focus is consistent with 
the other two case studies and also with a materialist conception of interests (discussed in 
chapter two) which, though it does not make assumptions about which groups 
governments will consult, informs government views on which CSOs comprise the focal 
stakeholders on trade matters. Once more it appears that EIGs are the CSOs that these 
processes are specifically geared towards. Indeed a representative form the Ministry of 
External Affairs stated that at the time (September 2004) associations from outside of the 
private sector were not involved in either formal or informal consultations between 
government officials and “non-state actors” that do occur, but went on to state that non-
EIG consultations “will” occur when the External Trade Council is established (MEA).  
 
It is notable that in St. Lucia, the activism of agricultural associations is more 
important than it is in the former two case studies (Trinidad and Tobago especially). Of 
note in particular is the regional umbrella association, WINFA, which mobilised both in 
St. Lucia and across the Windward Islands. WINFA’s activism and its inclusion by 
government officials can be attributed to the vital role that the bananas industry has 
played in the Windward economies (as highlighted previously in this chapter). The 
economic significance of the banana industry meant that banana growers were supported 
by governments in the Windward Islands in the face of trade issues that threatened both 
the interests of banana producers and the economic viability of banana producing 
countries in the region.  
 
The placement of the SLBGA as a statutory body (that included both government 
officials and farmers) and the activism on this body, further shows that the government 
and farmers alike shared concerns over the fate of the banana trade. The same can be said 
of governments across the Windward Island banana producing countries since similar 
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arrangements existed in the other three Windward Islands and at the Windward Island 
sub-region level in the form of WINBAN. Hence, the concerns of EIGs representing 
banana farmers, such as WINFA and its members, were taken into consideration. Since 
banana farmers were listened and were of crucial economic significance, this shows that 
material factors were important in understanding farmer activism and in understanding 
government openness to consulting with their CSOs (notably WINFA).  
 
However, consulting with CSOs has also been guided by ideas about the 
importance of this as a facet of good governance that, according to a representative of the 
Ministry of External Affairs in St. Lucia, has been emphasised in the late Lomé and post-
Lomé EU-ACP trade contexts. This representative further stated that consultation with 
“stakeholders” on trade has become important because “globalisation” and increasing 
“trade liberalisation” have mad such necessary (MEA- italicised words are direct 
quotations from this interviewee). One cannot state with any certainty that the ideational-
material context was more important than were strictly material factors (the economic 
significance of the banana trade to governments and farmers). Certainly, most favouring 
materialist conceptions would see the latter as the most significant factor. Whichever was 
most important though, both were of salience and this is the significant point to heed 
here. It is important to acknowledge that both ideational and material factors are 
important for understanding government-CSO interaction on trade. 
 
Threats to the banana industry were brought via EU reforms to the European 
banana import regime and then by the WTO dispute (both in the 1990s). Therefore, 
activism by banana farmers in response bears out materialist conceptions about 
mobilisation on trade and economic issues. However, this activism should not be 
separated from the context in which it was located. Banana farmer activism was certainly 
prompted by material changes in the trade arena and the concomitant effects on farmer 
earnings or “livelihoods”, in the words of Renwick Rose from WINFA (Renwick Rose 
interview: 10-22-05). However, these changes in themselves were linked to an ideational 
shift towards neo-liberal policy thought. In this context, CSO activism was: in line with 
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material dictates but was also prefaced by ideas and impacted on by the ideational-
material context of the time.   
 
So, ideas and material interests have informed the Government of St. Lucia’s 
stated “need” to include CSOs and the activism/desire for activism by CSOs on trade 
issues in the ideational-material context of the time (i.e. the importance liberalisation, 
globalisation and a focus on governance). 
 
Institutional considerations must be heeded too. Farmers’ associations across the 
region mobilised jointly via WINFA in the face of this crisis in the banana industry. This 
cooperation occurred because the constituent associations did not individually have the 
institutional ability to be able to address their concerns over trade issues in meaningful 
and well-informed ways (Renwick Rose interview: 10-22-05).  
 
The importance of such CSOs and the rationales behind their activism aside, the 
fact remains that the formalised channels or institutionalised mechanisms allowing for 
consultations between EIGs of any sort and trade officials are lacking (UNDP January 
2000). In this regard, the case of St. Lucia is dissimilar to those of Barbados and Trinidad 
and Tobago. There are no systematised mechanisms that regularise government 
consultation with CSOs, not even of the CSOs that government officials see as important 
stakeholders on trade matters. Institutionalised consultative channels on trade negotiating 
matters with business/private sector representative associations do not exist (Brian Louisy 
interview: 17 -09-04) and the same can be said of consultations between trade officials 
and labour unions as expressed by Joseph Goddard of the NWU. 102
 
This partial inclusion of EIGs is both because there are few formal channels for 
inclusion on the government side, but in part because of the lack of institutional capacity 
of CSOs (including EIGs) to actively attempt to insert themselves more fully in trade 
                                                 
102 However, the case of the labour movement in St. Lucia must be qualified by the history of unions 
having relatively weak pull in the island as the emphasis on self-employment grew with the banana 
industry based on peasant agriculture (previously noted). 
 
 256
matters. Hence, institutional factors are important in understanding the limited 
involvement of CSOs in this case.  
 
Unlike in Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, even the more prominent private 
sector representative associations lack the staffing and financial resources to allow them 
to conduct adequate research or to aptly insert themselves in domestic discussions on 
trade issues up for negotiation in various forums. This is made clear by Kerde Severin 
from the Agriculturalists’ Association who stated that there is a need to create a free-
standing Chamber of Agriculture to build better capacity amongst agricultural producers 
to conduct research and advocate in a unified way on issues of concern to agricultural 
producers with reference to trade (Kerde Severin interview: 16-09-04). Additionally a 
representative from the Ministry of External Affairs speaks to the capacity constraints of 
private sector actors who “…would love to become involved but have limited resources 
that limit their ability” (MEA). The president of the SLISBA also highlighted this 
institutional deficit in an August 1999 newspaper article in which he expressed the need 
for more funding to establish a secretariat that would enable the association to fulfil its 
mandate (St. Lucia Online 1999). Institutional problems faced by private sector 
associations were reiterated by Louisy of the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and 
Agriculture too- although Louisy champions his institution for attempting to fill this gap - 
(Brian Louisy interview: 17-09-2004). In this respect, EIGs in St. Lucia are like the non-
EIGs in the two prior case studies (and in St. Lucia too) that would like to be included 
more but cannot effectively advocate due to internal institutional constraints.  
 
Therefore, a material interest-based logic alone does not explain limited activism 
in this case. Instead, institutional factors take one further in understanding how CSOs 
have/have not mobilised and have/have not been consulted involvement of CSOs. The 
lack of mechanisms that facilitate and systematise inclusion speaks to institutional factors 
that limit participation in St. Lucia and also in other CARICOM countries. This is true 
even of the EIGs that wield more economic power -as producers of employment and 
earners of foreign exchange- than non-EIGs.  
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Malcolm Spence from the RNM sheds light on this institutional capacity problem 
linking it to population considerations when discussing the differences between CSO 
involvements across countries in the region. Spence stated that CSOs have been more 
engaged when it comes to trade “in the larger economies” (such as the cases of Trinidad 
and Tobago and Barbados103) due to the existence of   “more critical mass” and “more 
people who can spend the time and take the energy to pursue the issues with officials”. 
The difference in terms of CSO participation in shaping the character of trade negotiating 
agendas between larger, or more advanced economies in CARICOM (as via the Eastern 
Caribbean cases discussed in this thesis), and smaller or less advanced economies (i.e. 
this case study), is partly because of institutional factors. Although ideas and the 
ideational-context may prompt CSOs to want to mobilise more and although material 
interests being affected has led to mobilisation of EIGs on trade issues; engagement 
levels have been affected by institutional factors. This has meant that in St. Lucia, where 
EIGs tend to face similar institutional constraints to action as non-EIGs, there appears to 
be more cooperation between EIGs and non-EIGs to build capacity and engage with the 
government on trade issues. 
 
INCLUSION OF NON-EIGS AND COOPERATION WITH EIGS 
 
In St. Lucia an NWCT exists under the auspices of the CPDC. However, unlike 
the NWCT in Trinidad and Tobago this working committee comprises representatives 
from an array of private sector associations (e.g. the St. Lucia Vendors Association, the 
St. Lucia Industrial and Small Business Association and the St. Lucia Chamber of 
Commerce, Industry and Agriculture) in addition to labour unions and an array of non-
EIGs (e.g. CSOs representing women, the disabled, churches). Here, CSOs that one 
would expect to have very different interests and originating from both the EIG and non-
EIG categories attempt to work together “…to influence the negotiating positions of 
policy makers in trade negotiations” (unpublished document CPDC 2004). All of these 
associations feel the need to work together to pool capacity and engage with the St. 
Lucian government and the OECS machinery on trade issues. 
                                                 
103 Note that although Barbados is smaller in area than St. Lucia it has a larger population base. 
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 There are both non-EIGs and EIGs that are aware of the fact that there are trade 
issues under negotiation that will have effects on the economy and society in St. Lucia. 
Indeed, all CSO representatives interviewed or contacted had at least general policy 
proposals to offer or concerns they wished to express relating to trade negotiations. Some 
of the concerns raised related to fair trade, labour standards, gender issues, the need for 
special and differential treatment and the necessity of food security. Their attempts at 
activism are informed not only by the possession of material concerns about trade, but 
also by ideas about trade liberalisation and about CSO mobilisation. The idea that 
CSOs of all sorts are important stakeholders with vital contributions to make on trade 
negotiating agendas as required for the purposes of good governance and as needed in 
light of globalising and liberalising trends is paramount.  
 
This ideational factor is intangible and it is therefore difficult to measure the 
degree to which it is influential in informing activism on trade or other issues. However, 
one cannot help but pick up this sentiment in communication with CSO representatives. 
This is especially evident in their focus on educational work that attempts to engage 
wider CS on trade issues and is driven by the view that such popular involvement is vital.  
 
Protests were led by CAFRA St. Lucia and the CPDC on 30 September 2005 and   
included a wide array of CSOs from St. Lucia and across the region. These protests 
illustrated that ideas and material interests have been important in propelling CSO 
mobilisation. CSO representatives spoke of the impacts of globalisation and neo-liberal 
trade policies. They bore placards and spoke to what they saw as problematic about 
globalisation and trade liberalisation. These groups spoke to the necessity of governments 
engaging with CSOs and to the importance of CSO activism in efforts to impact on the 
content of trade agreements (Alfred 2005; Verwer 2005). The words of one protester sum 
up the point that CSO activism is not only linked to the material interests of those that 
trade but to wider society: 
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“It affects not only the farmers, everybody. The small man, the baby that 
just born, every one of us,” (Alice Franics quoted in Alfred 2005) 
 
St. Lucian non-EIGs that focus on trade were extremely difficult to interview or to 
correspond with. Their limited numbers in terms of staff and the concentration of work in 
the hands of a few individuals meant that little direct feedback was gained from these 
representatives. However, the few conversations that were possible, specifically with 
staff members at CAFRA St. Lucia, were useful for confirming the assertion that 
institutional capacity hinders the ability of non-EIGs to mobilise effectively and 
continually on trade matters. These discussions also revealed, as consistent with the 
messages at the demonstrations on 30 September 2005, that ideas about trade 
arrangements and societal inclusion are a critical forces motivating the joint activism of 
CSOs to address trade agreements. In particular, the sentiments represented in these 
protests exemplify efforts at bringing a more socially oriented focus into trade talks that 
have been dominated by a neo-liberal agenda and of efforts to enhance CSO consultation 
on issues that affect people’s lives. 
 
The lack of institutional capacity to effectively become involved in influencing 
trade negotiations has meant that activism on trade issues has not been continual despite 
desires to mobilise on trade and to impact on the agenda of the St. Lucian government. 
The NWCT in St. Lucia attempts to make up for this deficit.  
 
GOVERNMENT CAPACITY AND CSO INCLUSION 
 
Added to capacity constraints within CSOs are the lack of formalised mechanisms 
and practices on the side of the Government of St. Lucia. St. Lucia is an important case 
here because, unlike the more economically diversified economies or the more export 
oriented CARICOM countries (Jamaica, Barbados, the Bahamas, Trinidad and Tobago 
notably), capacity constrains not only CSO involvement on trade issues but also the 
government from actualising its desires to refashion the ways in which it operates. Such 
problems pertain to the countries with better ability and where there is more formalised 
consultation, but the capacity constraints are more marked in some of the LDCs such as 
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St. Lucia. Dr. J. Bernard Yankey of the OECS Secretariat made this institutional capacity 
problem clear in stating:  
 
Inadequate staffing in the Ministries of Trade and Industry and Ministries 
of Legal Affairs is a serious problem. Usually, one senior is responsible 
for managing and directing as well as attending technical meetings on 
behalf of the Ministry. Travel fatigue is obvious. The annual budgets of 
these ministries to support their work programmes are small and 
inadequate. (Yankey 1996: 4) 
 
This problem was also made clear in the case of St. Lucia via the government’s 
report in the “Trade Policy Review: St. Lucia”: “The Trade and Legal Division comprises 
two officers who are charged with the responsibility of undertaking all international trade 
matters” (WTO 2002: 68). Field visits to St. Lucia confirmed this assertion. Moreover, 
attempting to interview a second source at the Ministry or External Affairs in St. Lucia 
was impossible since one individual was largely responsible for trade matters. This 
situation further reinforces the point that the institutional capacity to broaden consultation 
on trade in a meaningful way is severely lacking in St. Lucia.  
 
In addition to staffing constraints within the trade ministry in St. Lucia there are 
also problems of coordination between ministries. For instance report by OECS Trade 
Policy Project (“Report on Organisation and Functionality Assessment”) stated that there 
is a: “need for co-ordination at the national level, that is, improved co-ordination among 
the lead Ministries and between public and private sector agencies” (cited in WTO 2002, 
68). This lack of coordination between various government ministries is significant as it 
can mean that trade negotiating positions that are put forth may be disjointed and 
disconnected from the needs of the stakeholders that do interact with ministries outside of 
the external affairs ministry. What is more, if there are not institutionalised mechanisms 
to coordinate consultation between the government’s ministries, it is difficult to fathom 
that there would be any with respect to consultation between the ministry that coordinates 
the trade negotiating agenda and CSOs that desire to be consulted.  
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This information illustrates just how difficult it is to assess consultative 
mechanisms on trade in St. Lucia. The same is true for other OECS countries that also 
lack the institutional wherewithal to deal with the issues up for negotiation in various 
negotiating theatres.  For example in the 2002 WTO Trade Policy Review for St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, this government notes that there were only eight staff in the 
country’s Trade Department and that as such “immediate and comprehensive responses 
from St. Vincent and the Grenadines in honouring its WTO commitments is severely 
constrained by inherent financial, technical, institutional and human limitations.” (WTO 
2002: 57). Therefore, institutional factors are important, not just on the side of various 
CSOs that have limited capacity to engage with government, but also on the part of the 
St. Lucian Government and other similarly strapped governments in the region that are 
struggling with institutional capacity problems. Indeed institutional problems limit all 
CARICOM countries and these shared institutional weaknesses underlie the region’s 
championing of special and differential treatment, other exceptions to trade rules, and 
advocating for recognition of the problems and hurdles faced by small island developing 
states (SIDS) within the multilateral trading system. 
 
CONCLUDING FOR ST. LUCIA 
 
 
The case of St. Lucia is illustrative of the diversity in terms of CSO activism and 
inclusion in consultation on trade negotiating matters in the CARICOM region. In this 
case there is no national consultative framework and only limited institutionalised 
consultation on trade negotiating issues. However, the informal or sporadic consultations 
that exist seem to focus on EIGs that one would expect to have material interests in trade 
liberalisation matters. This stated, since the consultation is not formalised, it is difficult to 
state this with great certainty. With respect to agricultural trade issues though, there is a 
history of approximately a decade of consultation with CSOs representing banana 
producers at the domestic level, within the Windward Island context and at the level of 
the OECS institution, particularly through the work of WINFA. WINFA is notable here 
because of the pooled capacity that has enabled this CSO to have voice and also because 
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the banana industry has been a vital organ of the Windward Island economies. This has 
earned WINFA and its member associations the ability to be heard and consulted by the 
St. Lucian government on trade issues, particularly in the sphere of agriculture. 
 
Also noteworthy in the case of St. Lucia is that both activism by CSOs and 
inclusion of CSOs in consultations on trade matters by government bodies are restricted 
by institutional deficits. The government faces resource constraints that limit the ability 
to negotiate effectively, far less to take the time and effort to incorporate actors beyond 
government officials. Additionally, even EIGs in this country are much more resource 
constrained than in the other two case studies observed. As a result, EIGs and non-EIGs 
tend to work together, as seen in the St. Lucian NWCT. It is evident that the institutional 
factor in St. Lucia cannot be underestimated in accounting for patterns of consultation on 
trade matters up for negotiation.  
 
Similarly, material interest-based factors cannot be underestimated here or in any 
evaluation of CSO activism and government inclusion of CSOs in consultations 
surrounding trade issues. Specifically, CSO activism on trade issues in St. Lucia began in 
noticeable ways in light of material changes to the country’s trading arrangements. CSOs 
mobilised and governments liaised with pertinent CSOs in efforts to deal with changes in 
the trade arena. Despite the efficacy of the material and institutional factors though, one 
should not forget ideational factors. Specifically one must remember the prevalence of 
the idea that it is important to include CSOs in consultation on trade matters (e.g. held by 
CSO within the NWCT, and alluded to in the official discourse of the government). One 
must also consider CSOs’ interest perceptions: they came to see themselves as having a 
right to mobilise in line with the trend towards good governance and as needing to 
mobilise on trade because of changes in the direction of liberalisation and globalisation. 
In other words, the ideational-material context of the time played into CSO perceptions 
of their interests and into CSO views about the importance of activism on trade matters. 
 
 So, although we see a case in which consultations are informal and in which the 
mechanisms to facilitate such on both the government side and on the side of CSOs are 
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limited, the ideational-material context of the time and institutional based factors are still 
important to consider in understanding this.  
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has highlighted that CARICOM countries have long been highly 
exposed to trade and consequently, changes in trade openness from the mid-1990s cannot 
(by themselves) account for CSO mobilisation on trade issues from this time. Changes in 
trade openness also cannot account for CSO consultative spaces being created by 
governments. Hence, one has to look at other factors and these factors include: 
ideational-material trends of the time; groups’ ideas and interests in light of these trends; 
and institutional facilitating factors.  Even EIG activism cannot be understood simply by 
looking at interests. Instead, one should look at how EIGs came to perceive their interests 
in the context of the time and at the institutional factors that have facilitated their 
activism and inclusion in consultations.  
 
The country case studies and the CARICOM case have shown that space has been 
opened for the inclusion of CSOs in consultations on policy issues from the mid/late-
1990s. This CSO inclusion became particularly marked by the first few years of the 21st 
century (the time of writing this thesis). CSOs within the CARICOM region have broken 
out of the mould of thought that privileges state-centric and technocratic decision-making 
to see themselves as important “stakeholders” on many issues. This view of CSO 
activism is in some respects akin to the Gramscian notion of forming counter-hegemonic 
blocs, but is based on interest perceptions and institutional considerations rather than 
class interests. Specifically, CSOs need to perceive themselves as having interests or 
needing to act on a policy area in order for activism to materialise and they also need to 
create the necessary institutional mechanisms to facilitate this. Important in this regard 
are ideas that inform views about what groups’ interests are, and these ideas are impacted 
on by the international ideational-material context of the time.  
 
The case studies have also shown that patterns of CSO mobilisation and inclusion 
have not been uniform, even though mobilisation and inclusion emerged from the 1990s 
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where none existed previously. For instance, EIGs and non-EIGs have been included 
differently and have mobilised to different extents in the region. EIGs (especially private 
sector EIGs) tend to be the focal groups included on trade matters and the best able to 
mobilise on trade issues. Material, ideational and institutional influences have impacted 
on differences between non-EIGs and EIG activism and insertion in trade matters at both 
the national and regional levels. However, the regional case shows that resource pooling 
has assisted non-EIGs in dealing with some of the hurdles that have limited their 
mobilisation and inclusion at domestic levels.  
 
Nonetheless, the status quo has not been reversed because CSOs have mobilised 
or because domestic/regional officials have begun to better incorporate CSOs in 
consultative mechanisms on trade. It appears that CSOs representing groups that were 
traditionally influential (prominent private sector and labour) remain so, a factor that in 
part is a reflection of the history of the region. One must, therefore, acknowledge that the 
legacy of the region has also impacted on the way in which CSOs have come to be 
consulted. Things also remain the same because government and regional officials remain 
the decision-makers in the final analysis. These officials sit at negotiating tables with 
other state officials and they do the negotiating. This is consistent with the history of 
CARICOM and its members and indeed with international politics, which tends to be 
based on the Westphalian system. 
 
Before considering the implications of these final thoughts it is perhaps good idea 
to look back at the road that this thesis took to get us here. 
 
THE FOUNDATIONS 
 
 
This study began by laying a foundation in explaining the terms Civil Society 
(CS) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs), by looking at their historical contexts and 
by exploring their contemporary meanings. Then CSOs were separated into two quite 
broad categories that, though somewhat artificial, were employed for the purpose of 
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clarity in looking at activism and inclusion in consultation and decision-making on 
economic issues of international scope. Dividing CSOs into EIGs and non-EIGs helped to 
illustrate the way in which literature on international economic issues views activism of 
EIGs as stemming from their direct interests being threatened and is, thus, grounded in 
material interest-based assumptions about collective action. However, with the growth in 
non-EIG activism on economic issues (such as on trade negotiating issues) it appears that 
something else must be driving CSO mobilisation as well as the inclusion of non-EIGs by 
government officials and officials in international organisations. This thesis therefore 
proceeded to argue that factors besides material ones must help one to account for this 
mobilisation. These factors are: temporally located changes/factors, ideas, interests and 
institutions.  
 
Temporal considerations are relevant since a movement towards CSO activism on 
international trade and economic issues both domestically and particularly internationally 
became more pronounced from the 1990s with liberalisation in economic affairs, with a 
shift towards emphasising “good governance” (with the rising proliferation and 
importance of NGOs), and with globalisation.  
 
Institutional factors can in some respects be linked to material factors that are 
important in interest-based assumptions: interest groups that are threatened and are able 
to overcome certain obstacles that hinder action and to create associations or coalitions to 
act in defence of the group’s direct interests. The creation of institutional frameworks is 
important. This institutional aspect can help one to understand non-EIG mobilisation on 
international economic issues as these associations need to gather the funding and human 
resource capacities to undertake specialised action on a range of issues. Thus, non-EIGs 
with what some may see as peripheral interests in international trade issues have come to 
mobilise on these issues. However, when one considers that material interests are created 
and that ideas are important in creating them, the interests of non-EIGs need not be seen 
as peripheral.  
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Some non-EIGs have come to perceive of their interests as directly affected by 
trade negotiations and necessitating activism. The same assertion, based on ideas 
constituting interests, can also be applied to EIG activism on trade in the region from the 
1990s to the present. Even EIGs have to first perceive themselves as needing to mobilise 
on trade issues in order to shape institutions, which in turn make this action possible. 
These perceptions of EIGs may be based on an instrumental logic, but still are at least 
partially ideational.  
 
Institutional considerations are also important on the side of official channels, be 
they international organisations, governments or other negotiating structures. The 
opening of space and channels for consultation or inclusion of CSOs is also important to 
look at. Mechanisms that have been created or facilitated by officials can allow for CSO 
consultation and by extension create the possibility for CSO views and concerns to be of 
impact on official actions.  
 
As already alluded to, in understanding activism and inclusion ideas-based factors 
are necessary to consider in addition. The impact of the idea that CSOs have roles to play 
in governance is important to note, both on the CSO and on the government/official side. 
Although EIGs may be viewed in some camps as the favoured CSOs with roles to play in 
international economic decision-making, non-EIGs have come to make room for 
themselves based on the idea that other CSOs have important roles to play in such 
spheres. Put differently, non-EIGs have framed their interests in trade based on ideas that 
link a wide array of concerns (development, gender, environment, etc.) to trade agendas. 
This is particularly the case in light of the various challenges and opportunities faced with 
liberalisation in the international economic arena and globalisation. The penetration of 
these ideas can be linked to CSO attempts at creating institutional strength to address 
trade issues.  
 
Hence, material, ideational and institutional factors all need to be considered in 
attempting to understand CSO mobilisation and consultation, instead of only looking at 
interest-based assumptions that see interests as pre-existing, pre-defined and triggering 
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automatic or near automatic reactions. These considerations are not just important for 
understanding the situation within CARICOM but because they highlight that actions are 
not determined by material changes alone. Ideas shape material changes; thus the focus 
throughout this thesis on the relevance of considering temporally located ideational-
material contexts.  
 
THE REGIONAL CONTEXT 
 
 
The thesis proceeded to focus on CARICOM, to highlight a history of CSO 
formation and activism from emancipation. This history illustrated that up until the 
1990s, CSO mobilisation on issues of international significance, be they economic or 
otherwise, was rather limited. Looking at domestic and regional settings, there appears to 
have been mobilisation of political associations, labour organisations, private sector 
associations and agricultural associations on various political and economic issues of 
domestic importance. The activism at the regional and domestic levels though tended to 
revolve around labour and private sector associations. This notwithstanding, most affairs 
in this region, even with the independence movements of the 1960s and 1970s, were 
relatively tightly controlled by bureaucrats and governments in power so that most CSO 
consultation was sporadic and limited.  
 
The case of trade agreements negotiated from the 1970s aptly shows this point. 
Trade agreements agreed from the 1970s through to the early 1990s were negotiated 
without CSO activism on such matters and without government/bureaucratic efforts to 
consult with CSOs. However, by the late 1990s we see a movement towards emphasising 
the need to consult with CSOs in the language of CARICOM officials and also in the 
practices of CARICOM with respect to trade and other issues. In tandem we also see the 
activism of CSOs, including non-EIGs. These changes in the 1990s can be linked to more 
than just material factors or material interests being affected. Institutional factors, 
ideational factors and material interests, all located in the time-specific ideational-
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material atmosphere help us to understand activism and movements towards CSO 
inclusion from the 1990s in CARICOM.  
 
THE CASES 
 
 
Moving beyond the historical and beyond theorising about the context in which 
CSO activism and inclusion of CSOs in the CARICOM region developed, the thesis 
looked at the CARICOM level and three CARICOM country case studies. It explored 
CSO activism and inclusion on shaping trade negotiating agendas and patterns of CSO 
inclusion and activism (EIGs and non-EIGs).  
 
In Barbados we saw the introduction of a social partnership that opened space for 
CSOs in consultations on issues of national salience in a tripartite framework (labour, 
private sector/employers, government). This occurred in the context of an SAP being 
created for the country. This consultative framework at the national level was slow to 
include other CSOs, but is important to consider when looking at consultations on trade 
because the partnership has been mainstreamed into government ministries. It is not 
coincidental that this is viewed as an example of “good governance” either. Consulting 
with social partners on trade though also coincided with the ideational-material trends of 
trade liberalisation and globalisation. In light of these changes, private sector EIGs have 
united in the country under the PSTT to create appropriate institutions (from the 1990s) 
through which they make inputs that government officials value. As for non-EIGs, these 
are not consulted via official channels but attempt to mobilise and to seek inclusion. The 
activism of non-EIGs, however, is limited mostly to awareness raising and emphasising 
discourses that focus on the importance of involving “ordinary” people. Important factors 
that constrict the mobilisation of non-EIGs at the domestic level are institutional, 
specifically staffing, funding and other resource constraints.  
 
In Trinidad and Tobago, again consultation on the trade agenda focuses on EIGs. 
Consultative mechanisms were created without the inclusion of other CSOs in mind, thus 
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not in any way mobilising non-EIGs. However, these consultations and their EIG focus 
has not been guided by any sort of social partnership created in the wake of SAPs. The 
ideational-material trends that led to domestic liberalisation and international trade 
liberalisation are more important to consider in understanding the activism of EIGs and 
government consultations with CSOs in the country. These trends were also important to 
non-EIGs in the country that have attempted to mobilise on trade issues via an NWCT 
and have also evoked the norm of “good governance” in efforts to be consulted on trade 
matters. Nevertheless, and as in Barbados, even though non-EIGs view themselves as 
having interests that need to be addressed in trade consultations, they for the most part 
lack the institutional capacity to do so and to be included to a degree similar to EIGs. 
 
In St. Lucia, we see a case that differs more than the previous two because 
capacity is limited all around. There are proposed consultative mechanisms and also 
government efforts to mobilise CSOs on trade issues. Where there have been 
consultations, private sector EIGs have been the focus, and the banana industry 
(particularly via WINFA) has had the ear of government too. Non-EIGs have mobilised 
on trade in St. Lucia via an NWCT, but in this case the NWCT encompasses and 
cooperates with private sector groups (e.g. the local Chamber of Commerce). Hence, the 
NWCT provides a platform for activism for a wide array of CSOs where little such exists 
otherwise. In addition to both EIGs and non-EIGs lacking the institutional wherewithal to 
mobilise meaningfully in St. Lucia, avenues for inclusion are limited due to deficits in 
institutional capacity on the side of the government ministry responsible for trade. 
Inclusion and activism in this country is therefore more limited than in the Barbados or 
Trinidad and Tobago. All the same, activism and the leaning towards inclusion became 
important in the 1990s in St. Lucia with the ideational-material shifts towards 
liberalisation, globalisation and good governance, just as was the case in the other case 
studies highlighted. 
 
This investigation into CSO activism and inclusion in discussions of trade 
negotiating strategies in three countries in the region has shown that understanding this is 
a complex issue and that there are no easily generalisable rules applicable to the region. 
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This is perhaps the case when looking at any set of diverse countries, whether or not they 
have similar historical backgrounds, political and economic ties or regional location. 
 
What the study has shown though, is that the trend towards or emphasis on 
including CSOs in such processes cannot be separated from occurrences at the 
international level, specifically the focus on internal economic and external trade 
liberalisation, linked globalisation and an emphasis on governance issues. These have 
percolated into the CARICOM context as the three case studies and the regional case 
indicate. Other examples of a CSO-consultative forum emerging in the region can be seen 
in the OECS sub-regional setting, and in national consultative mechanisms established  in 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Grenada and Jamaica, to name but a few examples 
(Renwick Rose interview: 10-22-05; Gleaner 2002a; Gleaner 2002b; BBC Monitoring 
2002). These movements towards including CSOs in consultations and towards enhanced 
CSO activism are time-specific actualisations.  
 
The country cases also showed that in looking at CSOs, EIGs (especially those 
representing private sector members) are better included and more pointedly active in 
shaping trade negotiation stances. However, EIG activism did not mean that non-EIGs 
were not attempting to insert themselves in shaping trade-negotiating agendas since there 
also exists a desire among other CSOs to become more involved in consultative processes 
based on the idea that they have important roles to play. Nevertheless, at the domestic 
level non-EIGs interested in activism on trade issues tend to lack the institutional 
capacity to do so meaningfully. 
 
The cases examined further showed that where institutionalised or formalised 
consultative mechanisms exist more inclusion of CSOs (even if these are mostly EIGs) 
exists. Institutions are thereby important. However the ability to engage CSOs or to 
implement such consultative frameworks has something to do with institutional capacity 
within states. Not only is capacity important in understanding the mobilisation of various 
CSOs around trade issues, it is also important in understanding state responsiveness to 
CSO concerns. 
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 At the regional level where CSOs unite though, non-EIGs that tend to have little 
voice at domestic levels have amplified their voices. These regional umbrella non-EIGs 
and non-EIG networks have helped to encourage mobilisation both at the region level and 
also within individual countries (for instance via NWCTs). The institutional capacity 
built by acting together regionally is important in allowing the non-EIGs that see 
themselves as having interests in trade issues to advance these. These non-EIGs have 
been included within CARICOM and the RNM, in addition to regional umbrella EIGs. 
Once more, the 1990s and the concomitant ideational-material trends of the time marked 
the turning point for CSOs activism and also for CARICOM in its overtures to CSO 
inclusion.  
 
In addition to ideational factors being important in comprehending attempts at 
CSO activism on trade issues, ideas are important in understanding government inclusion 
of some CSOs over others too.  Perceptions that partly stem from the interest based 
assumption about which CSOs would likely have stakes in matters up for trade 
negotiations (i.e. those that trade), colour patterns of inclusion by government officials. 
This has meant that non-EIGs are not primarily considered when it comes to 
consultations on trade isues, even if non-EIGs view themselves as “stakeholders” on 
trade matters and even where governments have expressed commitments to broad based 
consultation. It may be fair to say that some non-EIGs will never see themselves as 
having interests in engaging in issues relating to trade and that the government/official 
bias towards including EIGs rather than non-EIGs responds to this logic. However, this 
material-interest based logic is only relevant because it is based on premises that are seen 
as valid. Non-EIGs should not be excluded or discounted altogether based on these 
notions, since at least some important non-EIGs view themselves as having interests 
affected by trade negotiations.  
 
Moreover, with the acceptance of the idea that non-EIGs can contribute to the 
formulation and the legitimisation of trade stances to make them both more economically 
or more socially acceptable, officials in the region have come to consider non-EIGs 
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alongside EIGs in consultations. This non-EIG inclusion may illustrate the instrumental 
use of the idea of “good governance” since the aim is to utilise information, knowledge 
and ideas developed and put forth by a wide array of CSOs. Nonetheless, the idea that it 
is important to include a relatively broad range of CSOs for governance purposes is still 
an important guiding notion. At the CARICOM level, although one gets the sense there is 
still a focus more heavily on EIGs, the idea that a variety of CSOs should be conulted 
seems to have been recognised. This is reflected notably by the RNM with its role of 
helping to formulate the trade negotiating agenda. Moreover, there seems to be better 
coordination and activism of non-EIGs (and EIGs of less dominance) at the regional 
level, which facilitates the incorporation of these CSOs in addition to the more active 
EIGs that one would expect to mobilise. 
 
SO WHAT? 
 
 
So what are the implications of the findings presented here in terms of the study 
of International Relations and International Political Economy? 
 
Since CARICOM countries are relatively powerless on the international scale 
they are very susceptible to having their desires chipped away at in negotiations. They are 
neither politically significant in terms of world politics nor economically significant in 
terms of trade. Therefore, whether CSOs are consulted or whether or not EIGs are 
included at the expense of non-EIGs, the region’s negotiation proposals will likely be 
whittled away in the processes of inter-state bargaining. Therefore, in the grand scheme 
of things, it is likely that undertaking the task of consulting with CSOs when crafting 
negotiating positions may have very little impact on a negotiated agreement.  
 
This point aside though, listening to CSO inputs in trade negotiating proposals 
can be important in raising awareness of negotiators, or put differently, in decreasing the 
disconnect between government/regional officials and the societies they represent. What 
is more, there is more possibility that socially acceptable positions will be codified in 
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trade agreements negotiated between CARICOM and other countries if CSO views of all 
sorts are included in negotiating positions put forth by CARICOM than if such are 
excluded altogether. The potential to change things exists when processes change and 
processes have been changing in the CARICOM region, even if slowly and even if 
unevenly across the region. 
 
As an optimist, I hope that CSO consultation, attempts to consult with CSOs and 
efforts to institutionalise consultation are genuine at both the domestic and regional 
levels. On a similar note, I hope, and indeed the CSOs hope, that their research, advocacy 
and attempts at shaping trade agendas will be heeded at least to some degree. The 
inclusion of some CSOs (even if dominated by EIGs at present) in trade missions in an 
advisory capacity speaks to CSOs potentially having some impact in shaping negotiating 
agendas in the region. In the end though, the degree to which negotiations reflect the 
consultative processes that occur at the national and regional levels is uncertain and this 
is no doubt an area worthy of further research. However, continued processes of 
consultation and opening space for CSOs and CSO activism keep the hope that 
consultation will impact trade agendas alive. 
 
It is also worth noting here that the connections between domestic, regional and 
trans-national CSOs/networks (both of EIGs and non-EIGs) mean that CSO activism in 
the region is not restricted to CARICOM confines. Examples of the connections between 
CARICOM CSOs and those of transnational reach are not difficult to find. For instance 
CAFRA and the CGTN are part of the International Gender and Trade Network (IGTN). 
These two CARICOM CSOs also authorised and supported the “Joint Statement of 
NGOs and Social Movements” in which “International Civil Society Rejects WTO Doha 
Outcome and the WTO’s Manipulative Process” (TWN 2002). This thesis also 
highlighted the links between CSOs such as WINFA and the CPDC with the OXFAM 
group of NGOs. Another example of CARICOM CSO involvement with CSOs of wider 
remit is the membership of some Caribbean chambers of commerce (such as the Trinidad 
and Tobago Chamber of Commerce) in the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) 
via the ICC Caribbean, which makes policy recommendations on international trade (ICC 
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2005). These examples of the links between CSOs in CARICOM and those with 
transnational reach open further potentials for CSO activism in the region. Therefore, 
even if CSO concerns of are not incorporated in domestic/regional positions CSO 
involvement in the advocacy of larger associations or networks allows them the potential 
to be of some impact on trade matters through transnational CSO action.  
 
To close this thesis some final thoughts are worth consideration and emphasis. 
Activism by CSOs of all sorts and CSO engagement with domestic and regional officials 
are important actions because they open the potential for CSOs to impact on trade 
negotiating agendas. Specifically, CSO activism domestically, regionally and 
internationally and CSO inclusion in consultations with officials are actions that can alter 
the perceptions held by officials in the region and beyond. Moreover, CSO mobilisation 
on trade matters can function to raise awareness within the CARICOM societies about 
trade negotiations that will inevitably impact the region. Surely, this educational and 
empowering role is of great worth even if there is more inclusion of some CSO inputs 
than others, even if there is only limited inclusion of CSO positions, and even if 
negotiators in the end determine what is codified in trade agreements.  
 
The ability for CSO activism and inclusion to alter official views and to educate 
people are important potentials to ponder in the study of international relations and 
international political economy. This is particularly the case since the study of 
international political and economic affairs has tended to favour big issues and high 
politics, as reflected in the often biased focus on America, Europe or major issues or 
conflicts. However, at the “lower” levels, communities, societies, countries and regions 
of all sizes are connected to international affairs which, in my opinion, means that 
empowering people within CS to understand international occurrences and to choose 
whether or not to mobilise on international affairs is invaluable. 
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APPENDIX A - A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TERM CIVIL 
SOCIETY IN EUROPEAN THOUGHT 
 
The term CS has a long history in Western thought but has been adopted around 
the world over time. Although Western conceptions of CS are not universally accepted, 
these are most influential in the CARICOM region and in the mainstream of international 
politics. Therefore, this history of CS discourse in European thought is the focus here. 
 
The Emergence of “Civil Society” Language 
 
As stated in Chapter 1, Plato’s and then Aristotle’s “Politike Koinonia” was an early 
predecessor of “civil society, which delineated a political society or community 
comprising plural forms of association (koinonia) of civilised (not barbaric) individuals 
and groups acting in a unified way: a community of societies. Within this sort of society 
people had a single set of goals derived from common norms and values (ethos) (Cohen 
and Arato 1992: 84-85; Colás 2002: 27; Ehrenberg 1999: xi). In this conception there was 
no separation of society and Polis, instead the various forms of societal organisation 
(mainly communities) are united with government through morals and ethics.  
 
It is thought that the revival of monarchical autonomy and public law in Europe and 
the corresponding separation of prince and land/people contributed to the evolution of the 
CS-state divide (Cohen and Arato 1992: 86; Ehrenberg 1999: xii). Absolutism with its 
separation of princely authority from the many power holders in feudalism further 
reinforced the trend (Cohen and Arato 1992: 86). Thus, the separation of state and society 
in Western European history continued from the late Middle Ages through the 
Renaissance and into the eighteenth century and came to be reflected in a shift away from 
seeing CS as one with political rule. 
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Civil Society and Enlightenment Thought 
 
Political Philosophers recognised and contributed to this shift. Hobbes and Locke 
continued along the more traditional vein by identifying the modern state with 
civil/political society where society is fused with the state, but diverged in that this fusion 
did not occur naturally but via a social contract between state and society. Hobbes held 
that CS authorises the state to exercise power over society to decrease the risk of violence 
and chaos present in the natural condition (Cohen and Arato 1992: 87; Gauthier 1999: 59; 
Hampton 1999: 43). Locke viewed the contract as one in which political/civil society is 
distinguished from the state (“society” and “government”) but the two agree to act 
“…one political society” (Locke cited in Cohen and Arato1992: 88).  
 
In France, Montesquieu’s view was based on two social contracts that related to the 
Roman law distinctions between civil law and political law: laws relating to members of 
society and those dealing with the relationship between the governors and the governed. 
CS for Montesquieu was hierarchical (hierarchy based on merit rather than birth), which 
differs from Locke’s view of CS as comprising equals by virtue of natural law. (Cohen 
and Arato 1992: 88-89). 
  
These trends of thought show the philosophical shift towards viewing CS as 
separate from the state and also that, from a sociological vantage point, CS came to be 
seen as based on rational individual decisions rather than on the natural unity of 
interests, norms or values between non-barbaric society and state (Colás 2002: 31). Other 
views also flourished during the eighteenth century that linked CS to universal individual 
equality and freedom (not simply to contract). 
 
Rousseau for instance held the idea that CS was a social creation, brought about 
by the institution of private property (Colás 2002: 30, 31). Rousseau’s was a notion of 
natural law based on universal individuals as rights holders and agents of moral 
conscience. This equality based view, combined with anti-absolutism in Montesquieu and 
opposition to privilege in Voltaire and could be seen in societal opposition to the state 
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grew in French salons, coffeehouses and clubs. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
Citizen and the French revolution were also expressions of this philosophy which, along 
with various bills of rights in America, set societies based on equality between 
individusls in opposition to governments and constitutional states with ‘civil societies’ as 
the only sources of legitimacy (Cohen and Arato 1992: 89,92). In Germany Kant, Fichte 
and others also thought along similar lines of viewing CS as universal and based on the 
rule of law (Cohen and Arato 1992: 90-91).  
 
In Britain a slightly different basis for rights and the separation of CS and state 
emerged. Thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment added a new dimension: “civilised 
society” which came to mean the material and economic organisation of society 
separate from the state, rather than CS as strictly a form of political organisation (Cohen 
and Arato 1992: 90). For writers such as Adam Ferguson and Adam Smith CS was the 
emergence from “rude” to “polished” society through ownership of property, the division 
of labour and the exchange of commodities. CS was associated with a capitalist market 
society; it was a bourgeois thing created out of self-interest (Colás 2002: 37, 38; 
Ehrenberg 1999: xiii). This introduced the economy into CS (absent in the Aristotelian 
conception) and allowed for the reduction of CS to economic society (Cohen and Arato 
1992: 90) and also for Marxist disregard for CS as a thing of the bourgeoisie. 
 
 
CS Beyond the 18th Century 
 
Beyond the 18th century were thinkers such as Hegel, Marx, Parsons, Gramsci and 
Tocqueville who presented discussions on CS. Hegel asserted that CS is the dialectical 
struggle between ethical life (sittlichkeit) and non-ethical life (antisittlichkeit) that occurs 
in various forms of association. Associations are necessary because in modern society the 
family is no longer the primary source of moral life. (Cohen and Arato 1992: 92-113; 
Colás 2002: 39-41). CS is separate from the state but CS representatives have important 
roles to play in being governed. Therefore, CS is not sharply separated from the state; the 
duties of the state and those of CS tend to overlap so that the state conducts some private 
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functions and CS conducts some public ones (Cohen and Arato 1992: 92-113; Colás 
2002: 39-41). 
 
Marx stressed the atomistic and dehumanising aspects of CS and that social 
organisation reflects economic relations, rather than a system of needs as Hegel asserted. 
Thus, CS tends to be an expression of the dominant bourgeois class in capitalism. Here 
we see both a critique of Hegel and Marx’s affinity to 18th century Scottish 
Enlightenment thinkers (Colás 2002: 37). Gramsci innovated on the Marx’s view and 
also based his conception of CS on the social and political occurrences in Italy and the 
Soviet Union in the 1920s and 1930s. Gramsci saw CS institutions as separate from state 
and economy yet still linked to the state and the economy by indirectly maintaining the 
hegemony of the dominant class (i.e. CS was bourgeois). Inherent in his writing though is 
the possibility for disrupting the existing hegemony by creating counter-hegemonic 
historic blocks within CS (Cohen and Arato 1992: 144-152; Colás 2002: 42; Cox 1983), 
which is where Robert Cox picks up Gramsci’s work (Cox 1983).  
 
These views are consistent with earlier thought on CS in that they emphasise 
separation between CS and the state (enlightenment) and also show that the two are 
connected in important ways (Plato/Aristotlean view). On the other hand though, there 
were views that emphasised the importance of maintaining a separation between CS and 
the state, specifically pluralist views of CS. 
 
Parsons viewed CS as separate from the economy and state and expounded that 
CS integrates differing social systems through institutionalising values and norms (Cohen 
and Arato 1992:118-119). Parson’s relates his views to the USA, which he thought was 
the best illustration of the benefits of integrative effects of CS in conditions of plurality. 
Tocqueville also used the American example to discuss CS. In his view CSOs place 
limits on the state, thereby ensuring individual freedoms and limiting state meddling in 
economic and personal affairs within societies (Cohen and Arato 1992: 38, 117; 
Ehrenberg 1999: xv). These two linked pluralist conceptions of CS and CSOs continue to 
hold much sway in contemporary mainstream thinking the subject. 
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 These nineteenth and early twentieth century conceptions have in some respects 
emerged from those of the eighteenth century. They still place emphasis on the separation 
of state and society, with some conceptions seeing this separation as less distinct than 
others. These later views differ slightly from their Enlightenment predecessors in that 
they tend to place more importance on the role of associations within CS, as discussed in 
Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
 282
 APPENDIX B - A CLOSER LOOK AT TRADE DEPENDENCE 
ACROSS THE REGION 
 
Chapter 1 illustrated patterns of trade dependence for the MDCs in aggregate. 
However, in terms of trade dependence, the situation across the MDCs has not been 
uniform despite relatively heavy trade dependence in all countries. For instance, 
Suriname’s trade dependency dropped more drastically than any MDC, diving from over 
100% in the 1980s to a low of 42.6% in 1993 (but then increased to 77% in 2001). Also, 
Guyana’s trade dependence leaped substantially above that of all the MDCs from 1987 to 
2002. These variations are shown in the following chart: 
 
Figure 9: MDCs’ Trade Dependence: 1970-2002 
MDCs' Trade Dependence: 1970-2002
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Chapter 1 also presented composite figures on trade dependence for the region’s 
LDCs. The following chart maps these in disaggregated form. In looking at this chart we 
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see that, although levels of trade dependency varied widely amongst the LDCs, in all 
cases and in all years trade comprised more than 90% of GDP. This illustrates that the 
LDCs tend to be even more trade dependent than the region’s MDCs. 
 
Figure 10: LDCs’ Trade Dependence: 1977-2002 
LDCs' Trade Dependence: 1977-2002
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 APPENDIX C - A BRIEF CARICOM HISTORY 
 
The movement towards CARICOM is commonly seen as a descendent of the 
British West Indies Federation, established in 1958 in light of post- World War II 
pressure for political independence and British desire to loosen its colonial grip (Lewis 
1999: 2). The Federation created a Federal Government drawn from the ten member 
Caribbean islands. In its four-year life span, the Federation placed little emphasis on 
economic aspects of integration, as there were no economic changes in the region up until 
1962 when the Federation ended (although there were plans for a Customs Union) 
(CARICOM 1999).  
 
The Federation began to fizzle after Jamaica (the largest country and also a 
politically influential one in the group) decided, in a referendum on 21 September 1961, 
to discontinue membership. This action was replicated by Trinidad and Tobago in 1962. 
These two countries attained their independence in 1962 followed by other West Indian 
countries but the need for cooperation between the islands was still felt. Trinidad and 
Tobago proposed that a Caribbean Community should be formed upon its withdrawal 
from the Federation in 1962 (Lewis 1999: 15-18; CARICOM 1999),104 hence the view 
that “…its end [the British West Indies Federation] in many ways must be regarded as the 
real beginning of what is now the Caribbean Community” (CARICOM 1999).  
 
Between 1962 and 1965 the eight islands of the Eastern Caribbean discussed 
coming together to create their own federation, but in 1965 Barbados pulled out to pursue 
its own independence (gained the following year) and further discussions within the 
Eastern Caribbean were futile (Lewis 1999: 17-18). Additionally, the Premiers of British 
Guiana (Guyana) and Barbados proposed the creation of a Free Trade Area in the 
Caribbean in July 1965 (Payne 1989: 65).  
 
                                                 
104 According to Lewis, Trinidad and Tobago proposed two options: that the eight Eastern Caribbean 
islands of the Federation take on unitary statehood with Trinidad and Tobago; and that a Caribbean 
Economic Community be formed. 
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In December 1965, at Dickenson Bay in Antigua, the Heads of Government of 
British Guiana, Barbados and Antigua signed an agreement to set up a Caribbean Free 
Trade Association (CARIFTA) (Erisman 1992: 62; CARICOM 1998). However, there 
was little movement towards actually creating the free trade area, and it took private 
sector initiative of the Incorporated Caribbean Chambers of Industry and Commerce 
(ICCC) to give the necessary push.  
 
In August 1967 a meeting was held in Georgetown, Guyana to discuss the FTA 
issue. At this meeting, government officials, academics (those commissioned to 
undertake feasibility studies) and leading West Indian businessmen agreed that the 
outline for CARIFTA was to be based on the Antigua-Barbados-Guyana agreement, with 
further suggestions being accepted in October of that year at the annual Heads of 
Government meeting (Erisman 1992: 62-63). CARIFTA materialised on 1 May 1968 
when Antigua, Barbados, Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago became members, with 
Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla, St. Lucia and St. Vincent joining in July 
and Jamaica in August (CARICOM 1999).  CARIFTA was primarily an economic 
arrangement and thereby not as politically charged as the Federation that went before it: 
“The CARIFTA agreement was a standard free trade agreement.” (Bennett 1999: 135). 
 
Four years into the life of CARIFTA, at the seventh Heads of Government 
Conference in 1972, the leaders of member states decided to take their cooperative 
endeavours a step further due to dissatisfaction with trade creation for the LDCs within 
CARIFTA. For instance, MDCs accounted for 96% of intra-CARIFTA exports and 90% 
of imports in 1974 (Chernick 1978: 29-31). Added to these economic concerns, other 
political matters were important in coming to the decision to move beyond CARIFTA. 
Notably, countries saw the need for greater cooperation for broader development 
purposes and in approaches to international affairs (via foreign policy coordination) and 
incorporated these in plans to metamorphose CARIFTA (CARICOM 1998; Bennett 
1999: 133-135; Lewis 1999: 17-19). Thus, at the 1973 Conference in Georgetown, 
Guyana, the Georgetown Accord was signed, committing the four MDCs in the group to 
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establish CARICOM by 1 August 1973 and the other signatories to join by May 1974 
(CARICOM 1974: 1-3). 105
                                                 
105 "Progress in Caribbean Integration During 1973," (Georgetown, Guyana: Caribbean Community 
Secretariat, 1974).pp. 1-3. This report states that the Georgetown Accord committed Barbados, Guyana, 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago (the more developed countries in the grouping) to joining the 
Community on 1 August 1973 while the other less developed countries agreed to join in May 1974.  
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 APPENDIX D - INSTITUTIONAL FEATURES OF CARICOM 
 
 
The basic institutional structure of CARICOM was developed in its early days 
and resembled the intergovernmental structure of CARIFTA.  
 
Initially CARICOM was divided into the Community and the Common Market. 
The Community was charged with implementing political and functional aspects of 
coordination while the Common Market dealt with trade issues, namely the CET and Free 
Trade. The two main centres of authority were the Conference of Heads of Government 
Conference and the Common Market Council of Ministers. In addition to these a 
Secretariat established (out of the Commonwealth Caribbean Secretariat of CARIFTA) to 
coordinate and facilitate CARICOM activities (Erisman: 70-72; Chernick: 11; Axline 78-
79). 
 
Since the 1990s the institutional makeup of CARICOM has changed somewhat; there 
is no longer the somewhat artificial division between the Community and the Common 
Market. The two main “organs” in CARICOM responsible for making decisions remain 
the same though: 
 
1. The Heads of Government Conference in which each country has one vote and 
binding resolutions can only be made with unanimity. This body holds ultimate 
decision-making power and has the mandate for concluding treaties and 
overseeing relations with non-member states on behalf of CARICOM.  
 
2. The Council of Ministers (previously Common Market Council of Ministers) 
comprises government representatives and meets throughout the year; usually 
convening prior to the HGC to work out the details of the issues to be considered 
by their heads of government. Both the HGC and the Council, as governmental 
representatives, may focus on national rather than regional interests if they wish.  
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 Apart from these main organs there are now four others that did not exist at the time 
CARICOM was created: 
 
• The Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP) 
• The Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED) 
• The Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR) 
• The Council for Human and Social Development (COHSOD) (CARICOM 2005a) 
 
There are now also three assisting “bodies” dealing with:  
• The Committee for Legal Affairs,  
• The Budget Committee 
• The Committee of Central Bank Governors (CARICOM 2005a) 
 
The CARICOM Secretariat, which is independent of national officials and is not a 
decision-making organ, remains part of CARICOM. It now includes various specialised 
committees that deal with social and economic issues of importance. 
 
In addition to these organs, bodies and the Secretariat there are CARICOM 
institutions such as the University of the West Indies and the Caribbean Development 
Bank that have been formed over the years, some prior to and some during the life span 
of CARICOM, with the Caribbean Court of Justice (established in 2005) being the most 
recent. In 1997 CARICOM leaders created a body floating somewhere between the 
Secretariat, Community institutions and the Council of Ministers in the Caribbean 
Regional Negotiating Machinery (RNM), which was to develop and execute a negotiating 
strategy for trade issues in the region. 
 
Nevertheless, the basic intergovernmental plus Secretariat structure adopted from 
CARIFTA remains but has expanded and evolved, as has CARICOM. The main point to 
 289
note though is that the institutional structure of the group continued to reflect the need for 
decision making to be located in national governments. Autonomy was not ceded to any 
overarching body that would coordinate economic policies within the region or towards 
the outside world.  
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 APPENDIX E - DOCUMENTS ON THE ST. LUCIA NWCT 
 
The following 2 pages are copies of documents made available to the author by the 
CPDC.
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St. Lucia
NATIONAL WORKING COMMITTEE ON TRADE (NWCT) 
Membership List and Mission Statement; 
MISSION STATEMENT 
The St. Lucia National Working Committee on Trade (NWCT) will work closely with civil society 
organizations to mobilize and build national level capacity of civil society to influence the negotiating 
positions of policy makers in trade negotiations. 
The NWCT will also work closely with the Caribbean Policy Development Centre (CPDC), to ensure 
that the collective views of the majority of St. Lucians are taken into consideration for discussions 
and interventions at the regional and international level. 
MEMBERSHIP (Representatives of Civil Society Organizations/groups) 
Flavia Cherry         - CAFRA St. Lucia (Chairman) 
Michael McCombie     - Trade Union Representative (Deputy Chairman) 
(St. Lucia Seamen Waterfront and General Workers Union, Sans Soucis) 
Edward Harris  - St. Lucia Industrial & Small Business Association (P.R.O.) 
 
Yhasmine Remy         - CAFRA St. Lucia (Administrative Officer) 
 
Deanne Deterville       - National Commission on Human Rights 
 
Juliette Simon            - St. Lucia Vendors Association 
- Gospel Hall (church) & Father Michael Francis (Catholic) 
- Truth for the Final Generation (church) 
- National Council for the Disabled 
- St. Lucia National Organization of Women 
- Private Sector (Society of Qty. Surveyors & Horticultural 
Society) 
 
- President, St. Lucia Chamber of Commerce 
- President, National Youth Council 
- CAFRA Junior League 
- Methodist Women's League 
- Rastafarian Representative 
- Civil Society Council 
 
- Mirror Newspaper*
NATIONAL LEAD COORDINATING ORGANIZATION: CAFRA St. Lucia Chapter 
Rawson Antoine 
Francis Flavius 
Jeff  Elva 
Alicia Baptiste 
Teddy Theobalds 
Guy Mayers 
Silas Wilson 
Melissa Gilbert 
Clarina Horscroft 
Ipa IsaacLancia 
Isidore 
Guy Ellis 
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NATIONAL WORKING COMMITTEE ON TRADE (NWCT) 
WORK PLAN - up to June 30th 2004 
 
DATE ACTIVITY TIME VENUE 
ThurFebl2 Membership Meeting 6:30pm ADDITIONS office
ThurFebl9 Membership Training Workshop (Refreshments 3:30-7pm Bay Gardens Inn
Fri Feb 20 Networking Meeting & Cocktails 7:00pm Venue to be 
Thur Feb 28 Membership Meeting 5:00pm ADDITIONS office
Sat. March 6 National Consultation (TRADE) - RE: Cotonou. 10:15- Cultural Dev. 
WedMarch 17 Lecture - (FTAA & Cotonou Agreements) 6:00pm Central Library
Fri March 19 Workshop for School Principals l:30pm RLREPS Training 
Sat. March 27 Town Hall Meeting - Laborie Community Center 7:00pm Community Center
Sun March 28 Communty Discussion about Trade 3:30pm Choiseui Sec. School
Sat. April 3 Train the Trainers Workshop for Students ^ 3:00pm Central Library
Thur Apr 8 Youth Trade Lecture - Anse-La-Raye Town Hall 5:30pm Anse-La-Raye TH
ThurAprl5 Trade Workshop for Students - SALCC 9:00am SALCC - Mome 
Thur April 15 Membership Meeting. 6:00pm Central Library
April 18-23 School Trade Lectures Flexitime Five Secondary 
Fri Apr 23 Trade Workshop 9:30-12 Bay Gardens hm
Thur Apr 29 General Meeting 5:30pm Venja Cor. OfficeG-
Thur May 6 Membership Training Session and Meeting 6:00pm Bay Gardens Inn
Thur May 20 Consultative Meeting with Government Trade 3:30pm Ministry of Trade
Mon May 24 Workshop for Small Business Entrepreneurs 2-6pm Auberge Seraphin
Sat June 5 General Membership Meeting 5:30pm ADDITIONS office
Sat Jun 12 Workshop for Persons with Disabilities 10:30-4 Venue to be 
Thur June 17 Town Hall Meeting - Gros-Islet Community 6:00pm Gros-Islet 
Sun June 20 Community Training Session - Multi-Purpose 4:30pm Babonneau 
Sat Jul 3 General Meeting - Programme Review 6:00pm ADDITIONS office
 
 
Trade Lecture for Vendors Association - to be
confirmed 
  
 
 Trade Lecture for The Elderly - to be confirmed  
 Membership Social - To be confirmed   
 APPENDIX F - LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 
 
• Barbados 
 
Natalie De Caires  
Private Sector Trade Team 
 
Nalita Gajahdar 
National Organisation of Women 
 
Non-Attributable 
Barbados Workers’ Union  
 
Ruall Harris 
Barbados Chamber of Industry and Commerce 
 
Roosevelt King 
Barbados Association of Non-Governmental Organisations 
 
Dr. Lawson Nurse,  
Private Sector Trade Team 
 
James Paul 
Barbados Agricultural Society 
 
Non-Attributable 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade  
 
Non-Attributable 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade  
 
 
• St. Lucia 
 
Non-Attributable  
Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action – St. Lucia 
 
Joseph Goddard 
National Workers’ Union  
 
Non-Attributable and off the record 
St. Lucia Industrial and Small Business Association 
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Brian Louisy 
St. Lucia Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture 
 
Michael Severin 
St. Lucia Agriculturalists’ Association 
 
Andrina Simon  
St. Lucia Hotel and Tourism Association 
 
Non-Attributable  
St. Lucia Ministry of External Affairs  
 
• Trinidad and Tobago 
 
Anthony Guissepi 
Trinidad and Tobago Manufacturers’ Association 
 
Vincent Cabrera 
National Trade Union Centre 
 
Lawrence Placide 
Trinidad and Tobago Chamber of Commerce and Industry, International Trade 
Negotiations Unit 
 
Hazel Brown 
Network of NGOs of Trinidad and Tobago for the Advancement of Women 
 
David Abdulluh 
Federation of Free Trade Unions 
 
Non-Attributable 
Employer’s Consultative Association 
 
Non-Attributable (Correspondence) 
Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of Trade and Industry  
 
• Region Level Officials and CSO Umbrella Organisations 
 
George De Peana 
Caribbean Congress of Labour 
 
Non-attributable 
Caribbean Policy Development Centre (CPDC) 
 
Shantal Munro-Knight 
Caribbean Policy Development Centre 
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Karen Ford-Warner 
Caribbean Tourism Organisation 
 
Margaret Gill 
Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action (CAFRA) 
 
Nelcia Robinson 
Caribbean Association for Feminist Research and Action (CAFRA) 
 
Gerard Grenado 
Caribbean Conference of Churches 
 
Gisele Mark 
Caribbean Association of Industry and Commerce 
 
Non-Attributable 
Caribbean Export Development Agency  
 
Renwick Rose  
Windward Islands Farmers’ Association 
 
Malcolm Spence 
Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery 
 
Zakiya Uzoma-Waddada 
Caribbean Network for Integrated Rural Development 
 
Non-Attributable  
UNDP Barbados and the OECS 
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